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Abstract 
 
 
The role of human factors in healthcare was introduced into the mainstream medical literature 
following two important seminal reports, To E  i  H man  from the United States and An 
Organisation with A Memo  from the United Kingdom. This subsequently led to work 
conducted by the University of Aberdeen into defining the role of non-technical skills in the 
Operating Theatre for Anaesthetists, Surgeons and Scrub Practitioners. 
 
This thesis is an overview of work that I have undertaken in both Military and Civilian settings 
exploring and defining the importance of human factors in the management of complex trauma 
and emergency anaesthesia. I have undertaken original research investigating the barriers 
that exist to challenging seniors and have created guidelines for the management of non-
iatrogenic airway injuries. This thesis also discusses a novel project that I have been involved 
in, the development of the Trauma WHO , which is a simple checklist designed to improve 
patient safety during their pathway in complex trauma. I will describe how this was developed, 
tested in a field hospital in Afghanistan and is now embedded into military practice and some 
civilian centres.  
 
This thesis also describes further knowledge assimilation in the form of two published peer 
reviewed systematic reviews exploring the importance of human factors in the emergency 
department and operating theatre and the management of non-iatrogenic trauma to the 
airway. Additionally, I have selected five papers for inclusion that demonstrate a translation of 
knowledge into different trauma arenas where the importance of human factors is essential 
and now embedded. 
 
 9 
The implications of this thesis are that advances in human factors in complex trauma and 
emergency anaesthesia that were originally developed in the military setting have now been 
refined and adopted into certain areas of the NHS. The impact of these advances in guidelines 
for the management of penetrating airway injuries, streamlining communication and flattening 
hierarchies by awareness of barriers to challenge have been recently witnessed in the expert 
and successful management of seriously injured patients. Further work to promote these 
advances is still required to encourage further adoption in other major trauma centres in 
England.   
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Aims of the Thesis  
 
 
Trauma is no  firml  at the forefront of NHS England s clinical agenda ith an increasing rise 
in penetrating injuries in London (1) and a recently reported reduction in mortality following the 
reorganization of trauma services since 2012 (2). This favourable outlook has not always been 
the case as described in a seminal report published by the National Confidential Enquiry into 
Patient Outcome and Death in 2007 which was heavily critical of the provision for patients 
involved in complex trauma (3). Lessons learnt from two recent conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (4,5) have slowly been embedded into the National Health Service with the 
creation of Regional Major Trauma Centers supported by local Trauma Units (6) and an 
impressive collection of training packages (7,8). 
 
 
I have been a Medical Officer in the Royal Navy for over 20 years (1998-2018) and deployed 
to Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the Trauma Team in the Defence Medical Services Role 3 
Hospitals. I have also developed the trauma team and was responsible for Anaesthesia 
Education in the Defence Medical Services producing a continuous professional development 
matrix (9) and Higher Military Module (10), both approved by the Royal College of 
Anaesthetists. In addition to the development of new surgical (11) and anaesthetist techniques 
(4) for managing those involved in complex trauma, success was also attributed to the practice 
of Human Factors in the trauma team in rehearsal prior to deployment (12,13) and the culture 
of the trauma team whilst on deployment (14,15) leading to a year on year improvement in 
survival (5) (Figure 1.1). 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that I have a systematic acquisition and understanding 
of a substantial body of knowledge and am at the forefront of an area of professional practice; 
human factors in complex trauma. This thesis will also describe and demonstrate some of the 
work that I have undertaken to generate knowledge through original research, synthesis of 
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knowledge through systematic review and finally the translation of knowledge through the 
production of expert peer-reviewed articles. The manuscripts I have selected will concentrate 
on the implementation and use of Human Factors in the Management of Complex Trauma 
and Emergency Anaesthesia in both military and civilian settings.  
 
 
My role at Liverpool University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust is as the Director of Medical 
Education and the Lead for Simulation. In coordinating education in the regional Major Trauma 
Centre, I am required to facilitate training for those doctors, nurses and other members of the 
multi-disciplinary team who rotate through the hospital to ensure they are prepared to deal 
with complex trauma. Much of the work described in this thesis forms part of this training which 
predominately occurs using high fidelity simulation (8). Many of the concepts that are 
discussed are based on tacit knowledge that has been developed over several years of 
practice by a group of consultant anaesthetists in the Defence Medical Services who have 
embedded lessons learnt from recent conflicts into the National Health Service. 
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Figure 1.1  Plot of predicted probability of survival by NISS value for each year. Shaded 
regions indicate the 95% CIs for the predicted values obtained from the 
logistic regression model. J Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2015;78: 1014-1020 
 
The thesis is divided into four sections. The first section is an introduction to human factors 
and non-technical skills. This is be followed by sections on original research, systematic 
review and finally on knowledge translation and I will discuss the importance of human factors 
in the management of complex trauma and emergency Anaesthesia in each section. The 
original research presented develops the evidence base in the field of human factors and non-
technical skills will concentrate of the following peer reviewed publications: 
 
 
1. Speak Up! Barriers to Challenging Erroneous Decisions of Seniors in Anaesthesia Beament 
T, Mercer SJ Anaesthesia 2016; 71: 1332 1340  
2. Human Factors in Decision Making in Major Trauma in Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. Arul S, Pugh 
H, Mercer SJ, Midwinter M Annals of The Royal College of Surgeons of England 2015; 97: 262-
268  
3. Creating Airway Management Guidelines for Casualties with Penetrating Airway Injuries Mercer 
SJ, Lewis SE, Wilson SJ, Groom P, Mahoney PF. Journal of the Royal Army Medical 
Corps 2010; 156: S357-362  
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The systematic review section will consolidate the evidence base in human factors and 
emergency anaesthesia and the management of non-iatrogenic airway injury and will 
concentrate on the following peer reviewed publications: 
 
 
4. Human Factors in Preventing Complications in Anaesthesia Jones CP, Fawker-Corbett J, Groom 
P, Morton B, Lister C, Mercer SJ. Anaesthesia 2018; 73(S1): 12-24  
5. A Systematic Review of The Anaesthetic Management of Non-Iatrogenic Acute Adult Airway 
Trauma. Mercer SJ, Jones CP, Bridge M, Clitheroe E, Morton B, Groom P British Journal of 
Anaesthesia 2016: 117 (S1): i49 i59 
 
 
 
Finally, expert knowledge translation and synthesis will be considered in the following peer-
reviewed published articles to enable communication of the evidence base to members of the 
multi-disciplinary trauma team working in the Defence Medical Services and National Health 
Service. These papers have been selected to describe a flavour of human factors in complex 
trauma in several different environments from the mature field hospital to a remote deployed 
unit at sea. 
 
 
6. Performance Improvement Through Best Practice Team Management  Human Factors in 
Complex Trauma Mercer SJ, Arul S, Pugh H, Midwinter MJ Journal of the Royal Army Medical 
Corps 2014; 160: 105-108  
7. Human Factors in Trauma Mercer SJ, Tarmey N, Park C BJA Education 2015; 15: 231-236  
8. Human Factors on Contingency Operations Mercer SJ, Khan M, Scott T, Matthews J, Henning D, 
Stapley S Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2017: 163; 78-83  
9. Followership in Complex Trauma Fadden S, Mercer SJ. Trauma. 2019; 21: 6-13  
10. Human Factors in Complex Airway Gleeson S, Groom P, Mercer SJ British Journal of 
Anaesthesia Education 2016; 16: 191-197 
  
 
 
Throughout this thesis, the Vancouver referencing system will be utilised in preference to 
MMU Harvard; given that it is this referencing system that is used predominantly in the medical 
literature and is in keeping with the publications included. 
 
  
 14 
Section 1  
Introduction to Human 
Factors and Non-Technical 
Skills 
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This introduction section sets out to define several of the key concepts that will be discussed 
later in the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
1.1 What are Human Factors? 
 
 
There are several recognized definitions of Human Factors in the Medical Literature. These 
are listed at the start of this thesis to allow further explanation in subsequent chapters. One of 
the leading medical organizations concerning human factors is the Clinical Human Factors 
Group (https://chfg.org) founded by Martin Bromley OBE, defining Human Factors as 
enhancing clinical performance through an understanding of the effects of teamwork, tasks, 
equipment, workspace, culture and organisation on human behaviour and abilities and 
application of that knowledge in clinical settings  (16). Work undertaken by Aberdeen 
University has led to another definition; he cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that 
com lemen  echnical kill , and con ib e o afe and efficien  a k e fo mance  (17). A 
more simplistic definition has recently been described by Moneypenny in the British Journal 
of Anaesthesia as the science of improving human performance and well-being, by examining 
all the effectors of human performance (18). 
 
Ergonomics concentrates on designing the workplace and the equipment in it, taking into 
account the limitations of human performance. The Health and Safety Executive have 
suggested the definition he en i onmen al, o gani a ional and job fac o , and h man and 
individual characteristics which influence behaviour at work in a way which can affect health 
and afe  (19). These definitions will be expanded on in terms of the complex trauma team 
during the thesis. 
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1.2 History and evolution of Human Factors in Health Care 
 
 
Many of the principles of Human Factors have been adopted from earlier work by the airline 
industry, nuclear power stations, the railway and recently formula one motor racing. The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) described that 70% of errors in its 
organisation were due to specific Human Factors such as failed interpersonal communication, 
decision-making, and leadership (20). The development of the black bo  (flight data recording 
system) permitted the analysis of key conversations on the flight deck during critical incidents 
and subsequently detailed examination of the behaviours of the flight crew (21).  
 
Human Factors in Healthcare were really brought to the forefront by the now seminal report 
‘To Err is Human  by the Institute of Medicine in the United States (22). This report claimed 
that up to 98,000 patients died annually due to mistakes in the healthcare system. This report 
was preceded by UK lead publication An O gani a ion Wi h A Memo  (23) written by Sir 
Liam Donaldson the then Chief Medical Officer for England who commented that To err is 
h man, o co e   i  nfo gi able, and o fail o lea n i  ine c able  (24). Recently, The 
Fourth National Audit Project of the Royal College of Anaesthetists (NAP4) examined major 
complications in airway management and concluded that poor human factors could have 
contributed to 40% of the cases reported. In 25% of these cases, inadequate human factors 
were felt to be a major contributor to a poor outcome (25).  
 
Human Factors were further highlighted by a series of high-profile medical errors, many 
reported in the press and medical literature. Examples of these include the teenager Wayne 
Jowett who was in remission from leukaemia but died when he was administered vincristine 
intrathecally (drug administration into the cerebrospinal fluid) instead of the correct 
intravenous route (26). The Luer-lock connection on the syringe had enabled the syringe with 
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the vincristine in it to be attached to the spinal needle and removed the final safeguard thus 
creating a serious latent error. Another patient, Gordon Reeves had the wrong kidney removed 
and subsequently died (27). A review of the incident indicated that a medical student present 
actually knew that the wrong side was being operated on but was ignored by senior 
colleagues. In addition to this an x-ray in the operating theatre was displayed the wrong way 
around, also confusing the surgeons and setting up a catalogue of errors. Clinicians in the 
anaesthetic community are very familiar now with the tragic death of Elaine Bromley(28) who 
died following a catastrophic breakdown of many Human Factors in the anaesthetic room. In 
this case a national guideline on the management of unanticipated difficult intubation (29) was 
not followed and instead of an emergency surgical airway being performed, the anaesthetists 
persisted with continued attempts at intubation and the patient remained in a hypoxic state for 
up to 20 minutes.  
 
In 2013, A Concordat from the National Quality Board was published entitled Human Factors 
in Healthcare  and signed by several national organisations such as NHS England and the 
General Medical Council to wider promote human factors into clinical practice (30). It is hoped 
that this document and the renewed political interest resulting from key reports following recent 
scandals such as in Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (31) will encourage the 
implementation of Human Factors into mainstream clinical practice. 
 
1.3 Non-Technical Skills 
 
Non-technical skills are also described as crew resource management  (airline industry), 
crisis resource management  (by Gaba (32)) and team resource management . Much of the 
work in this field is described by Rall & Gaba (33) (Table 1.1) and Fletcher and Colleagues in 
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the Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills Framework (34) (Table 1.2). Schemes have also been 
developed for Surgeons (35) and Operating Theatre Scrub Nurses (36). Carthey reported that 
high performing surgeons demonstrated non-technical skills as an integral part of their surgical 
expertise, and these attributes were thought to play an equally significant role as technical 
skills (37). In a paper published by the Health Foundation, Professor Rhona Flin described 
that the following non-technical skills are typically required in clinical settings: situational 
awareness, decision making and problem solving, leadership, teamwork, communication and 
managing stress and fatigue. Human factors are also very important in the critical care 
environment, where patients have life-threatening illness, diagnostic uncertainties, and the 
potential for rapidly changing medical conditions, and are managed along variable treatment 
pathways (38). Patient care is carried out over a 24-hour period involving multiple team 
transitions and moves to different areas of the hospital, which can result in lapses and 
discontinuities in communication (38). The importance of non-technical skills in the 
management of patients with complex trauma will be discussed during this thesis. 
 
 
Table 1.1 Crew Resource Management Key Principles taken from reference (33). Know 
the environment.  
 
 
 Anticipate and plan.  
 Call for help early.  
 Exercise leadership and followership.  
 Distribute the workload.  
 Mobilize all available resources.  
 Communicate effectively.  
 Use all available information.  
 Prevent and manage fixation errors.  
 Cross (double) check.  
 Use cognitive aids.  
 Re-evaluate repeatedly.  
 Use good teamwork.  
 Allocate attention wisely.  
 Set priorities dynamically.  
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Table 1.2  The Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills Framework consists of four 
categories all containing specific elements (34) 
 
Task management 
 Planning and preparing  
 Prioritising 
 Providing and maintaining standards  
 Identifying and utilising resources  
 
Team working 
 Coordinating activities with team members 
 Exchanging information. 
 Using authority and assertiveness 
 Assessing capabilities 
 
Situation awareness 
 Gathering Information  
 Recognising and understanding  
 Anticipating and planning 
 
Decision making 
 Identifying options  
 Balancing risks and selecting options  
 Re-evaluating  
 
 
1.3.1. Teamwork 
 
I have listed teamwork as the first of the non-technical skills as this thesis will concentrate on 
the complex trauma team and how they work together to assess and manage a severely 
injured patient. A Team is defined as a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact 
dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively towards a common and valued goal, who have 
each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and who have a limited life-span 
membership  (39). Another definition being a small number of people with complementary 
skills who are committed to a common purpose, performance goals, and approach for which 
they hold themselves mutually accountable  (40). The complex trauma team and its function 
are described later in the thesis in section 1.4.1. 
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1.3.2. Communication 
Communication is of particular importance in healthcare. A study by Gawande and colleagues 
found poor communication to be a causal factor in 43% of errors reported by surgeons at three 
American teaching hospitals (41). Communication is the ability to impart critical information 
without the potential for misinterpretation or misunderstanding, irrespective of the situation or 
the professional diversity of the surrounding team. During this thesis I will describe a 
communication tool to use in complex trauma that was devised, tested and published in the 
medical literature (42). 
 
1.3.3. Leadership 
One definition of a leader is a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought and the 
behaviour of others  (17). This thesis will focus on the team leader in the complex trauma team 
and describe original research that I performed to investigate what drives junior members of 
the team to challenge (or not challenge) the leader. I will describe the role of the Trauma Team 
Leader (TTL) who has been described to have a job similar to that of the conductor of an 
orchestra (15) with multiple team members all working on a severely injured patient and 
numerous others supporting the resuscitation.  The process of leading the trauma team has 
also been described as driving the ship  but essentiall  means that the role of the TTL is 
hand  off  maintaining a complete overview of what could potentially be a rapidly changing 
situation. Figure 1.2 is a photograph taken of the complex trauma team in Afghanistan and 
Figure 1.3 is a recreation of the trauma team using models. As can be seen in both, the trauma 
team leader maintains this hands off  stance b  standing at the end of the bed enabling 
communication with the whole team and visualisations of all aspects of the trauma call as it 
unfolds. During the management of a patient with an anticipated difficult airway, the team 
leader has the following roles; formulating the airway management plan(s) and communicating 
this to the team, so they are all on he ame age , allocating roles within the team and 
identifying any limitations in skill mix. The team leader must also maintain situation awareness 
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and not becoming task fixated while for example the airway is being secured and defining the 
trigger points for moving from Plan A to B (and subsequent plans) if required.  
 
Figure 1.2.  Position of the Trauma Team Leader during a Trauma Call. (Photo courtesy 
of Dr Mark de Rond) 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Position of the Trauma Team Leader during a Trauma Call to maintain 
Situational Awareness.  
  
 22 
1.3.4 Situation Awareness 
This concept describes the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the 
nea  f e  (43). There are three stages that have been described; gathering information, 
interpreting the information and anticipating future states. These stages are described in terms 
of the trauma team in Figure 1.4 Strategies to maintain situation awareness have been 
suggested, including routines for scanning vital signs and instrument functions (44). 
 
 
1.3.5 Followership 
 
There are several definitions of the term followership; the active engagement of followers in 
helping the group achieve its goals  (45), people having a shared vision of a common goal or 
future state, and what needs to be done to reach it  (46) and the ability to effectively follow 
the directives and support the efforts of a leader to maximi e a c ed o gani a ion  (47). 
A follower is also defined as anyone not acting in the position of leader and responding to 
organizational actions; a person who is active rather than passive (48). During this thesis I will 
describe the importance of followership in the complex trauma team with reference to a 
particular article (included as Paper 9) that I have published in Trauma (49). 
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Figure 1.4.  The Three Stages of Situational Awareness in a Trauma Setting 
 
 
 
 
1.4 History and Evolution of Trauma Care in England since 2009 
Trauma remains a leading cause of death worldwide (50) and is the most frequent cause of 
death in 15-44 year olds in England and Wales (51) (Figure 1.5). Each year, more than 20,000 
patients sustain major trauma, defined by an Injury Severity Score (ISS) (52) of >15 (53)), of 
which nearly 5000 will suffer life-threatening haemorrhage and an estimated 1,550 will die as 
a result of bleeding (54). The most common preventable cause of death being from 
exsanguination due to uncontrollable haemorrhage (55). In November 2007 the National 
Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death published a report which concluded that 
almost 60% of the patients reviewed received a standard of care that was less than good 
practice (3). This was the first report that really highlighted the problems with the trauma 
system in England and was then followed in 2010 by a report from the National Audit Office. 
This estimated that the annual lost economic output as a result of major trauma was between 
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£3.3 billion and £3.7 billion (56). The economic burden to the population is considered in this 
context as if a patient with complex injuries receives timely and optimal care initially by an 
expert team and then undergoes successful rehabilitation then they could potentially return to 
work and continue to contribute financially to society. Should they remain unable to work due 
to the burden of their injuries then the cost of their lifelong care would need to be met by the 
taxpayer.  
 
These reports paved the way for the reorganisation of the trauma services in England and the 
creation of Regional Major Trauma Centres (57). This coincided with two major conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan that involved clinicians working in the Defence Medical Services (UK-
DMS) and also the National Health Service (NHS). Lessons learnt in the management of 
complex trauma slowly started to be translated into NHS practice (4). I currently work at 
Liverpool University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Aintree site) which is a Major Trauma 
Centre covering the population of Cheshire and Merseyside in the North West of England. I 
have also served for 20 years in the Royal Navy and deployed to both Iraq (2009) and 
Afghanistan (2011) and have been responsible for training the trauma team at Aintree (8).  
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Figure 1.5.  Causes of injury deaths worldwide. (Adapted from World Health Organization. 
Injuries and violence: the facts. Geneva: WHO; 2010) 
 
 
A systematic review evaluating trauma system performance in the USA (58)  found 14 articles 
and of these, 8 showed improved odds of survival of patients being treated at Major Trauma 
Centres. Meta-analysis of all published studies found that there was a 15% reduction in 
mortality in favour of trauma systems. Another study reviewed the outcomes at 18 trauma 
centres and 51 non-trauma centres in the USA and found a 20% reduction in the risk of death 
in a trauma centre that increased to 25% when outcome data is extended to 1 year (59). In 
terms of Trauma now in England, a recent publication by Professor Chris Moran, Trauma Lead 
for NHS England concluded that of the 110,863 patients reviewed with an Injury Severity Score 
(ISS) of 9 or more there were no changes in unadjusted mortality, however the analysis of 
trends in risk adjusted survival for study hospitals showed a 19% increase in the case mix 
adjusted odds of survival from severe injury (2) (Figures 1.6 and 1.7). This is an early indication 
that the reorganisation of services to Major Trauma Centres is beneficial to our patients. 
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Figure 1.6.  New Injury Severity Score (NISS) (60) associated with 50% chance of survival 
following injury. Data applies to casualties treated by the UK DMS during a period of the 
Afghanistan conflict (2003 2014) and shows the improvement in survival rates associated 
with the development of the trauma service. (Figure taken from (61)) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7.  Trends in odds of surviving major trauma: April 2008 March 2017. Figure 
taken from (2) 
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1.4.1 A Trauma Team 
The activation of the trauma team in a Major Trauma Centre is dependent on a pre-determined 
criterion based on the patient s anatom , ph siolog  and mechanism of injur , an e ample of 
such criteria is described in Table 1.3. Should this criterion be met then a trauma team 
activation is triggered, and the trauma team is called to the emergency department. A typical 
NHS trauma team and their roles is described in Table 1.4.  
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Table 1.3. Trauma team activation criteria (taken from Kings College Hospital London, 
Major Trauma Service: Information for Members of the Trauma Team) (62)  
1 Traumatic event and one of the following:  
 Oxygen saturation <90% 
 Systolic arterial pressure < 90 mm Hg 
 Respiratory rate <9 or >29 bpm  
 GCS <14  
2 Penetrating injury to 
 Head 
 Neck 
 Chest 
 Abdomen 
 Pelvis 
 All gunshot wounds  
3 Fractures 
 Open or depressed skull fractures 
 Pelvic fracture 
 Two or more proximal long bone fractures 
 Flail chest  
4 Traumatic amputation  
5 Blast or crush injury  
6 Major burns  
 10% total body surface area but lower threshold in child or elderly  
 Combination of burns and trauma  
7 Road traffic crash  
 High speed crash (>30 mph) or pedestrian vs. vehicle at >20 mph  
 Separation of rider and bike  
 Intrusion into passenger compartment  
 Ejection from vehicle  
 Death of another person in the same passenger compartment  
 Bull s e ed indscreen  
 20 min extrication time  
8 Falls  
 Height of >3 m  
 Paediatrics consider the age and height of the child in relation to the height fallen  
9 Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) transfer  
10 Drowning/submersion  
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Table 1.4. The composition and roles of a Complex Trauma Team at a typical Major 
Trauma Centre in England 
 
 
Role  Function in the Trauma Team 
Team Leader [Emergency Department Consultant] Allocation of roles to the team 
Maintaining situational awareness 
Primary Survey Doctor [Emergency Department 
Trainee ST3+] 
Conducts the Primary Survey 
Anaesthetist [Senior Trainee (ST5+)] Airway management 
Operating Department Practitioner (ODP)  Assisting the Anaesthetist 
Setting up anaesthesia equipment 
Radiographer Portable x-ray 
Orthopaedic Surgeon [ST4+] Responsible for orthopaedic injuries 
General Surgery [ST4+] Responsible for surgical injuries 
Runner [HCA] Collects blood and blood products from the 
transfusion laboratory and other equipment 
as necessary 
Emergency Department Nurse [1] Obtaining intravenous access and blood 
transfusion 
Emergency Department Nurse [2] Drawing up intravenous medication 
Scribe [Senior Nurse] Accurately recording observations and drug 
administration 
 
 
 
1.4.2 The Trauma Call 
 
This thesis will describe the importance of Human Factors during a trauma call and 
subsequent transfer of a patient to the operating theatre. I will describe and critically appraise 
original research that has been performed in an attempt to improve communication during the 
management of complex trauma (42). I have recently published an article in the British Medical 
Journal (63) describing the process of a typical trauma call in a Major Trauma Centre, the 
main highlights and timelines are shown on the infographic in Figure 1.8. A complex trauma 
patient may require Damage Control Resuscitation which is defined as a systemic approach 
to major trauma combining the <c>ABC paradigm (control of catastrophic haemorrhage, 
airway, bleeding and circulation) with a series of clinical techniques from point of wounding to 
definitive treatment in order to minimise blood loss, maximise tissue oxygenation and optimise 
o come  (64). A senior clinician as the trauma team leader, allows early decision making in 
terms of the patient s treatment pathway which could involve transfer to CT Scan, Operating 
Theatre, Critical Care or the Major Trauma Ward (Figures 1.9 and 1.10 from (4)). 
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Trauma call timelineVisual summary
1 Patent airway
3 No visible active haemorrhage
2 Central pulse
Equipment
Drugs
Chest and 
pelvic x rays
Is further Intravenous
access needed?
Ultrasound (FAST† scan) 
to aid critical decision making
Immediate CT scan versus transfer to operating theatre
Set goals on physiology and blood products
Ongoing transfusion requirements?
Reassess splinting and all dressings
Secure patient and all IV access lines
Consider use of a pre-departure checklist
Analgesia
Tranexamic acid (15 mg/kg)
Antibiotics
Tetanus prophylaxis
Calcium chloride
Operation theatre
Interventional radiology
Trauma ward
Critical care
Oxygen
Secure large bore venous or intraosseous access
To allow rapid administration of blood and blood products
Blood tests
Full blood count Venous blood gas
Blood group and save Urea and electrolytes
Point of care INR testing
If patient is on warfarin
Thromboelastometry
Such as RoTEM
Disclaimer: This infographic is not a validated clinical decision aid. This information is provided without any representations, 
conditions, or warranties that it is accurate or up to date. BMJ and its licensors assume no responsibility for any aspect of 
treatment administered with the aid of this information. Any reliance placed on this information is strictly at the user's own risk. 
For the full disclaimer wording see BMJ's terms and conditions: http://www.bmj.com/company/legal-information/
This suggested trauma team timeline is based on a combination of guidance 
from expert opinion and experience of UK emergency departments. It aims 
      to help clinicians familiarise themselves with the basic principles 
      of organising and responding as a trauma team, and the 
              central role of the trauma team leader.
T-15
Time T
T+0
T+5
T+15
T+20–30
15 minutes
before arrival
of patient
Patient
arrives
Immediate
actions
5 minutes
after arrival
15 minutes
after arrival
20–30
minutes
after arrival
Team assembles Declare code red?
Inform transfusion 
laboratory if a “shock 
pack” is required
Initial assessment
Team brief
Team leader briefs the team 
with information from the 
pre-hospital alert. Team discusses 
what they expect to happen
Make ready
Prior to receiving a sterile handover
confirm:
Patient handover
Pre-hospital handover 
is received with 
trauma team silence 
using "AT-MIST"
Review <C>ABCD
Consider further treatment Analgesia
Situational update
Command huddle Confirm drugs given so far Inform family
Prepare for transferSecondary survey
Once the initial examination of the 
patient is complete, a decision on 
the next steps of treatment is 
made by senior members of the 
team. This is then communicated 
to the whole trauma team
The trauma team 
leader and a senior 
nurse (usually the 
scribe) will talk to 
the patient’s family to 
explain the situation
Transfer
If a CT scan has been performed 
elsewhere, consider priority transfer to:
May be performed 
if patient does not 
require time critical 
interventions
* RSI = Rapid sequence induction of anaesthesia
† FAST = Focused Assessment with Sonography for Trauma
Ensure all team
members present Introductions
Allocation
of roles
A
Age
T
Time of
injury
M
Mechanism
of injury
I
Injuries
sustained
S
Signs and
symptoms
T
Treatment
given so far
<C>
Catastrophic 
haemorrhage
controlled?
A
Reassess airway and 
indications for RSI* 
if not yet performed
B
Assess ventilation status 
and e!ectiveness of 
chest decompression
C
Consider whether a 
massive transfusion
is required
D
Reassess 
Glasgow
 coma scale
Consider risks and benefits of RSI*. It may be needed 
for humanitarian reasons, if patient is in very severe 
pain and an operation is planned very soon
Horizontal assessment
Components of the <C>ABCD paradigm and initial investigations (such 
as chest and pelvic x ray, and blood tests) are carried out by several 
people at the same time, coordinated by the trauma team leader. 
This allows the team to have the required clinical information quickly
Assess whether essential
bodily systems are under 
control
<C>
Control of 
catastrophic
haemorrhage
A
Airway
B
Breathing
C
Circulation
D
Disability
Example of <C>ABCD systematic approachInitial treatment
"# L via non-re-breather mask
Use a vacuum mattress
<C>
A
B
C
D
Amputated limb: Apply tourniquet and compression bandage with 
or without topical haemostatic agents 
Actual or impending airway compromise: 
RSI* with cervical spine control
Ventilatory failure: RSI* and consider need for chest decompression: 
needle versus thoracostomy versus chest drain insertion
Pelvic fracture suspected: Apply pelvic binder
Long bone fractures: Splint and assess peripheral pulses
Unconsciousness (GCS 8 or less), unmanageable, combative 
or severely agitated patient with a head injury: RSI*
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Figure 1.9.  Patient Pathway leading to CT Scan and then Operating Theatre. Figure 
taken from (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.10.  Patient Pathway leading to direct transfer to the Operating Theatre. Figure 
taken from (4) 
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1.5       Overview of the thesis 
 
This thesis will describe the recent advances in human factors in complex trauma and 
emergency anaesthesia and then how they have been implemented into military and civilian 
trauma systems. Sections on original research, systematic review and knowledge translation 
will allow me the opportunity to present my published work and demonstrate how original 
knowledge and knowledge assembled from systematic review has been introduced and 
implemented successfully into mature trauma systems.  
 
 
Three original research manuscripts will examine the barriers to junior anaesthetists 
challenging the decisions of senior anaesthetists, the use of a communication tool The 
T a ma WHO  [14] to enhance communication amongst the trauma team and the creation of 
guidelines for the management of casualties with penetrating airway injuries. Two systematic 
reviews are presented that appraise and summarise the current literature around human 
factors in complex trauma and emergency anaesthesia and also in the management of 
penetrating neck trauma. Finally, there are five articles that have been selected to 
demonstrate the skill of knowledge translation all relating to different clinical situations where 
human factors in trauma are vital to the functioning of the complex trauma team. It is this 
translation of knowledge that I perform on a daily basis training teams in theatre and in the 
high-fidelity simulation centre attached to my hospital. 
 
 
The ten articles selected, described and critically appraised will allow me to describe how 
original knowledge and knowledge summarised in the systematic reviews are vital to the 
management of complex trauma patients in different situations and also demonstrate an ability 
to translate the findings of more comple  articles and guidelines in a digestible  format that 
can be read by busy practitioners to keep updated on good practice in trauma care.   
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Section 2  
 
Original Research  
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2.1 Introduction 
My publications are listed in chronological order in Appendix 1. I have selected the following 
three manuscripts to demonstrate my contribution to original research in the field of Human 
Factors in Complex Trauma and these will be described and critically appraised in this chapter 
of the thesis. 
 
 Beament T, Mercer SJ. Speak Up! Barriers to Challenging Erroneous Decisions of 
Seniors in Anaesthesia. Anaesthesia 2016; 71: 1332 1340  
 
 Arul S, Pugh H, Mercer SJ, Midwinter M Human Factors in Decision Making in Major 
Trauma in Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. Annals of The Royal College of Surgeons of 
England 2015; 97: 262-268  
 
 Mercer SJ, Lewis SE, Wilson SJ, Groom P, Mahoney PF. Creating Airway Management 
Guidelines for Casualties with Penetrating Airway Injuries. Journal of the Royal Army 
Medical Corps 2010; 156: S357-362  
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Speak up! Barriers to challenging erroneous decisions of seniors in
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Summary
‘Speaking up’ or the ability to effectively challenge erroneous decisions is essential to preventing harm. This mixed-
methods study in two parts explores the concept of ‘barriers to challenging seniors’ for anaesthetic trainees, and pro-
poses a conceptual framework. Using a fully immersive simulation scenario with unanticipated airway dif!culty, we
investigated how junior anaesthetists (one to two years of training) challenged a scripted error. We also conducted
focus groups with senior trainees (three to seven years of training) and undertook a ‘thematic network analysis’ of
responses. Junior anaesthetic trainees challenged erroneous decisions effectively, but trainees with an additional year
of experience challenged more quickly and effectively, combining ‘crisp-advocacy-inquiry challenge’ with ‘non-verbal
cues’. Focus group analysis conceptualised a ‘barrier network’ with three main themes: concerns around relationships;
decision-making; and risk/cost–bene!t. Emotional maturity is an important protective layer around decisions to
challenge. Despite signi!cant multifactorial barriers, systematic training in effective ‘speaking up’ could improve the
con!dence and ability of juniors to challenge erroneous decisions.
.................................................................................................................................................................
Correspondence to: T. Beament
Email: tbeament@gmail.com
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Introduction
Analysis of the tragic death of Elaine Bromiley high-
lighted a breakdown of several important non-techni-
cal skills [1], including the failure to challenge senior
consultants who persisted with inappropriate airway
management. A recent publication from the Dif!cult
Airway Society on how to manage unexpected dif!cult
tracheal intubation [2] suggested limiting the number
of intubation attempts, with a direction to perform
emergency surgical cricothyroidotomy if conventional
ventilation is impossible. In another high pro!le case,
a patient had the wrong kidney removed and
subsequently died, despite a junior member of the
team knowing that the healthy kidney was being oper-
ated on [3].
Failure to challenge erroneous decisions con-
tributes to patient morbidity and mortality [4]. Team
members with the interpersonal skills to challenge the
decisions of their leaders without contributing to a
defensive or risk-adverse culture are referred to as
responsible followers [5], while a reluctance to speak
up threatens patient safety [6]. For the purposes of this
article, we de!ne ‘speaking up’ as communicating
other team members’ doubts, differing opinions or
1332 © 2016 The Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland
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potential problems about decision or course of action
in medical care. Challenging other colleagues’ views
involves taking risks on the part of those who speak
up, especially in hierarchical systems such as health-
care, where the terms ‘juniors’ (doctors in training)
and ‘seniors’ (consultants) infer this divide. In order to
improve training on this subject, it is vital to clearly
identify effective interpersonal skills and possible barri-
ers to challenging seniors [7].
Summarising all known ‘barriers to challenging’
from the recent literature (Table 1), it is evident that,
despite ample research, barriers to effective communica-
tion in medical emergencies are complex, contradictory
and still poorly understood. Previous work suggests that
using simulation to include deliberate erroneous deci-
sions during training can uncover failures to speak up
and promote appropriate leadership challenges [4, 8–
10]. Recent research also suggests that doctors can, in a
similar way to the aviation industry, train for and assess
‘surprise and startle’ events [11], and that effective
‘speaking up’ can improve patient safety [12].
Methods
Research and development institutional research ethics
approval was granted for this study by Aintree Univer-
sity Hospital NHS Foundation Trust Research and
Development Department.
For the !rst part of the study, a qualitative
approach using focus group verbatim transcriptions of
senior anaesthetic trainees (three to seven years of
experience, ST3-7) was used. A total of 12 of all
invited ST3-7 trainees in the Mersey Deanery partici-
pated in four facilitated focus group sessions to discuss
barriers to challenging consultants in their own and
other specialties involved with peri-operative care.
Each session lasted approximately 30 min (two to !ve
participants in each group).
Initial questions were standardised using a set of
predetermined open questions to initiate and deepen
discussions between participants and their experiences
of challenging or failure to challenge consultants.
Participants were encouraged to exchange anecdotes,
clarify their views and remark on each other’s experi-
ences. Field notes were taken, and all focus group ses-
sions were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim and
de-identi!ed.
Table 1 Summary of previously identi!ed barriers to
challenging [4, 9, 10, 12–16].
Authors Barrier themes identified
Belyanski,
et al. [4]
• Poor intra-operative communication
between seniors (attendings) and
juniors (residents)
Bould,
et al. [9]
• Hierarchy in operating theatres
• (Weak) position of individual within
the perioperative team
• Negative effect (challenge detrimental)
of challenging on learner, patient,
learning
Friedmann,
et al. [10]
• Behaviour of seniors (inclusive-friendly
versus exclusive-hostile); no barrier for
challenging
• Lack of formal training
Okayuma,
et al. [12]
• Motivation and clinical context
(perception of low risk to patient)
• General contextual factors (teamwork
and individual’s relationship within
team, attitude of senior)
• Individual factors (lack of knowledge
or confidence, poor communication
skills)
• The perceived safety of speaking up
(fear of reprisal, concerns of appearing
incompetent, avoiding conflict)
• The perceived efficacy of speaking up
(prediction that nothing will be done)
Kobayashi,
et al. [13]
• Ethnicity/nationality and linked
hierarchical social structures: no
difference in self-reported threshold to
challenge
• Differences in beliefs regarding factors
thought to affect challenging
o Penalty, repercussion
o Social acceptance, rejection
o Knowledge, experience, understanding
o Image, self-worth
o Teamwork, professionalism, hierarchy
o Communication skills
o Relationship, personality
Pian-Smith,
et al. [14]
• Assumed hierarchy
• Fear of embarrassment of self or others
• Concern over being misjudged, fear of
being wrong
• Fear of retribution
• Jeopardising an ongoing relationship
• Natural avoidance of conflict
• Concern for reputation
Sydor,
et al. [15]
• No effect of operating room hierarchy
on challenging behaviour
• Lack of training in effective challenging
techniques
Weiss,
et al. [16]
Interindividual factors such as:
• Lack of agency (assertiveness, persis-
tence, independence)
• Presence of communion (helpfulness,
friendliness, sociability)
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Data were analysed using a thematic network anal-
ysis of known barriers and new, emerging barriers,
leading to the formulation of ‘barrier clusters’. Subse-
quent qualitative analysis of barriers to challenging
seniors used an iterative process of coding according
to a set of known barriers from previous literature
(Table 1), and also allowed for emerging, previously
unidenti!ed themes in an exploratory approach
informed by grounded theory.
Manual coding of transcripts through a constant
comparative process between transcripts, and similar
phrases from previously identi!ed known barriers were
used. In line with a thematic network [17], we noted
keywords next to basic (!rst level) themes, and gradu-
ally grouped them into three common organising (sec-
ond level) themes to explain the complexity by which
these personal, organisational and situational factors
interconnect and in"uence the global theme of per-
ceived barriers to challenging erroneous decisions by
anaesthetic trainees. To increase the validity and
reliability of our !ndings, we undertook a process of
inter-rater conformability, whereby both authors
independently coded the !rst transcript independently.
We then engaged in a repeated coding process that led
to agreement on most of the codes.
For the second part of the study, we undertook a
quantitative analysis of a simulated high-!delity airway
crisis, whereby a confederate consultant anaesthetist
failed to intubate a patient, and junior anaesthetic trai-
nees (!rst two years of training, CT1/CT2) were
expected to challenge decisions that were clearly
wrong. This was combined with a qualitative analysis
of barriers to challenging that were expressed and
identi!ed during the debrief session.
We recruited and obtained written consent from
13 junior anaesthetic trainees within their !rst (n = 6)
and second (n = 7) years of anaesthesia training in
Merseyside, UK. They were asked to complete a back-
ground questionnaire (age, sex, grade, years experience,
simulation experience, ethnicity and medical school)
before participation. We explained that they were to
participate in a videoed, standardised and scripted
fully-immersive failed intubation simulation.
After a short brie!ng, the trainee joined the ‘the-
atre team’, which consisted of actors playing the roles
of consultant anaesthetist, operating department
practitioner (ODP) and surgical consultant, just before
completion of the !rst part of the World Health
Organization (WHO) surgical checklist. A SimMan
(Laerdal, Orpington, Kent) 3-G wireless simulator was
used to simulate a patient who was just about to
undergo emergency abdominal aortic aneurysm repair
surgery. The trainee anaesthetist was asked to inject
the drugs for induction of anaesthesia and neuromus-
cular blockade. The confederate faculty consultant
anaesthetist was deliberately unable to intubate the
patient simulator, and then became task-!xated on
intubation, failing to oxygenate and ventilate despite
oxygen desaturation. The scenario was controlled by
another faculty member, who adapted patient observa-
tions to a predetermined script of worsening oxygen
saturations. The candidate was expected to construc-
tively challenge further intubation attempts, and
suggest a rescue ventilation technique to oxygenate the
simulated patient. If the candidate failed to challenge
appropriately, the ODP suggested using a supraglottic
airway device after a pre-agreed duration of hypoxia.
Trainees were debriefed immediately following the
simulations using video playback from their respective
scenarios. A method called ‘thinking aloud’ [18] was
used, whereby they were asked to comment on and
describe their thinking and actions during video play-
back, allowing exploration of displayed behaviours,
barriers to speaking up and strategies used for chal-
lenging. The simulation videos and debrief recordings
were de-identi!ed, and main excerpts were transcribed
using a mixed-method approach. Key events were
quantitatively and qualitatively analysed according to
primary outcome measures (Table 2). Challenges were
graded according to an adapted ‘challenges grading
score’ (Table 3).
Results
For the focus group discussions, we used a thematic
network analysis [17] to identify 22 basic (!rst level)
themes to describe barriers to challenging erroneous
decisions. These were further linked into the three
main organising (second level) themes of ‘relationship
concerns’, ‘decision-making concerns’ and ‘risk/cost–
bene!t concerns’ to explain the global theme (third
level) of ‘barriers to challenging erroneous decision in
anaesthetic trainees’. Examples of these barriers,
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stemming from the coding of the focus group verbatim
transcriptions are described in a supplementary online
table, and via a thematic network diagram (Fig. 1). We
also compared barrier themes from focus group trai-
nees with the barrier themes identi!ed during the sim-
ulation debrief. Relationship concerns were the most
commonly quoted barriers that prevented challenging
(mentioned 77 times during focus group discussions),
and encompassed many different aspects such as per-
sonality of both seniors and juniors, hierarchical struc-
tures in medical culture, ingrained respect for seniors
and maintaining or establishing relationships or avoid-
ing con"ict within a team. Previously established bar-
riers to challenging, such as sex, age and ethnicity,
were not considered important by our trainees. Deci-
sion-making concerns were less often cited (19 times)
by senior trainees, perhaps due to their advanced stage
of training, and hence more experience, knowledge
and con!dence in their ability. When citing these bar-
riers to challenging, trainees mainly spoke about their
junior training level, in which they lacked the appro-
priate skills to make correct decisions and challenge
seniors. Risk assessment concerns (cited 29 times)
weighed up whether a challenge was worth the poten-
tially negative effects on either patient safety, relation-
ship with the person to be challenged or oneself. These
risk concerns were also in"uenced by the clarity or
ambiguity of the clinical decision to be challenged.
Clear black and white situations with a potential
life-threatening outcome for the patient would be
challenged, whereas for grey, ambiguous situations,
speaking up may not be worth the supposed negative
consequences of their actions.
A new concept that emerged from analysing the
focus group transcripts was the idea that emotional
maturity acted as an additional layer, rather like a !lter
around a trainee’s decision to challenge or not to chal-
lenge. Senior trainees (seven years of training) reported
the experience of weighing up and searching for ele-
gant ways to convince the other party of their con-
cerns, in order to achieve a change in an erroneous
decision and avoid a head-on confrontation. They
rationalised that ‘con"ict doesn’t achieve much. . . in
some ways keeping silent and stepping away from the
problem has also been good in achieving the end out-
come.’
Thirteen core trainees (six in their !rst year of
training, four women and two men and seven in their
second year of training, three women and four men)
completed the simulated airway scenario. Sex, ethnicity
and medical school were not found to in"uence study
results and observed behaviour. A summary of the
Table 2 Summary of primary outcomes from the fully
immersive simulation scenario. Values are mean (SD).
Primary outcome
measures
CT1
trainees
CT2
trainees
Time to 1st challenge; s 78.2 (25.3) 68.3 (38.8)
Time to highest grade
(CAIC) challenge; s
272.0 (67.8) 172.7 (55.8)
Intubation attempts; n 6.5 (2.3) 5.0 (1.2)
Time to oxygenation
(ETCO2); s
346 (69) 262 (62)
Lowest SaO2; % 64 (7) 70 (8)
Verbal communication 14 (4) 13 (2)
Non-verbal communication 08. (0.8) 3.0 (1.8)
Grade 5 challenges 0.5 (0.8) 3.0 (1.8)
Grade 2 challenges 7 (3) 5 (2)
Table 3 Adapted verbal challenges grading score mod-
i!ed to airway scenario [14].
Type Score Example
Say nothing 1
Say something
oblique,
obtuse
2 “Really?”
“sats are 89%”
“no breath sounds/no end-tidal
CO2”
Advocate or
inquire
3 “I am concerned about the low
sats”
OR
“Shall I get help/the difficult
airway trolley?”
Advocate or
inquire
repeatedly
with initiation
of discussion
4 “Can we talk about the low sats?”
and/or
“I’m & uncomfortable with these
low sats”
and/or
“What else can we do?”
and/or
“Shall we ventilate the patient?”
Use crisp-
advocacy-
inquiry
5 “I am concerned about violating
the DAS intubation guidelines,
you have had four goes now, the
patient is deteriorating, you
need to bag-mask-ventilate or use
a supraglottic airway device to
ventilate
the patient”
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primary outcomes from the simulation scenario is
listed in Table 2. Trainees with an additional year of
experience in anaesthesia (second year of training)
challenged more quickly and effectively by combining
‘crisp-advocacy-inquiry challenge’ (CAIC) with ‘non-
verbal cues’ (removing equipment, obstructing consul-
tant).
Comparing CT1 and CT2 trainees, CT2s chal-
lenged quicker, allowed fewer intubation attempts,
established quicker adequate rescue oxygenation and
ventilation and less simulated patient desaturation was
observed (Table 2). CT2 Trainees also employed more
high-grad.
Low-grade 2 or 3 challenges used by CT1 trainees
included repetition of worsening saturations and
obscure statements such as ‘no CO2’ or ‘I can’t hear
anything’, or isolated inquiries such as ‘do you want me
to do anything?’, or advocacy statements like ‘we can’t
intubate, can’t ventilate but can’t wake the patient up’
without eliciting any further discussion. As the simula-
tion situation worsened for every further intubation
attempt without oxygenation, the grade and quality of
the challenges improved in all candidates, and most (9
of 13 trainees, of which all 7 CT2 but only 2 CT1) can-
didates reached the maximum grade 5 challenge during
the scenario, leading to a rescue ventilation strategy. All
CT2 trainees spoke more frequently with a grade 4 or
grade 5 CAIC communication style. Of particular inter-
est was the use of effective non-verbal challenges in
addition to strong high-grade verbal challenges. Eleven
candidates (all seven CT2 trainees on numerous occa-
sions, but only four CT1 trainees) prevented the consul-
tant from further intubation attempts by:
• Obstructing the consultant in further intubation
attempts
• Removing the laryngoscope
• Placing the facemask near consultant or onto the
manikin or face
• Touching the consultant’s shoulder/arm repeatedly
to gain their attention
• Raising their hand to indicate the need to ‘stop’
Figure 1 Thematic network diagram of barriers to challenging seniors.
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These non-verbal cues seemed particularly power-
ful in gaining the confederate consultant’s attention,
who acted as if situational awareness had been lost
during repeated intubation attempts. To our knowl-
edge, no one has as yet reported on the importance of
such non-verbal cues as effective tools to challenge
erroneous decisions during medical emergencies.
Second-year trainees were particularly accomplished at
using non-verbal cues, and it is of interest that one
single year more in anaesthetic training seemed to
equip trainees with this non-verbal skill.
During the speaking-aloud debrief, simulation can-
didates unanimously agreed that they knew the con-
federate consultant had mismanaged the crisis, had not
followed the Dif!cult Airway Society Guidelines [2],
and that they were worried for the patient’s safety. All
trainees underestimated the number of intubation
attempts they allowed the consultant to have. Most
quoted 4–5 attempts, when in fact the consultant had
tried many more times (4–7 attempts with CT2 trai-
nees and 5–11 attempts with CT1), suggesting that
they themselves had also lost situational awareness.
During the debrief, no candidate was upset or felt
deceived by the less than complete information regard-
ing the precise focus of the study.
Barrier themes to challenging the confederate con-
sultant identi!ed during simulation debrief with CT1
and CT2 trainees included: hierarchy; respect for and
trust in seniors; fear of retribution or negative evalua-
tion; concern for reputation; communication skills;
lack of experience/knowledge/understanding; potential
negative impact of challenging on patient safety; and
risk assessment in view of ambiguity of situation or
decision to be challenged (full details are available on
request). Barriers from the simulation debrief matched
!ndings from the thematic code analysis of focus
group transcripts, and could be attributed to the three
main organising themes of relationship, decision-mak-
ing and risk/cost–bene!t concerns.
Discussion
Recent !ndings [10] could not clearly link trainees’
ability or inability to challenge wrong decisions with
the communication pattern displayed by the consultant
(friendly/open/inclusive or hostile/strict/exclusive). As
we discovered, there are still signi!cant and complex
barriers that impair trainees’ ability to challenge their
seniors (Fig. 1). The main barrier themes to challeng-
ing seniors were established in both the focus groups
and simulation debrief. They were associated with ‘re-
lationship concerns’ such as hierarchy and respect for
consultant experience and ‘decision-making concerns’
such as lack of knowledge and own perceived inexperi-
ence that could potentially damage their working rela-
tionship with said consultant. A new emerging theme
was concerns surrounding the ‘risk/cost–bene!ts’ of
making a challenge. Trainees effectively weighed up
the potential consequences for patient harm of chal-
lenging or not challenging, versus the potential nega-
tive effects on themselves or their relationship with the
senior in the context of the clinical situation/decision
to be challenged.
The importance of hierarchical organisational fac-
tors as a barrier to challenge erroneous decisions can
be linked to junior trainees wanting to show clinical
independence and avoid seeking help [19]. Situated
learning models perceive learning not only as gather-
ing more knowledge and skills but also as the develop-
ment of a new identity as a member of a particular
community of practice [20]. By aspiring to become
expert clinicians, juniors may feel under pressure to
manage anaesthetic emergencies on their own without
asking for help. There is still a misconception, perhaps
less so in anaesthesia but nevertheless prevalent in the
medical profession, that calling for help is a sign of
weakness or failure to cope. Trainees unanimously
voiced their awareness of the consultant disregarding
the Dif!cult Airway Society guidelines [2] by attempt-
ing tracheal intubation more than three times during
emergency intubation. However, trainees also stated
that it was acceptable for consultants to ‘break the
rules’ in de!ned circumstances, but it was perceived
that trainees were required to follow them under all
circumstances.
Some trainees attributed their reason for not chal-
lenging to a lack of con!dence [10], which is re"ected
in both the focus groups and the simulation debrief.
Participants described situations whereby they
expressed uncertainty about their competency and
knowledge, and were unclear whether they should be
able to manage a situation rather than ask for help.
They also felt they lacked experience to decide if a
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decision might be wrong, as juniors thought that con-
sultants ‘ought to know better’ and that their own role
was to follow rather than to lead.
The transition from novice anaesthetist to expert
seems to diminish associated feelings of anxiety when
being forced to take responsibility and challenge
erroneous decisions. Experience, and this is a time-
dependent and not just competency-based attribute, is
the solution to a more con!dent challenge, as one
candidate expressed: ‘. . . when you’ve got a layer of
experience that gives you con!dence in your decision-
making.’
Figure 2 illustrates the concept of a risk/cost–bene!t
analysis that goes on in a trainee’s mind when consider-
ing speaking up, and attempts to display the conceptual
connection between clinical ambiguity (grey scenarios
vs. black and white scenarios) and the severity of
perceived consequences for patient harm.
In a black and white scenario with clear guidelines
to follow and a perceived threat to actual severe
patient harm, trainees would be more likely to pose a
challenge. However, in a grey scenario involving ethi-
cal ambiguity or multiple treatment options, whereby
certain decisions by a senior would not cause patient
harm (even if a better decision was possible), trainees
would not speak up unless their relationship with said
senior was strong and not scarred with hierarchical
power-distance issues or fears of repercussion.
Several studies that researched the in"uence of
hierarchy on speaking up [9, 14, 21] used ambiguous
or ‘grey’ scenarios, whereby ethical considerations and
several potential correct decisions were possible, and
hence were identi!ed as confounding factors in the
willingness of trainees to speaking up [9, 12, 21].
Emergency decision-making is complex, and study
design with grey scenarios renders methods even more
ambiguous, as the interpretation of participants’
actions or inactions could be a result of an ambiguous
scenario and may not accurately re"ect trainees’ ability
or inability to challenge.
This research scenario was deliberately chosen to
be a clear ‘black and white’ deviation from emergency
airway management, with the confederate consultant
disregarding the Dif!cult Airway Society guidelines [2]
and potentially endangering the patient. Black and
white scenarios and resulting actions are easier to
interpret, but may feel arti!cial and divorced from real
life, as real medical emergencies are anything but
‘black and white’.
Overall, the most striking !ndings were the differ-
ence in performance between CT1 and CT2 trainees.
Trainees with an additional year of experience (CT2)
challenged the consultant more quickly and effectively
using appropriate non-verbal cues. This included put-
ting a hand up to obstruct the consultant, and remov-
ing the laryngoscope while placing the facemask on
the patient in an attempt to prevent further desatura-
tion. This ensured that fewer intubation attempts were
made, thereby allowing oxygenation and ventilation to
be established more quickly. Of particular note was the
more frequent use of high-grade CAIC communica-
tion, particularly in combination with clear non-verbal
Figure 2 A model of the cost–bene!t analysis making a challenge likely or unlikely.
1338 © 2016 The Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland
Anaesthesia 2016, 71, 1332–1340 Beament and Mercer | Barriers to challenging erroneous decisions of seniors
cues. All trainees (CT1 and CT2) initiated an appro-
priate challenge to prevent the confederate consultant
from making further intubation attempts, and venti-
lated the patient. There was no need for the faculty
ODP to rescue the situation and avoid simulated
patient death by suggesting alternative strategies for
ventilation.
Our results contrast with recent !ndings, where
the quality of Canadian trainees’ challenges was
assessed as ‘mostly poor, . . . isolated inquiry or advo-
cacy statement, . . . no use of crisp advocacy/inquiry
and no attempts to take over management of the case’
[10]. The inability to challenge authority could not be
attributed to superiors’ interpersonal communication,
but to a lack of con"ict management training [10].
This identi!es systematic failure rather than failure of
individual trainees. Although we support this notion of
demanding more formal ‘speaking up’ training, our
!ndings in the UK differ from those in Canada [10],
perhaps through the impact of high pro!le medical
tragedies such as Elaine Bromiley’s death [1] and the
subsequent work of Martin Bromiley through his Clin-
ical Human Factors Group (CHFG). Additionally, the
recent agreement of key NHS organisations, profes-
sional institutes and regulators to sign the Concordate
for Human Factors in Healthcare [22] brought human
factors values and training to the forefront in emer-
gency and especially anaesthetic training in the UK. In
our region (Mersey, UK), medical students and junior
doctors attend mandatory simulation courses regularly
throughout their training. These courses do not speci!-
cally train challenging techniques, but trainee doctors
get taught communication, teamwork and crisis man-
agement from an early stage onwards. The importance
of effective communication (open-ended questions,
closing of the communication loop, sharing frames of
understanding and declaration of the emergency) is
also highlighted.
The General Medical Council [23] is clear: doctors
have an overriding duty to ‘take prompt action if you
think that patient safety, dignity or comfort is being
compromised’. Hierarchy and con"ict will certainly
contribute to team tensions and build barriers within a
team, but doctors must override this duty to ‘speak-
up-for-safety’. Training on these issues should not only
be targeted towards juniors’ ability to speak up, but
also for seniors to be receptive to questions and chal-
lenges. Seniors must actively contribute to creating a
culture where all team members are valued, decision-
making is shared, and humiliation or bullying reper-
cussions of con"ict are no longer acceptable. Concerns
about the lack of high-quality, effective challenges by
trainees [9, 10, 15] according to a CAIC principle sug-
gest that learning of such speaking up skills should be
included in curriculae to improve patient safety [12].
In our study, we demonstrated that our regional
training programmes, although not perfect, did prepare
junior anaesthetists to effectively challenge seniors’
wrong decisions.
Anaesthesia departments should encourage regular
in-situ simulation practice to include the whole multi-
disciplinary team, so that patient safety is seen as part
of the team approach to safety.
In summary, a key !nding in our study was the
effectiveness of non-verbal cues, which were particu-
larly used by more experienced trainees and which
worked synergistically with high-level CAIC to rescue
"awed clinical situations and encourage the consultant
to change their erroneous actions. We also presented a
thematic network model of ‘barriers to challenging
seniors’ (Fig. 1) that combines previously known and
newly described themes to advance our current knowl-
edge of the !eld of barriers to speaking up, and high-
lighted the importance of emotional maturity as an
additional layer or buffer that in"uences the decision
process. Our ‘cost/risk–bene!t’ conceptual model
(Fig. 2) may prove useful in understanding the compli-
cated decision-making process underlying ‘speaking
up’ behaviour.
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2.2 Commenting on Beament T, Mercer SJ. Speak Up! Barriers to Challenging 
Erroneous Decisions of Seniors in Anaesthesia. Anaesthesia 2016; 71: 1332 1340  
 
 
I am the senior author for this publication.  
 
2.2.1 Why this paper was written? 
It is well known that deficiencies in non-technical skills including not thinking ahead, not 
following procedures and not speaking up when concerns about risks are raised, can increase 
the chances of human error (66). Reid commented that speaking up is not exercised nearly 
enough in NHS facilities and that the likelihood of junior members of staff speaking up was 
entirely dependent on whether the voice and action of all staff were actively encouraged and 
valued by the organisation (67). Previous work undertaken on medical students that I was 
involved in and was published in The British Journal of Hospital Medicine concluded that 
erroneous decisions remain unchallenged not because of a failure to notice that the decision 
was wrong, but because of a reluctance to challenge the leader (68). 
The following three critical events have elements of team members not challenging the leader 
and have all lead to individuals dying. I have summarised these events as they form the basis 
for initially conducting this research project. 
 
2.2.1.1  Kegworth Air Disaster 
 
On 8 January 1989, British Midland Flight 92, a Boeing 737-400 crashed on to the 
embankment of the M1 motorway near Kegworth whilst it was attempting to make an 
emergency landing at East Midlands Airport. A fan-blade had broken in the left engine which 
disrupted the air conditioning and filled the flight deck with smoke. The pilots believed that this 
indicated a fault in the right engine  as earlier models of the 737 ventilated the flight-deck from 
the right but this was not the case on the 737-400. The crew mistakenly shut down the 
functioning engine, and pumped more fuel into the malfunctioning one, which subsequently 
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burst into flames. Sadly, of the 126 people who were aboard, 47 died and 74 sustained serious 
injuries. Retrospective analysis showed that a number of human factors could critically affect 
the way a team undertook complex activities. At least one junior steward overheard the 
Captain say he was shutting down the right engine  when he had seen sparks and flames 
coming from the left  engine but felt unable to challenge this decision. Had this decision been 
challenged then perhaps this situational awareness mistake could have been avoided and 
lives not lost. 
 
2.2.1.2  Elaine Bromley 
The case of Elaine Bromley is very well known in the anaesthetic community and has been 
well publicised b  Elaine s husband Martin Bromle  OBE (69). On 29 March 2005, Elaine 
Bromley, a 37-year-old female presented for sinus surgery to a private hospital. She was 
deemed to be low risk for a general anaesthetic and was listed for a day case procedure. She 
was initially under the care of a Consultant Anaesthetist and following induction of 
anaesthesia, it proved impossible to firstly insert a flexible laryngeal mask and then to 
conventionally ventilate her lungs using a bag-valve-mask. Help was provided by another 
Consultant Anaesthetist and a Consultant ENT Surgeon. Despite there being a situation 
developing called can  in ba e, can  oxygenate  which anaesthetists practice drills on 
regularly, the national guidelines suggesting emergency front of neck access were not 
followed (29) and further failed attempts at intubation persisted. The clinicians involved 
appeared to be oblivious to the passing of time (for they had lost situational awareness) and 
Elaine underwent a prolonged period of hypoxia. The clinicians also were not challenged 
regarding their actions by any other members of the team present such as the Operating 
Department Practitioner or Scub Nurses who were aware that guidelines were not being 
followed. This case demonstrated a complete breakdown of non-technical skills in addition to 
failure to challenge the leader. Elaine did not regain consciousness again; and she died on 11 
April 2005.  
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2.2.2.3  Gordon Reeves  
Gordon Reeves, a 70-year-old male underwent what should have been a right nephrectomy 
at the Prince Philip Hospital in Llanelli, South Wales, in January 2000 (27). He was operated 
on by a Consultant Urologist and a Specialist Registrar. The left kidney was removed in error 
and this as felt to be compounded b  the patient s -ray being displayed the wrong way 
around and an incorrect entry had been made in the operation booking list. These errors 
occurred despite a medical student in the theatre knowing that the wrong site was being 
operated on. On discovering their mistake, the doctors carried out further surgery in an attempt 
to restore function to the chronically diseased right kidney which failed. Mr Reeves developed 
septicaemia and died five weeks after the first operation. 
I was interested to investigate the barriers that existed to trainee anaesthetists not challenging 
consultant anaesthetists whilst working together in the operating theatre and I felt that this was 
important as trainees should act as responsible followers; and them not speaking out would 
put patients at risk of harm. This was the basis of the original research. In the article presented 
the challenging of seniors is defined as speaking up  and this centred on communicating other 
team members  doubts, differing opinions or potential problems about decision or course of 
action in medical care (70).  
 
2.2.2 What was known at the time of writing? 
An independent review into creating an open and honest reporting culture in the NHS 
conducted by Robert Francis in February 2015 noted that two particular barriers to challenging 
authority stood out and these were the fear of repercussions for an individual and their career, 
and the futility of voicing a concern as it was thought that nothing would be done about it (31). 
Additional, previously reported barriers to challenging reported in the medical literature are 
described in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Previously reported barriers to challenging 
 
 
Poor intra-operative communication between senior and junior doctors (71) 
 
The existence of a hierarchy in operating theatres (72). 
 
Behaviour of seniors affecting challenging (73) 
 
Motivation and clinical context in relation to the perception of risk to patients (74) 
 
Individual factors including a lack of knowledge or confidence and poor communication skills (74)  
 
The perceived safety of speaking up including the fear of reprisal, concerns of appearing 
incompetent, avoiding conflict and the perceived efficacy of speaking up including prediction that 
nothing will be done (75) 
 
Fear of embarrassment of self or others (76) 
 
Concern over being misjudged, fear of being wrong (76) 
 
Fear of retribution (76) 
 
Jeopardising an ongoing relationship (76) 
 
Natural avoidance of conflict (76)  
 
Concern for reputation (76) 
 
No effect of operating room hierarchy on challenging behaviour (76) 
 
Lack of training in effective challenging techniques (76) 
 
Interindividual factors such as a lack of agency (assertiveness, persistence, independence) and the 
presence of communion (helpfulness, friendliness, sociability) (77) 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Wha  he a e  added  c ib ed  he g ba  c i ica  c i ? 
The analysis of both parts of the study determined the main barriers that anaesthetic trainees 
perceived to challenging consultants. One conclusion was that a new theme of the risk/cost 
benefit  existed in respect to anaesthetic trainees. This was exemplified by trainees effectively 
weighing up the potential consequences for patient harm of challenging or not challenging, 
versus the potential negative effects on themselves or their relationship with the senior in the 
context of the clinical situation/decision to be challenged. A key finding in the study was the 
effectiveness of non-verbal cues, predominantly used by more experienced trainees. Analysis 
of both parts of the study were used to formulate a thematic net ork model of barriers to 
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challenging seniors  (Figure 2.1) that combined previously known and newly described 
themes. The cost/risk-benefit  conceptual model (Figure 2.2) may prove useful in 
understanding the complicated decision-making process that exists underl ing speaking up  
behaviour.  
 
2.2.4 Where are we now? 
A recently published systematic review by Pattni (78) and colleagues entitled Challenging 
a ho i  and eaking  in he o e a ing oom en i onmen : a na a i e n he i  reviewed 
31 manuscripts around the subject of speaking up in the operating theatre and reviewed our 
original research. In addition to the conclusion that more senior trainees seemed to challenge 
more quickly, it also referred to another conclusion that we had made in terms of the cultural 
aspects to challenge. Friedman (73) and colleagues concluded that junior doctors struggled 
to challenge authority, but our study found the opposite and although our study was not 
statistically powered, it did suggest that trainees based in the UK challenged more effectively. 
It was hypothesized that this could well be due to the education and training provided in the 
Merseyside region around cases such as Elaine Bromley (79) and them being publicized in 
the anaesthetic literature (28).  
 
The subsequent narrative synthesis performed by Pattni and colleagues concluded that 
hierarchy gradients, organisational culture, and education were the most frequently observed 
factors that affected an individual s abilit  to challenge authorit  (78). They also concluded 
that perceived barriers and enablers to speaking up were largely modifiable and that to 
promote speaking up within health teams would require organisations to cultivate a culture of 
open, safe communication in addition to an education programme regarding the importance 
of speaking up (78), which concurs with elements of our discussion. 
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2.2.5 Reflections on the methodology 
Our original research project was split into two components and both elements are 
summarised and reflected on below 
 
2.2.5.1 Part One. Focus Group Investigation of Senior Anaesthetic Trainees. 
This consisted of a qualitative approach using verbatim transcriptions from a total of 12 
anaesthetic trainees (ST3-7) from the Mersey Deanery from four facilitated focus group 
sessions each lasting about 30 minutes. Trainees were asked to discuss barriers that they 
perceived to exist to challenging consultants in their own and other specialties. The format of 
the focus group was to initiate questioning using a standardised set of predetermined open 
questions and then participants were encouraged to exchange anecdotes, clarify their views 
and remark on each other s e periences. A verbatim transcription as made of the intervie s 
along with field notes and we analysed data using a thematic network analysis of known 
barriers and ne , emerging barriers and this led to the formulation of barrier clusters . In line 
with a thematic network, we noted keywords next to basic (first level) themes, and gradually 
grouped them into three common organising (second level) themes to explain the complexity 
by which these personal, organisational and situational factors interconnected and influenced 
the global theme of perceived barriers to challenging erroneous decisions by anaesthetic 
trainees. To increase the validity and reliability, we undertook a process of interrater 
conformability, whereby both authors independently coded the first transcript independently. 
We then engaged in a repeated coding process that led to agreement on most of the codes. 
Although an invitation was given to all Speciality Trainees (ST3-7) on the Mersey Rotation 
those who replied may have added a self-selected bias around challenging seniors. We may 
also have missed other aspects of challenging that have been experienced by those who did 
not participate. 
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2.2.5.2  Part Two. High Fidelity Simulation 
We performed a quantitative analysis of a simulated high-fidelity airway crisis. A confederate 
(actor) consultant anaesthetist failed repeatedly to intubate a patient, and 13 junior anaesthetic 
trainees (first two years of training, CT1/CT2) were expected to challenge decisions that were 
clearly wrong in their individual scenario. This was combined with a qualitative analysis of 
barriers to challenging that were expressed and identified during the debrief session. Trainees 
were debriefed immediately following the simulations using video playback from their 
respective scenarios. The technique thinking aloud  (80) was used to explore displayed 
behaviours, barriers to speaking up and strategies used for challenging.  
 
When CT1 (less than one-year experience) and CT2 trainees (less than 2 ears  experience) 
were compared, the CT2s challenged quicker and ensured fewer intubation attempts, they 
established quicker adequate rescue oxygenation and ventilation and less simulated patient 
desaturation was observed. It has to be noted though that this was merely an observation and 
was not powered sufficiently to draw any meaningful statistical conclusions and in the planning 
stages of the study this was not an expected finding and so was not planned for. Limitations 
to this study were that the scenario was conducted in a simulation centre with a high-fidelity 
mannequin and that candidates may well have behaved very differently in real clinical practice. 
Some of the candidates had also worked with the consultant anaesthetist who was playing the 
role of the consultant anaesthetist in the scenario and this may have altered the way they 
would usually behave (or may not have), again this was not considered in the planning stages 
of the study and could have introduced a bias. This potential for bias could have been 
mitigated by the consultant who was intubating the mannequin (the confederate) being played 
by an actor or inviting another consultant who was unknown to the candidates. 
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Figure 2.1.  Thematic network diagram of barriers to challenging seniors 
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Figure 2.2.  Model of Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
 
2.2.6 Where are we now? Contribution of the Paper to Clinical Practice and What it 
says about me as a Researcher? 
The impact that this article has made in the medical literature could be gauged by the fact that 
it has been cited 28 times. The Altmetric Attention score is 34 based on it being mentioned by 
1 news outlet, in 1 blog and been mentioned on Twitter 27 times. There has also been 
engagement with this article 40 times on Mendeley. The impact factor of the Journal of 
Anaesthesia is 5.8 (2018-2019). This journal was chosen as it is read on a regular basis by 
consultant and trainee anaesthetists who are working in hospitals in the United Kingdom. The 
Journal is also circulated to members of the Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and 
Ireland. Two citations of this article were to develop my own work: 
 
 Jones CP, Fawker-Corbett J, Groom P, Morton B, Lister C, Mercer SJ. Human Factors 
in Preventing Complications in Anaesthesia. Anaesthesia 2018; 73(S1): 12-24 
 Mercer SJ. Team-working, communication and use of communication aids and 
checklists (Book Chapter) Section 2 - The impact of human factors in clinical practice 
in Decision-Making and Simulation in Obstetric Anaesthesia. Cambridge University 
Press. 2019 Chapter 8 Pg 45-51. 
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The articles listed in Table 2.2 have also cited this publication (I have only listed articles 
published in English). Of note, it is a particularly pleasing to see that this paper is mentioned 
in a very recent editorial by Jennifer Weller(81) who I consider to be one of the world 
anaesthesia leads on patient safety and human factors. Several papers in Table 8 have cited 
our paper to define Speaking Up . 
 
 
Table 2.2. Publications citing Beament T, Mercer SJ. Speak Up! Barriers to Challenging 
Erroneous Decisions of Seniors in Anaesthesia. Anaesthesia 2016; 71: 1332 1340 
 
Paper Summary 
Tarrant C, Leslie M, Bion J, Dixon-Woods 
M.  
A qualitative study of speaking out about 
patient safety concerns in intensive care 
units  
Social Science & Medicine 2017; 193: 8-15  
 
This study reports the outcomes of ethnographic 
observations and interviews of personnel working in 
intensive care units in England and focuses on 
concerns about patient safety and poor practice. 
The article concluded that formal reporting or 
communication training as the solution to giving 
voice to safety concerns was simplistic and that a 
more sophisticated understanding of social control 
was needed.  Our work is cited here in the context 
that the challenging of seniors by trainees or junior 
members of the team was thought to be a particular 
issue of concern.  
Almghairbi DS, Marufu TC, Moppett IK. 
Conflict resolution in anaesthesia: 
systematic review. BMJ Simulation and 
Technology 2019; 5: 1 7.  
 
This is a systematic review that focuses on conflict 
resolution interventions and strategies and their 
impact on educational, behavioural and patient-level 
outcomes. The authors reviewed the concept of 
speaking up  and used the definition in our paper, 
eaking  i h one , and/o  o he  eam 
members doubts, differing opinions or potential 
problems about decision or course of action in 
medical care  hen conducting their literature 
search. The literature review revealed 3830 records 
initially and this was narrowed down to 11 eligible 
studies of which our paper was one of these. Our 
paper was then excluded at the full text screening 
stage.  The article commented that an environment 
with and atmosphere of open and clear speaking up 
was essential and concluded that currently the 
evidence for training to improve conflict resolution in 
the clinical environment was sparse. 
Martinez W, Lehmann LS, Thomas EJ.  
Speaking up about traditional and 
professionalism-related patient safety 
threats: a national survey of interns and 
residents.  
BMJ Quality and Safety 2017; 26: 869 880. 
This paper reports the results of an anonymous 
survey of 1800 medical and surgical trainees on 
their attitudes about, barriers and facilitators for, and 
self-reported experience with speaking up. Our 
article is cited as one of a number of articles that 
describe the factors that influence trainees in 
speaking up about patient safety threats. The 
conclusions were that trainees commonly observed 
unprofessional behaviour yet were less likely to 
speak up about it compared with traditional safety 
threats even when they perceived high potential 
patient harm.  
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E Paradis, CR Whitehead. Beyond the 
lamppost: A proposal for a fourth wave of 
education for collaboration. Academic 
Medicine 2018; 93: 1457-1463 
This article is a historical review of interprofessional 
learning described in four aves . Our publication is 
cited with two other articles in the context that new 
health care professionals are not thought to be in a 
position to confront harmful and unsafe professional 
hierarchies. Another article that I have published 
was also cited in this publication (68) 
Richard A, Pfeiffer Y, Schwappach DDL. 
Development and Psychometric 
Evaluation of the Speaking Up About 
Patient Safety Questionnaire. Journal of 
Patient Safety 2017 Aug 28. 
This publication investigates speaking up in hospital 
organisations in Switzerland in the form of a 
questionnaire. Our article is cited just in the context 
that barriers to challenging have been investigated 
in the past. 
 
Schwappach D, Sendlhofer G, Häsler L. 
Speaking up behaviors and safety climate 
in an Austrian University 
Hospital. International Journal for Quality 
in Health Care 2018; 30: 701 707  
This publication sought to analyse speaking up 
behaviour and safety climate in an Austrian 
University Hospital via a questionnaire and 
concluded that only moderately frequent concerns 
were in conflict with frequent speaking up 
behaviours. Our article was cited whist defining 
speaking up. 
Pattni N, Arzola C, Malavade A. 
Challenging authority and speaking up in 
the operating room environment: a 
narrative synthesis British Journal of 
Anaesthesia 2019; 122: 233-244. 
 
This publication is a narrative synthesis which 
explores the literature on challenging authority in the 
operating room environment. Articles were identified 
as either discussion or review articles, observational 
or qualitative studies, or studies identifying the role 
of specific barriers or investigating the effect of 
educational interventions. It was noted that 
hierarchy, organisational culture and education 
were most frequent and that simulation studies were 
important (our study used simulation in part). Our 
article is a listed publication in the analysis and is 
cited as a source of qualitative research to offers 
insight into a trainees  perception of hierarch  in the 
operating room and the perceived barriers and 
enablers to speaking up. 
Guris RJD, Duarte SS, Miller CR, et al. 
Training novice anaesthesiology trainees 
to speak up for patient safety. British 
Journal of Anaesthesia 2019 (In Press) 
 
This publication had the primary aim of testing 
whether repeated simulation-based practice was of 
benefit to trainees in enabling them to speak up 
about patient management concerns. Our article 
was cited in respect to novice anaesthetists and 
also that different individuals are more predisposed 
to speaking out than others. The conclusion was 
that novice anaesthesia trainees benefited from 
simulation training to improve intrapersonal factors 
and communication. 
Cooke G, Mitchell B. Silence is golden. 
Medical Education 2018; 52: 780 788  
 
This editorial discusses pauses and hesitations in 
clinical practice in the context of the interactions 
between trainers and trainees. Our article is cited as 
hesitancy could be viewed as a feature of a learner 
about to learn. For learners, operating at the edge 
of their ability, but not too far beyond it, implies their 
actions are difficult, and therefore hesitation or 
uncertainty are features of a learner in the right 
space to progress. Here, interpreting uncertainty as 
incompetence, although perhaps correct at that 
moment, may also result in the missing of a golden 
opportunity for a teachable moment.  
Price Y. Barriers to challenging senior 
anaesthetists' decisions. Anaesthesia 
2017; 72: 272. 
This is a correspondence to the editor in response 
to our article. The author commented that it was 
disappointing that patients were potentially at risk 
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 due to trainee s reluctance to speak up and 
challenge senior colleagues. The author suggested 
that a reluctance to challenge may have been due 
to a lack confidence in knowledge. They also 
commented that the cost-risk conceptual model was 
interesting and should be used in other clinical 
decisions involving significant patient risk and 
uncertain management. 
Ng GWY, Pun JKH, So EHK, et al. Speak-up 
culture in an intensive care unit in Hong 
Kong: a cross-sectional survey exploring 
the communication openness perceptions 
of Chinese doctors and nurses. BMJ Open 
2017; 7: e015721  
 
This study uses a questionnaire to explore the 
perception of issues in ICU communication in 
Chinese Doctors and Nurses, their reasons for 
speaking up and the possible factors and strategies 
to promote speaking up. Our article is cited in the 
context that indirect speaking strategies by the 
Chinese to maintain harmony may also be related to 
the training that they receive on human factors 
involved in speaking up. It is stated that an inability 
to challenge authority is often attributed to a lack of 
training in conflict management. Another abstract 
that I have published was also cited in this article 
(82). 
Smith AF, Plunkett E. People, systems 
and safety: resilience and excellence in 
healthcare practice. Anaesthesia 2019, 74, 
508 517  
 
This editorial describes safety science in terms of 
three ages , defined as the age of technolog , the 
age of human factors  and the age of safet  
management . The authors argue that clinical and 
organisational work can be made safer by fostering 
excellence and promoting resilience in addition to 
talking negative comments. Our article is cited in the 
context that trainees should be able to raise 
concerns. 
Bringans C. Medicine Needs Medical 
Student-Scientists: Update on an Old 
Theory. The New Zealand Medical Student 
Journal 2017; 25 
This article is a discussion on medical students 
speaking out  
Schwappach D, Sendlhofer G, Kamolz L- 
P, Ko le W, Brunner G. Speaking up 
culture of medical students within an 
academic teaching hospital: Need of 
faculty working in patient safety. PLoS 
ONE 2019; 14(9): e0222461. 
This paper reports a survey amongst medical 
students using a validated questionnaire. Our 
paper is quoted to define speaking up . The stud  
concluded that the more experienced the student 
the more frequently they reported perceived patient 
safety concerns or rule violations. 
Etherington N, Wu M, Cheng-Boivin O, 
Larrigan S, Boet S. Interprofessional 
communication in the operating room: a 
narrative review to advance research and 
practice Canadian Journal of Anesthesia 
2019; 66: 1251 1260 
This paper is a narrative review that outlines the 
importance of interprofessional communication for 
surgical patient safety. It also maps the barriers 
and facilitators to communication and highlights 
key strategies for enhancing its quality in the 
operating room. Our paper is cited to emphasise 
that there are many barriers to speaking up in the 
operating room (e.g., hierarchy, lack of training, 
relationships, personality). A research agenda to 
inform best practices in interprofessional operating 
room communication has been suggested based 
on this work. 
Weller JM, Long JA. Creating a climate for 
speaking up. British Journal of 
Anaesthesia 2019; 122: 710-713 
This is an Editorial in the British Journal of 
Anaesthesia and provides an overview of the 
literature on speaking up. The authors reveal an 
imbalance in efforts to promote speaking up and 
note that the predominance of studies are actually 
directed at junior staff. Our paper is cited and 
commented that we undertook a useful synthesis 
of studies exploring barriers to speaking up. The 
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editorial comments that barriers are due to poor 
communication between senior and junior medical 
staff, the behaviour of senior staff, the perceived 
hierarchy in operating theatre teams, and the low 
status of an individual. 
Newsam R. Operating department 
practitioners and midwives: The 
undervalued obstetric care collaboration. 
British Journal of Midwifery 2018; 
26. https://doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2018.26.
11.714 
This is a case study of communication on the labour 
ward and gives an example of when communication 
broke down between a junior and senior 
practitioner. 
Novak A. Improving safety through 
speaking up: An ethical and financial 
imperative. Journal of Healthcare Risk 
Management 2019; 39: 19-27 
This article describes an initiative at one institution 
to encourage staff to Speak Up!  
Best JA, Kim S. The FIRST Curriculum: 
Cultivating Speaking Up Behaviors in the 
Clinical Learning Environment. The 
Journal of Continuing Education in 
Nursing 2019; 50: 355-361 
This paper describes an educational program to 
encourage speaking up. The conclusion is that 
training improved participants motivations to speak 
up concerns. 
Toy S, Guris RJ, Duarte SS, Dwivedi P. 
Development of a scale to measure 
intrapersonal factors influencing 
speaking up in the operating room. 
Perspectives on Medical Education 2019; 
8: 253 260  
This paper reported on the development of a scale 
to measure intrapersonal factors that may 
influence speaking up behaviour in the operating 
room. Our research was cited as one article that 
identified individual factors as the main barriers to 
speaking up. 
 
 
The following individual thesis have also cited this article which demonstrates that my work is 
now starting to be acknowledged in current research and being further developed. 
 
 
Ann-Sofie Sundqvist (PhD Thesis) 
 Title: Perioperative patient advocacy - having the patient's best interests at heart  
 Institution: rebro University 
 
enay Sarmaso lu (Program of Medical Education Master of Science Thesis) 
 Title: Intern doctors  likelihood of speaking up for patient safet  
 Institution: Republic of Turkey Hacettepe University Graduate School of Health 
Sciences  
 
Jamie White (PhD Thesis) 
 Title: Empowering medical personnel to challenge through simulation-based training  
 Institution: University of Birmingham  
 
 
2.2.7 Where this paper places me with reference to being at the forefront of my area 
of professional practice. 
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I have used the knowledge we discovered from this research paper to present at the following 
invited national meetings with multidisciplinary audiences. 
  
Title:   Simulation for Trauma Training 
Meeting: Trauma Care Conference 
Location: Yarnfield Conference Centre, Stafford 
Date:   6 March 2019 
 
Title:   Wrong Site Block 
Meeting: Royal College of Anaesthetists Updates Meeting 
Location: Hilton Hotel, Liverpool 
Date:   26 November 2018 
 
 
Title:   I i g T a a Tea . U de a di g Wh  Tea  D  W  
Meeting: Cambridge Trauma Conference 
Location: Churchill College Cambridge 
Date:   28 April 2018 
 
Title:   Human Factors in Complex Trauma 
Meeting: Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland Annual Congress 
Location: BT Convention Centre, Liverpool 
Date:   28 September 2017 
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ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION The concentration of major trauma experience at Camp Bastion has allowed continuous improvements to occur
in the patient pathway from the point of wounding to surgical treatment. These changes have involved clinical management as
well as alterations to the physical layout of the hospital, training and decision making. Consideration of the human factors has
been a major part of these improvements.
METHODS We describe the Camp Bastion patient pathway with the communication template that focused decision making at
various key moments during damage control resuscitation and damage control surgery (DCR–DCS). This system identifies four
key stages: ‘command huddle’, ‘snap brief’, ‘sit-reps’ (situation reports) and ‘sign-out/debrief’. The attitude of staff to communi-
cation and decision making is also evaluated.
RESULTS Twenty cases admitted to Camp Bastion with battlefield injuries were studied from 6 September to 6 October 2012.
Qualitative responses from 115 members of staff were collected. All patients were haemodynamically shocked with a median
pH of 7.25 (range: 6.83–7.40) and a median of 18 units of mixed red cells and plasma were transfused. In 89% of instances,
theatre staff were aware of what was required of them at the beginning of the case, 86% felt there were regular updates and
93% understood what was required of them as the case progressed.
CONCLUSIONS The evolution of the hospital at Camp Bastion has been a unique learning experience in the field of major
trauma. The Defence Medical Services have responded with continuous innovation to optimise DCR–DCS for seriously injured
patients. Together with the improvements in clinical care, a communication and decision making matrix was developed. Staff
evaluation showed a high degree of satisfaction with the quality of communication.
KEYWORDS
Trauma – Military – War – Afghanistan – Battlefield injuries – Gunshot wounds – Blast injuries –
Landmines
Accepted 29 July 2014
CORRESPONDENCE TO
Suren Arul, E: suren.arul@bch.nhs.uk
Damage control resuscitation (DCR) and damage control
surgery (DCS) are established UK military doctrine for the
initial management of severely injured patients.1 However,
taking the theory and converting it into a practical, workable
solution has required a continuous process of meticulous
data collection, research, audit and service improvement.2
The actual patient pathway has therefore evolved signifi-
cantly from the early days of the tented hospital to the
present layout in the purpose built hospital.3 Each step in
the patient transfer on arrival to Camp Bastion has been
considered carefully, from the use of tourniquets4 at the
point of injury in order to control catastrophic haemorrhage
to the medical emergency response team.5 These medical
teams arrive by Chinook helicopter to collect patients for
transfer to Camp Bastion; the purpose is to bring care as far
forwards as possible and minimise the time to reach medical
treatment.
Not only has clinical practice evolved but the physical
floor plan has changed in Camp Bastion to improve the
ergonomics of transfer. Furthermore, there has been a con-
centration on human factors to optimise leadership, team-
work and the multidisciplinary approach.6
The need for urgent treatment in the most severely injured
patients, especially in a busy trauma hospital such as at
Camp Bastion where multiply injured casualties are often
evacuated from the battlefield to the emergency department
(ED) in a short time, meant that established communication
techniques sometimes failed to keep the team adequately
informed and updated while dealing with the casualty.7 The
authors of the ‘10 seconds for 10 minutes’ principle identified
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in a simulation laboratory that even in emergencies, taking
time to assess the situation, which aims to teach followership
and leadership among other skills, improved decision mak-
ing and made the team work effectively.8 The newly estab-
lished European Trauma Course teaches teamworking and
leadership, uses a five-second check done by the team leader
on the arrival of the casualty, prior to the team starting
work.9,10 This allows the team leader and team members an
overview of the patient, which is vital to maintaining situa-
tional awareness and forming a mental model.
Both approaches place human factors and communications
at the very centre of the management of sick patients. Similar
evidence is published on the need for concentrating on human
factors in the operating theatre.11–14 Best practice assumes
good communication to sequence and coordinate the proc-
esses. This is taught in detail by the Defence Medical Services
with intensive training for revision just before deployment.15–17
The World Health Organization (WHO) surgical safety check-
list, introduced in 2009,18–20 helps to reduce ‘never events’ and
improves briefing of the team.21 It has also been reported to
reduce hospital mortality.21 It was not, however, designed to
optimise communication in the rapidly changing situation
faced by the ED and operating room (OR) teams dealing with
a severely injured patient. A discussion paper published in
2012 therefore sought to improve and streamline communica-
tion specifically during the DCR–DCS sequence.22
The patient pathway
Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the front
end of the Camp Bastion hospital footprint while Figure 2
shows the communications system, known as the ‘Trauma
WHO Checklist’. Virtually all injured patients arrived by
helicopter, transferred either by the British or American
teams landing at the helicopter landing site approximately
200 metres from the hospital. Transfer was by ambulance
to the front of the ED with triage occurring at several
stages in the process. The numbers below relate to the
points on Figure 1:
1. Detailed information was sent directly from the Patient
Evacuation Coordination Cell to the hospital, informing
them of the type of incident as well as the number and
severity of casualties due to arrive. This allowed the
consultant of the ED to call out the trauma teams, and
to allocate relevant resources and staff to the correct
number of beds in the ED and theatres.
2. The ED consultant met the ambulances on arrival and
allocated them to a resuscitation bay. Although this was
usually decided in advance based on the radioed infor-
mation, it occasionally changed again.
2.1. While the patient was being unloaded by the recep-
tion teams, the senior transferring clinician (doctor
or paramedic) gave the accepting team a briefing
based on the ‘ATMIST’ handover system (Table 1). It
was vital that the trauma team were disciplined and
remained focused and silent during the handover.
Often the prehospital doctor entered the ED prior to
the patient, allowing for less distraction. However, if
the patient arrived at the same time, he or she
would only have been looked at to confirm there
Surgeons waiting
area
Resus bay 6 Resus bay 4 Resus 
bay 1 Resus
bay 2 
Resus
bay 3
(paeds)Resus bay 5
Minor
Injuries 
Resus bay 7
Radiology
& 2 x CT
scanners  
Operating theatre
Table 3 Table 2
Table 1
Reception
Table 4
(paeds & burns) 
Scrub,
prep,
stores  
Intensive Care 
Unit To
Wards 
Helicopter
Landing Site
(200 m away)
Ambulances
Unloading
bay 
1 2
3
5
4
6
Figure 1 Diagrammatic representation of the British military hospital at Camp Bastion and the patient pathway during damage control
surgery (not to scale)
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was no ongoing catastrophic haemorrhage or air-
way obstruction. All other treatment commenced
after the handover had finished.
3. The patient arrived in the resuscitation bay on a stretcher
and was transferred to the hospital trolley. A <C>ABC
approach4 to injury identification and management was
followed under the leadership of the ED team leader
using a horizontal resuscitation approach.23
3.1. Occasionally, a severely injured patient with
ongoing haemorrhage may have gone straight to
the operating theatre without stopping in an ED
bay, known as ‘right turn resuscitation’.24 (The
direction of patient flow has evolved over recent
years so readers will note from the floorplan that
at the time of writing it was actually a left turn to
the theatres.) In this case, the entire ED trauma
team stayed with the patient to do the primary sur-
vey and identify injuries while the surgeon/anaes-
thetist managed the catastrophic haemorrhage.
The Trauma WHO
1. Command Huddle
2. Snap Brief
3. Sit Reps (10 seconds every 10-30 mins)
4. Sign out and Debrief
4 vital steps to optimising comms in DCS
Continuous communication is vital during Damage Control Resuscitation & Surgery (DCS).
The Trauma WHO is a means of enhancing this. It should be used for time critical patients
i.e. Right turn resus, massive transfusions and urgent transfers to theatre for any reason.
The situation can change rapidly during damage control surgery. The sit-reps, usually lead
by anaesthetics, should be quick and inform all members of the team of the patient's status.
 - T Time since the start of the procedure. Temperature
 - B BP, Blood volume given so far, Blood gases
 - C Clotting (i.e. ROTEM results)
 - S Surgical progress and plan
As the surgery / anaesthesia enters a more stable phase a common sense approach
should be taken and the urgent nature and frequency of the 'Sit-reps' should be reduced.
it is important that all members of the theatre team check we have the right patient and
know what is about to happen. In a time critical situation it is essential to be concise.
- Surgeon confirms the correct patient, the clinical & imaging findings and the surgical plan
- Anaesthetist states the T(temp), B(BP, blood given, blood gas), C(clotting) & other issues
- Confirm antibiotics given, TXA given, blood available
- The time of the start of the procedure should be recorded on a board (this is Time Zero)
At the end of the operation a sign-out is essential for both the surgeon and the anaesthetist
to summarise the patient's injuries, what has been done and what has been left untreated.
This should ideally be done in the presence of the accepting team (probably ITU). A debrief
should be done immediately after the sign-out as the team will rapidly disperse.
Occurs early in resus / evaluation - usually in ED. Decision made jointly by ED, Surgeons,
Anaesthesia, DMD i.e. Should patient go to Theatre, CT Scan or Ward. Theatre team
leader to be involved. Futility of continuing treatment should also be considered.
Figure 2 Aide-mémoire for time critical surgery, especially damage control resuscitation and surgery
Table 1 ‘ATMIST’ handover
A Age of patient
T Time of incident
M Mechanism of injury
I Injuries (from top to toe)
S vital Signs
T Treatments given so far
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3.2. Once the initial assessment was complete, the ED
team leader called a ‘command huddle’ in conjunc-
tion with the anaesthetist and the senior surgeon,
to establish appropriate treatment (or possible
futility), which was usually going either to theatre,
to computed tomography or straight to the ward.22
4. The majority of patients with penetrating battlefield inju-
ries went to the OR. On arrival, the anaesthetist called
time out for a ‘snap brief’, modelled on the WHO check-
list but streamlined specifically for the most urgent time
critical patients. It must be remembered that unlike an
elective operating list, these patients may arrive in thea-
tre within minutes of arriving in the department so the
theatre team could have very little warning of the patient
or what to expect. As a result, it is essential that the key
information is communicated to the entire team in a set
format to make sure that nothing is missed.
5. The time of the start of surgery was noted on a board in
theatre and documented during the snap brief so that
the importance of time was not lost.
5.1. The situation changes rapidly during DCS as new
injuries are discovered and the patient’s physiology
fluctuates in regard to his or her injuries and treat-
ment. Furthermore, multiple surgical teams could
be working on the same patient. ‘Sit-reps’ (situation
reports) were used every 10–30 minutes to keep the
team updated of progress. The mnemonic ‘TBCS’
helped the team leader to remember the critical
information to be covered (explained in more detail
in Appendix 1 – available online.) Bringing the vital
physiological parameters and the surgical progress
together like this regularly helps reduce the risks of
tunnel vision or loss of situational awareness. It
also focuses the team to review their surgical plan
and change it if necessary.
6. At the end of surgery a ‘sign-out’ should be done. At
Camp Bastion, the intensive care unit (ICU) team came
to collect the patient. The sign-out is essential for both
the surgeons and the anaesthetist to inform the receiv-
ing ICU team as well as all the other members of the
theatre team about the patient’s injuries, what has been
done and what is left to do. By definition, DCS will focus
on the critical injuries causing haemorrhage or contam-
ination so many things will have been left to be dealt
with at second-look surgery when the patient’s physiol-
ogy has improved.
6.1. A debrief was done at the end before the team dis-
persed to other activities. This is important for clini-
cal feedback and also to allow staff to express their
feelings about the sometimes complex emotional,
moral and ethical dilemmas with which they have
dealt.
6.2. Further analysis of the case continued over the fol-
lowing days, including a weekly telephone confer-
ence morbidity and mortality meeting that involved
both the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham
and the US medical facility in Landstuhl, Germany,
until all learning points had been extracted and
dealt with.
Methods
Approval was obtained from the director of the Joint Medi-
cal Command prior to the start of the project (RCDM/Res/
Audit/1036/12/0230) as well as from the deployed medical
director of the hospital. Theatre staff attitudes to communi-
cation during the management of major trauma were
investigated by means of a standardised questionnaire.
This was prepared with advice from experts in psychology
and communication, and included 12 questions as well as
a visual analogue scoring system. This was used to get
information on the case and record the reactions of all
members of the team associated with the case. Free text
was also used to allow staff to express their personal opin-
ions. The questionnaire was confidential. The case inclu-
sion criteria were that the patient was severely injured and
required DCS.
Although the Trauma WHO Checklist paper had already
been published22 and widely distributed in predeployment
training, the surgeons, anaesthetists and theatre staff were
briefed again in Afghanistan prior to the start of the project
on the format for communication during cases in which it
was likely that DCR–DCS would be required. Posters were
placed around the theatre as an aide-mémoire for the com-
munication system proposed. Data were anonymised for
both the patient and the staff, and recorded on a standard
Excel® spreadsheet (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, US).
Results
Twenty cases were studied in a thirty-day period during
September 2012. Responses from 115 members of staff
were collected. Patients were all admitted to the hospital at
Camp Bastion with either gunshot or blast injuries. They
were haemodynamically shocked with a median pH of 7.25
(range: 6.83–7.40), a median base excess of -7mEq/l
(range: 0–-24mEq/l) and a median lactate of 4.99mmol/l
(range: 1.9–14.6mmol/l]. A median of 18 units of mixed
packed red cells and fresh frozen plasma were transfused
(9 units of each in a 1:1 ratio). The median time from
arrival to the first incision in theatre was 56 minutes
(range: 3–110 minutes). There was one death in this group.
The 115 responses from staff are shown in Table 2
(30 from surgeons, 23 from anaesthetists, 18 from operat-
ing department practitioners, 18 from scrub nurses, and 26
from others such as runners and transfusion staff). Overall,
88% of the theatre staff either agreed or strongly agreed
that they were aware of the injuries at the beginning of the
case, 91% said there were regular updates during the case
and 99% understood what was required of them as the
case progressed. Teamwork was found to be effective by
93% of staff members and the same proportion believed
there was good communication throughout the case. Over
two-thirds (69%) felt that regular sit-reps contributed to
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improved communication with only 10% feeling that they
could become annoying or unhelpful. Free text was
allowed to feed back specific comments (Table 3).
Discussion
The medical treatment facility at Camp Bastion has been a
unique environment for the treatment of the severely
injured since it opened in 2006. A process of data collec-
tion, audit and service improvement has led to continual
innovation and improvement.25 DCR–DCS is now the
standard of care for the severely injured patient,1,26 and
every step in the pathway from point of wounding to the
evacuation back to the UK has been considered in detail to
minimise the delays and optimise treatment. With the clo-
sure of the hospital, we feel it is important to capture the
logistical and clinical changes that occurred during its
lifetime.
In the complex environment of managing major trauma,
teamwork and non-technical skills are essential for peak
performance.12,14,16,17,27 Training started for the entire the-
atre team before arrival in Camp Bastion in the form of a
72-hour whole-hospital simulation.28 Care was consultant-
delivered throughout the patient journey, unlike in the
National Health Service where it is often only consultant-
led.29 It is this relatively recent acceptance of the complex-
ity of both medicine in general and the operating theatre
environment in particular30 that led to the development of
the checklist. Gawande found that this produced a 36%
reduction in complications and a 47% reduction in
deaths.31 The result was the worldwide acceptance of the
WHO checklist18,19 and the British Defence Medical Serv-
ices formally introduced it to the hospital at Camp Bastion
in 2010.
The original WHO checklist includes 19 questions and
takes approximately 2–5 minutes to complete. Unlike most
surgery, where the operation is seen as a distinct entity
from the preoperative or ward phase and the operative
plan is clear at the preoperative stage, severely injured
patients require treatment along the DCR–DCS sequence in
which resuscitation, identification of injuries, rapid surgi-
cal control of bleeding and management of life threatening
injuries are integrated seamlessly and occur concurrently.1
Human factors are essential in maintaining good team-
work.16,17 However, a single point checklist such as the
WHO checklist is not sufficient to promote optimal intrao-
perative team communication because the knowledge of
the injuries sustained and the dynamically changing phys-
iological derangement requires the surgical management
plan to evolve in light of this change.
Table 2 Results of questionnaire for optimising communications
Please answer the following questions by circling one response only, using the scale below.
0 1 2 3 4
Disagree strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Agree strongly
At the start (ie after the snap brief)
0 1 2 3 4
Q1 At the start, were you aware of the patient’s injuries? 3% 6% 4% 20% 68%
Q2 At the start of the operation, did you understand the
surgical plan?
1% 2% 9% 19% 69%
Q3 Did you know what was required of you at the beginning
of the case?
1% 1% 2% 11% 85%
During the case
Q4 Were there regular updates during the case? 1% 4% 4% 20% 71%
Q5 Were changes or problems during the case communicated
effectively to the entire team?
0% 1% 11% 20% 68%
Q6 Did you feel that you knew what was happening during
the case?
0% 2% 4% 21% 73%
Q7 Did you know what was required of you as the case
progressed?
0% 0% 1% 7% 92%
Communication
Q8 Did the team work effectively throughout the case? 0% 2% 6% 15% 78%
Q9 Was there good communication during the operation? 1% 4% 2% 20% 73%
Q10 Did you feel regular sit-reps helped to improve communication? 0% 6% 15% 20% 58%
Q11 Did you feel that you could communicate freely during the case? 0% 4% 3% 10% 83%
Q12 Were regular sit-reps helpful? 3% 7% 21% 34% 35%
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The fact that the hospital at Camp Bastion was probably
one of the busiest major trauma units in the world pro-
vided the background against which we could trial a spe-
cific protocol of communication for trauma. Following
discussions within the Defence Medical Services, it was felt
that to promote good communications for severely injured
patients, these would need to start in the resuscitation
room, continue throughout the operation and finish with a
formal sign-out; debrief should be done at this point as the
trauma team will usually disperse rapidly.
All military doctors, nurses and theatre personnel
involved were trained jointly in both trauma management
and teamwork. This occurred using cadavers for DCS and
high fidelity simulation for teamwork on the Military Opera-
tional Surgical Training course.15 Furthermore, to learn to
how to manage casualty flow, a whole-hospital simulation in
a hanger was used. Considered vital in all aspects of military
activity, clear communication is confirmed by the fact that
96% of respondents had a clear understanding of their role
at the beginning of the case and that 99% understood what
was required of them as the case progressed reflects the fact
that teamwork is already well honed in this small group of
clinicians. The biggest single innovation for this project was
the addition of the sit-reps, which formalised the communi-
cation during the progress of the case.
Having some flexibility in the timing of sit-reps was found
to be beneficial (eg waiting for the results of the blood gases
or thromboelastometry). Recognition that a key part of man-
aging the trauma patient is at the time of transition from the
OR to ICU led to the addition of the sign-out so that it could
be made clear to all staff and the team accepting the patient
exactly what had been performed as well as the goals for
management for the next few hours and days.
By identifying just a few key moments in the manage-
ment of complex trauma, we can focus minds on the
importance of good communication even when the team is
engrossed in performing DCS. This concept was well illus-
trated by the ‘10 seconds for 10 minutes’ principle.8 The
major advance on the WHO checklist described in our
guideline is the use of the sit-reps, which seek to continue
good communication practice in the intraoperative phase
and to remind the team of maintaining a dialogue.
Although this concept was already well known, it is fre-
quently characterised by open questions such as ‘how are
things going?’ while responses such as ‘we are keeping up’
are too vague to allow for meaningful dialogue and deci-
sion making. A simple protocol based on the mnemonic
‘TBCS’ reminds us of the importance of giving a minimum
dataset of information to get a fuller picture of the patients’
problems, their current physiological status and the evolv-
ing surgical plan. It does not intend, however, to reduce
other forms of communication that may be considered rel-
evant. Gawande found one unexpected result of the origi-
nal WHO checklist: it seemed to improve management in
areas not covered by the checklist presumably by facilitat-
ing better communication.30 We had similar findings,
reflected in the comments of the trauma team (Table 3).
Conclusions
This article has described the Camp Bastion system of
major trauma management, in which every moment of the
patient journey has been considered. Numerous improve-
ments in clinical management have been described includ-
ing DCS,1 use of thromboelastometry32 and massive
transfusion protocols.33 In addition, human factors and
good communication have been placed at the very centre
of our management approach. Identifying key moments for
vital communication in the DCR–DCS process and, in par-
ticular, the introduction of sit-reps has further enhanced
the communication in an already good team. As with all
guidelines, repeated use will encourage all the team mem-
bers to become comfortable with the terms and the proc-
ess. We would therefore recommend that this guideline be
introduced for communication in DCR–DCS and be taught
as part of the team preparations.
Table 3 Free text comments from theatre staff
Comments
Anaesthetist: Unstable patient. Comms very helpful to understand what was going on and how to proceed.
Anaesthetist: Feel the sit-reps formalises what is already done. Will probably become more user friendly with repetition.
Operating department practitioner: Patient’s injuries were not obvious and as patient hadn’t had a CT I knew what was required of
me but at times I felt overwhelmed with tasks. Sit-reps worked well to tie everything together.
Surgeon: The patient had dropped systolic blood pressure down to 60 without the surgical team being informed. Poor communication but
problem highlighted by the sit-reps.
Scrub nurse: The sit-reps were done at a time dictated by the anaesthetist. This made the operation and communication more smooth.
Transfusion team: This was the best case I’ve worked on yet. The anaesthetist was extremely professional. He discussed the plan at logical
intervals, he explained his clinical decisions, plans for products and follow-up tests were talked about with enough time to react. I
appreciated his teaching with me as well. I was also glad when the surgeons discussed their plans at the beginning and could gauge some
of the ups and downs ahead to communicate product needs to emergency department staff. Back in the emergency department also at the
beginning, the anaesthetist told us the target BP so at any given time, it was open communication to discuss a bolus. Great case.
Thank you.
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2.3 Commenting on: Human Factors in Decision Making in Major Trauma in Camp 
Bastion, Afghanistan. Arul S, Pugh H, Mercer SJ, Midwinter M Annals of The Royal 
College of Surgeons of England 2015; 97: 262-268  
 
 
 
2.3.1 Why this paper was written? 
 
WHO surgical safet  checklist  as launched in 2009 (83) in an attempt to reduce patient 
safet  errors and in particular Never Events  (84). Examples of Never Events  include the 
wrong surgery being carried out on a patient or surgery carried out on the wrong site. The 
checklist itself comes in three parts; a sign in (a check prior to induction of anaesthesia), a 
time out  (a check prior to actuall  starting the surger ) and a sign out  (a check at the end of 
the surgery). Despite being reported to save lives (85) one of the limitations of the WHO 
Checklist  itself, is that it is time consuming and when treating patients with complex trauma 
every second counts. As a group of UK-DMS Consultants who had recently deployed to Iraq 
and Afghanistan, we felt that a shorter alternative should be suggested and piloted for time 
critical patients who had been involved in complex trauma. Following a discussion paper (14) 
here the Trauma WHO  as suggested and the elements of the checklist chosen e plained, 
we tested the checklist in a deployed field hospital in Camp Bastion (42). This original research 
article tests the resulting proposed Trauma WHO  checklist in a Militar  Hospital involved in 
an active conflict. 
 
 
 
2.3.2 What was known at the time? 
The original Trauma WHO  (14) consisted of four components 
2.3.2.1  The Command Huddle  
The team leader processes information from the patient handover from the pre-hospital team, 
the primary survey and any initial investigations that have taken place. This is part of the 
gathering evidence  phase or stage one of situational awareness (43) (Figure 1.4). With a sick 
patient, decisions are time critical and require a senior robust decision (86). The options for 
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patient treatment will be (but not exclusively) to remain in the trauma bay for further 
resuscitation, transfer to the CT scanner often for a full body scan (pan-CT), transfer to the 
operating theatre, critical care or a designated trauma ward. The decision-making process is 
aided by a senior discussion between the surgeons, anaesthetist and the team leader. The 
futility of continuing treatment is also considered at this time.  
2.3.2.2  The Snap Brief 
This stage is a final rapid check before any surgery begins  
 The Surgeon confirms  
o The correct patient is present 
o The clinical and imaging findings  
o The surgical plan  
 The Anaesthetist states  
o The patient s temperature 
o Blood pressure 
o Blood given so far 
o Blood gas results (particularly the pH and the base excess) 
o Clotting (near point testing e.g. RoTEM & other issues) 
o Confirms antibiotics given 
o Tranexamic Acid given 
o Blood available 
 The time of the start of the procedure should be recorded on a whiteboard in the 
operating theatre  
 
2.3.2.3  Sit Reps 
The situation can change rapidly during damage control surgery. The sit-reps or situational 
update allows all team members to maintain situational awareness. This process usually 
occurs ever 10-30 minutes, led by anaesthetics and should be quick and inform all members 
of the team of the patient's status. The initial acronym was TBCS 
 T  Time since the start of the procedure. Temperature  
 B   Blood Pressure, Blood volume given so far, Blood gases  
 C   Clotting (i.e. RoTEM results)  
 S  Surgical progress and plan  
This was then later changed after testing on several military exercises to STACK (87) 
 S Systolic Blood Pressure 
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 T Temperature 
 A Acidosis 
 C Coagulation 
 K Kit (Including blood products used) 
 
2.3.2.4  The sign out and debrief 
At the end of the operation a sign-out is essential for both the surgeon and the anaesthetist to 
summarise the patient's injuries, what procedure has been performed and what has been left 
untreated. This should ideally be done in the presence of the accepting team (probably from 
critical care). A hot  debrief should be done immediately after the sign-out as the team will 
rapidly disperse.  
 
 
2.3.3 Wha  he a e  c ib ed  he g ba  c i ica  c i  
 
The Trauma WHO  has no  been adopted b  the UK-DMS and is used in the training of 
deployed hospital teams and has been used successfully on other recent deployments. UK-
DMS personnel are embedded in the National Health Service and as with many of the other 
advances from recent conflicts (4) this concept is being translated into NHS trauma teams. At 
my own hospital, Liverpool University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, the concept of sit-
reps  is firml  embedded into Damage Control Surger  (88) and has led to a culture change 
in the way that information is exchanged in the operating theatre. This is true for other UK-
DMS colleagues who work in major trauma centres in England, and has been described in 
damage control surgery for sick neonates at Birmingham Children s Hospital (89). During this 
observational study, Trauma WHO  ith particular focus on sit-reps  was encouraged to 
enhance communication within the operating theatre team has proved useful in 27 cases 
between 2010-2017. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Where are we now?  
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The concept of The Trauma WHO  (14) was described in 2012 in an attempt to improve the 
communication within the complex trauma team. Training on the importance of human factors 
in complex trauma teams was introduced into the Military Operational Surgical Training 
Course (86) in 2010 as lectures, workshops and a fully immersive high-fidelity simulation 
involving the hole trauma team. Follo ing this project the sit-rep  stage was modified to 
STACK (87) as described above and The Trauma WHO  has no  been formall  adopted b  
the UK-Defence Medical Services. Since Operation HERRICK (Afghanistan) there have been 
subsequent UK-DMS deployments, Operation GRITROCK (Ebola, West Africa) (90) and 
Operation TRENTON (South Sudan) (91) and The Trauma WHO  has been included in 
training and used during deployment. As described above, adoption of the Trauma WHO  has 
been predominately where there have been local champions, particularly with clinicians 
working in the Defence Medical Services. In addition to my own trust there has been a 
publication from Birmingham Children s Hospital(89) that is described above. In addition to 
advances in surgical and anaesthetic techniques the year-on-year improvement in survival 
during both the recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts (5) have been thought to be due to 
improvements in human factors (92) of hich the Trauma WHO  is certainly a contributor. 
2.3.5 Reflections on methodology 
Prior to deployment, all theatre staff attended the Military Operational Surgical Training Course 
(MOST Course) (13) and the Hospital Exercise (12) where they were formally taught about 
The Trauma WHO  and this as practiced during high-fidelity simulation scenarios. On arrival 
in Afghanistan, theatre staff ere reminded about The Trauma WHO  and posters ere 
available on the walls of the operating theatre complex. A standardized confidential 
questionnaire was developed with the help of a psychologist with experience in human factors 
(Professor Rhona Flin from the University of Aberdeen and original author of the ANTS project 
(34)) was used to investigate theatre staff attitudes to communication during the management 
of major trauma. This questionnaire included 12 questions as well as a visual analogue scoring 
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system and was used to get information on all patients who required damage control surgery 
and record the reactions of all members of the team associated with the case. There was the 
opportunity to record comments in free text to allow staff to express their personal opinions. 
The following questions were asked 
 At the start, ere ou a are of the patient s injuries?  
 At the start of the operation, did you understand the surgical plan?  
 Did you know what was required of you at the beginning of the case?  
During the case 
 Were there regular updates during the case?  
 Were changes or problems during the case communicated effectively to the entire 
team?  
 Did you feel that you knew what was happening during the case?  
 Did you know what was required of you as the case progressed?  
Communication 
 Did the team work effectively throughout the case?  
 Was there good communication during the operation?  
 Did you feel regular sit-reps helped to improve communication?  
 Did you feel that you could communicate freely during the case?  
 Were regular sit-reps helpful?  
 
In total, 20 different operations including patients with blast or gun-shot wound injuries were 
studied in a 30-day period during September 2012. Responses from 115 members of staff 
were collected the composition of which were 30 surgeons, 23 anaesthetists, 18 operating 
department practitioners, 18 scrub nurses and 26 from other members of staff (such as 
runners and transfusion staff). Overall, 88% of the theatre staff either agreed or strongly 
agreed that they were aware of the injuries at the beginning of the case, 91% said there were 
regular updates during the case and 99% understood what was required of them as the case 
progressed. Teamwork was found to be effective by 93% of staff members and the same 
proportion believed there was good communication throughout the case. Over two-thirds 
(69%) felt that regular sit-reps contributed to improved communication with only 10% feeling 
that they could become annoying or unhelpful. 
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Limitations to this study included the following 
 This project took place only during one time period (September 2012) and as such only 
took input from one field hospital unit in the Defence Medical Services. In the entire 
period of Operation HERRICK, the Role 3 Field Hospital in Camp Bastion was led by 
regular and reserve units from a wide background of individual experiences. 
 Using just one hospital unit could have incorporated bias into the findings, particularly 
as this was the hospital unit where one of the researchers was posted. 
 The project was limited to 30 days and only 20 operations and as there were 2,792 UK 
military casualties sustaining 14,252 separate injuries during the period in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2012 (5) this accounts for a minor 
fraction of cases seen. 
 We only used one form of investigation (a questionnaire). Further information may 
have been obtained had we used other methodology such as a focus group or semi-
structured interviews 
 These limitations were as a result of a study team member being required to be present 
in Camp Bastion in Afghanistan to conduct the study. 
Positive points from the methodology include the following 
 The methodology engaged a wide range of the multidisciplinary team and this was 
important as the communication tool being investigated (The Trauma WHO) was 
designed to improve communication throughout the trauma team and in the operating 
theatre. 
 
2.3.6 Contribution of the Paper to Clinical Practice and what It says about me as a 
Researcher? 
This article was published in 2015 in the Annals of The Royal College of Surgeons of England 
with an impact factor of 1.268. This journal was chosen as it is predominately read by surgeons 
orking on the shop floor  ho ould be dealing ith patients ith comple  injuries. The 
article has been cited 16 times and has an Almetric Attention score of 2 based on comments 
on social media (Twitter, 3 comments and 34 readers on Mendeley). I have used this 
publication to develop the following articles 
 Jones CP, Fawker-Corbett J, Groom P, Morton B, Lister C, Mercer SJ. Human Factors in 
Preventing Complications in Anaesthesia. Anaesthesia 2018; 73(S1): 12-24 
 Mercer SJ, Khan M, Scott T, Matthews J, Henning D, Stapley S. Human Factors on 
Contingency Operations. Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2017: 163; 78-83 
 Schofield SL, Welfare E, Mercer SJ. In Situ Simulation. Trauma 2018; 20: 281-288 
 Mercer SJ Using full immersive simulation to prepare trauma teams to work in a major 
trauma centre. Trauma 2017: 19: 277-285 
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 Nevins EJ, Bird NTE, Malik HZ, Mercer SJ, Shahzad K, Lunevicius R, Taylor JV, Misra 
N. A systematic review of 3251 emergency department thoracotomies: is it time for a 
national database? European Journal of Trauma and Emergency Surgery 2018; 
doi.org/10.1007/s00068-018-0982-z 
 Mercer SJ. Human Factors in Ballistic Trauma in Ballistic Trauma. A Practical Guide. 
Fourth Edition. Editors Breeze MJ, Penn-Bar ell JG, Keene D, O Reill  D, Je anathan J, 
Mahoney PF. Chapter 22. Pg 347-356. Springer, 2017 
 Mercer SJ. The trauma team and initial management of the critically injured patient 
(Chapter 4). In: Trauma and Combat Critical Care in Clinical Practice Ed. Hutchings S. 
Springer; 1st Edition (10 October 2016) 
 
The articles listed in Table 2.3 have also cited this publication (I have only listed articles in 
English) 
 
Table 2.3. Publications citing Human Factors in Decision Making in Major Trauma in 
Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. Arul S, Pugh H, Mercer SJ, Midwinter M Annals of The Royal 
College of Surgeons of England 2015; 97: 262-268  
 
Paper Summary 
Arul GS, Pugh HEJ, Kluth MJ and Bromiley 
M. Common goals, shared risk and a just 
culture: human factors lessons from the 
front line. Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 2017; 110: 93 97  
 
An opinion paper from my two colleagues 
following on from presentations at the Royal 
Society of Medicine. They described that there 
was a statistically significant improvement in 
survival of casualties as the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan continued with an estimated 265 
casualties surviving potentially fatal injuries from 
the start of the conflict and  injuries that would 
probably have been fatal at the start of the 
conflict and 38 surviving with injures classed as 
unsurvivable  b  NHS standards. The  
described the improvements in care in terms of 
human factors and three tenets: Common 
Goals, Shared Risk and a Just Culture . This 
article goes on to describe the importance of 
human factors in the management of complex 
trauma as I have described in this thesis. 
Bates P, P Parker P, McFadyen I, Pallister I 
Demystifying damage control in 
musculoskeletal trauma.  
Annals of The Royal College of Surgeons of 
England 2016; 98: 291 294  
 
This paper is a discussion on the concepts of 
Damage Control Resuscitation and in addition to 
describing the techniques, it reviews the decision 
making in terminating an operation and moving 
the patient to critical care. The decision-making 
centres around the Trauma WHO  that e 
described in our discussion paper (14) and then 
tested this research paper. The common huddle, 
snap brief and sit-reps are also discussed as 
useful in team centered decision making. 
Hicks C, Petrosoniak A.The Human Factor. 
Optimizing Trauma Team Performance in 
Dynamic Clinical Environments. Emerg Med 
Clin N Am 36 (2018) 1 17. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emc.2017.08.003  
Review of the importance of Human Factors in 
Trauma Teams. Our paper is quoted in terms of 
communication amongst the team. 
 
Slope R, Pope C, Crouch R, Bernthal EMM.  Description of patient journey with the 
importance of good communication. Also taken 
from Ro ena Slope s PhD Thesis E ploration 
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Military and civilian handover 
communication in emergency care: how 
does it differ?  
Journal of Paramedic Practice 2019; 2 
https://doi.org/10.12968/jpar.2019.11.2.66 
of handover communication in military and NHS 
emergenc  care settings . 
Groombridge CJ, Kim Y, Maini A, Smit DV, 
Fitzgerald MC. Stress and decision-making 
in resuscitation: A systematic review. 
Resuscitation 2019; 144: 115-122  
This is a systematic review that aimed to 
identify human factors affecting decision making 
in challenging or stressful situations. Our article 
was identified in the literature search. The 
conclusion was that human factors contribute to 
decision-making and can be mitigated by 
tailored stress training and cognitive aids.  
Chen S, Yang J, Zhang L, et al  
Progress on combat damage control 
resuscitation/surgery and its application in 
the Chinese People's Liberation Army 
Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 
2019; 87: 954-960  
This is a description of recent advancements in 
the care of complex trauma patients in the 
Chinese People s Liberation Arm . Our article is 
cited with respect to efficient delivery of medical 
information, and smooth communication as 
other important factors ensuring the continuum 
of implementation of DCR/DCS  
Arul GS, Singh M, Ali AM, Gee OJ. Damage 
control surgery in neonates: Lessons 
learned from the battlefield. Journal of 
Paediatric Surgery 2019 (in press) 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpedsurg.2019.04.001 
This is a description of how the Trauma WHO is 
useful in civilian practice with a narrative of how 
it was used for 27 neonates undergoing 
Damage Control Surgery between 2010-2017. 
 
2.3.7 Where this paper places me with reference to being at the forefront of my area 
of professional practice. 
I am a recognised national speaker in the field of human factors and simulation to train trauma 
teams. The follo ing invited national and international presentations contained details of The 
Trauma WHO . These meetings ere attended b  members of the multi-disciplinary team. 
Title:   Simulation for Trauma Training 
Meeting: Trauma Care Conference 
Location: Yarnfield Conference Centre, 
Date:  Stafford 6 March 2019 
 
Title:   I i g T a a Tea . U de a di g Wh  Tea  D  W  
Meeting: Cambridge Trauma Conference 
Location: Churchill College Cambridge 
Date:   28 April 2018 
 
Title:   Human Factors in Complex Trauma 
Meeting: Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland Annual Congress 
Location: BT Convention Centre, Liverpool 
Date:   28 September 2017 
 
Title:   Training for Trauma 
Meeting: Royal College of Anaesthetists, Updates Meeting 
Location: Marriott Hotel, Liverpool 
Date:   11 May 2016 
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Title:   Training the Whole Trauma Team 
Meeting: The Anesthesiology Annual Meeting 
Location: San Diego Conference Centre, San Diego, California, US 
Date:   27 October 2015 
 
Title:   Training the Whole Trauma Team 
Meeting: Uniformed Services Societ  of Anesthesiologists/ Association of Veterans  
Affairs Anesthesiologists Annual Academic Meeting 
Location: Hilton San Diego Bayfront Hotel, San Diego, California, US 
Date:   23 October 2015 
 
Title:   Human Factors in Trauma 
Meeting: North West Regional Trauma Meeting 
Location: Whiston Hospital 
Date:   8 September 2015. 
 
Title:  Testing the Whole Obstetric Team: Lessons from Simulation in Military 
Medicine 
Meeting: Obstetric Anaesthetists Association Annual Scientific Meeting 
Location: Torquay 
Date:   21 May 2015. 
 
Title:   Using Simulation to Train Trauma Teams 
Meeting: Trauma Care Conference 
Location: Telford 
Date:   22 April 2015 
 
Title:   Teamwork and Human Factors. A Military Anaesthesia Perspective 
Meeting: Association of Cardiothoracic Anaesthetists 
Location: Manchester 
Date:   27 March 2015 
 
Title:   Lessons from conflict  the importance of training and research 
Meeting: AAGBI Annual Conference 
Location: Harrogate 
Date:   17 September 2014 
 
Title:  Safety Through Team Working - Lessons Learnt from Anaesthesia in the 
Military 
Meeting:  5th NWAC World Anaesthesia Convention  
Location: Vienna 
Date:   3 May 2014 
 
Title:   Training for Trauma,  
Meeting: Current Concepts Meeting 
Location: Royal College of Anaesthetists, London 
Date:   10 October 2013 
 
Title:   Human Factors in Trauma Teams 
Meeting: West Midlands Anaesthetic Society Summer Meeting 
Location: National Motorcycle Museum, Birmingham 
Date:   14 June 2013 
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Title:   Human Factors in Trauma Teams 
Meeting: Royal College of Anaesthetists Updates Meeting 
Location: Royal College of Anaesthetists, Liverpool  
Date:   10 December 2012 
 
 
Title:   Trauma Update 
Meeting: Liverpool Society of Anaesthetists 
Location: Liverpool Medical Institute 
Date:  16 November 2012 
 
 
Title:   Preparing Civilian Trauma Teams  
Meeting: Association for Simulated Practice in Healthcare 
Location: Kassam Stadium, Oxford 
Date:   8 November 2012 
 
Title:   Clinical care - Crew Resource Management  
Meeting: Disaster planning and management - are we prepared?  
Location: Royal Society of Medicine 
Date:   13 April 2012 
 
Title:   Human Factors in Damage Control Resuscitation 
Meeting: Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain & Ireland Updates Meeting 
Location: Liner Hotel Liverpool 
Date:   24 February 2012 
 
The knowledge from this paper was incorporated into the Military Operational Surgical 
Training Course (13) and also the Hospital Exercise (12) which are courses for the deploying 
trauma teams. Training was undertaken as a multidisciplinary team with good feedback. 
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Introduction
Combat trauma airway management is distinctive because of 
the increased prevalence of penetrating airway injuries [1]. !e 
majority of UK military deployed trauma consists of blast/
fragmentation injuries (53.8%) and gunshot wounds (GSW) 
(29.9%), in contrast to National Health Service (NHS) trauma 
where the bulk is blunt airway injury due to motor vehicle 
collisions [2]. Penetrating injuries are often dramatic with severe 
disruption of both soft tissue and bone [3], and airway injury is 
likely in ballistic and penetrating injury to the face and neck. !e 
proximity of the carotid vessels means that penetrating carotid 
injury may impact airway patency. Consequently the team dealing 
with such injuries need to consider the likely fragment /projectile 
trajectory and potential airway e"ects.
UK Defence Medical Services (DMS) anaesthetists spend 
the majority of their clinical practice working with civilian 
patients in the NHS and will generally deploy on military 
operations every six to 18 months. Not only does the deployed 
environment have a di"erent case mix, but clinicians are also 
required to use what may be unfamiliar equipment and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs). SOP’s have been developed for 
management of the di#cult airway by the American Society of 
Anesthesiologists (ASA) [4], and for the unanticipated di#cult 
airway by the Di#cult Airway Society (DAS) [5]. Both protocols 
were designed to deal with a civilian patient population in the 
setting of a general hospital and do not re$ect the circumstances 
currently encountered in the deployed military environment. 
Although the management of anticipated di#cult airway has 
recently been evaluated to some extent in a civilian setting [6], we 
felt the unusual nature of penetrating airway injury necessitated 
its own SOP for use in the deployed %eld hospital. It is hoped that 
this will allow anaesthetists to improve their non-technical skills 
or human factors [7] in a clinical environment that has recently 
be identi%ed as exceptional by the Healthcare Commission [8].
!ere is a lack of literature reporting the anaesthetic 
management of penetrating neck injuries [9,10] with manuscripts 
often concentrating on surgical management [11]. Currently, 
there is no consensus amongst the anaesthetic community on 
the management of casualties with penetrating airway injuries 
[12] and much variability has been described [11]. We reviewed 
the current literature, the experience of previously deployed UK 
DMS anaesthetists as well as documented experience from the 
UK Joint !eatre Trauma Registry (JTTR) [2] and present our 
initial guidelines.
Methods
In order to establish a complete overview of current practice, three 
separate methods of investigation were undertaken.
Literature Review
!e databases and search terms used to identify papers published 
after 1995 are summarized in Table 1. Two of the authors (SEL/
SJM) evaluated each paper for relevance to the anaesthetic 
management of penetrating head and neck injuries and 
summarized any case reports.
Survey of DMS Anaesthetists
All 185 DMS Anaesthetists whose details were held on the 
Defence Consultant Advisor (DCA) database were contacted by 
e-mail on 23 November 2009. !e details of any cases of blast or 
ballistic airway injury that they had treated were requested. !is 
email was repeated on 23 January 2010. All cases were collated in 
tabular form.
Search of the UK Joint !eatre Trauma Registry (JTTR)
!e UK JTTR has already been described in this journal [13] 
and is maintained by the Academic Department of Military 
Emergency Medicine at the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine. 
Essentially this registry contains continuous data from 2003 for 
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Abstract
Anaesthetists in the Defence Medical Services (DMS) are currently dealing with casualties who have an increased prevalence 
of injuries due to blast, fragmentation and gunshot wounds. Despite guidelines already existing for unanticipated di"cult 
tracheal intubation these have been designed for a civilian population and might not be relevant for the anticipated di"cult 
airway experienced in the deployed #eld hospital. In order to establish an overview of current practice, three methods of 
investigation were undertaken; a literature review, a survey of DMS Anaesthetists and a search of the UK Joint !eatre Trauma 
Database. Results are discussed in terms of anatomical site, bleeding in the airway, facial distortion, patient positioning and an 
anaesthetic approach. !ere are certain key principles that should be considered in all cases and these are considered. Potential 
pitfalls are discussed and our initial proposed guidelines for use in the deployed #eld hospital are presented.
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all casualties who trigger a trauma team activation in either the 
deployed !eld hospital or the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility 
a"oat. Over 3000 records were interrogated for the search terms 
listed in Table 2. Cases identi!ed by this search were analyzed by 
one of the authors (SJM) and those consisting of casualties with 
blast and ballistic head and neck trauma were recorded.
Search Term
Casualty Reference Numbers
Gender
Major Trauma
UK Military
Survivors
Blast Injury or Ballistic Injury
New Injury Severity Score (NISS) >16
Airway Interventions
Mechanism of Injury
Brief Incident History
Injuries 
Information from free text boxes. 
Table 2. Search terms used to identify cases in JTTR
Results
#e literature review revealed 51 papers that were considered 
relevant to this study; 23 were civilian case reports and three 
contained military case reports. #ere were 17 case reports 
submitted by DMS Anaesthetists and the cause of injury in all 
cases was either GSW or Improvised Explosive Device (IED). 
Over 3000 were searched on the JTTR and 19 were identi!ed 
of soldiers with penetrating head and neck injury. #ese injuries 
were either caused by blast (from IED, mine, mortar or rocket 
propelled grenade) or were due to GSW. Common themes from 
all three areas of investigation are summarized in headings below.
Penetrating injury though the mouth
Case reports included projectiles or objects trans!xing facial 
structures and interfering with mouth opening. Examples 
included trans!xion through the "oor of the mouth with a 
bamboo cane [17], penetration of the mouth "oor with a nail 
[18], a spear gun shaft penetrating the "oor of the mouth [19] and 
a crossbow arrow entering under the chin and passing through the 
tongue, nasal cavity and between the frontal lobes [20]. Methods 
of management included awake !breoptic intubation (AFOI) 
[17-20] rapid sequence induction of anaesthesia (RSI) [22,23] 
and surgical tracheostomy following failure of AFOI [19].
Injuries to the Face
Two articles summarized case series of GSW to the face from 
Level 1 Trauma Centres in the USA [23] and South Africa [24]. 
Of 73 patients in the USA case series, 36 underwent AFOI, 30 
were conventionally intubated and seven had a cricothyroidotomy 
performed. In the South African case series there were 28 
emergency orotracheal intubations (18 of which were performed 
in the prehospital phase), two cricothyroidotomies and six 
tracheostomies. #e DMS survey revealed !ve case reports 
of soldiers with facial injuries as a result of IED blasts and 
four of these underwent uneventful RSI (one had a surgical 
tracheostomy performed in the prehospital phase). #ere were 
4 case reports of GSW to the face of which two had RSI, one 
had a cricothyroidotomy and the other had an emergency surgical 
tracheostomy. #e JTTR search contained three casualties who 
had undergone blast injuries to the face, two of which were 
managed by RSI and one who underwent cricothyroidotomy in 
the prehospital phase.
Laceration to the neck
#ere were several case reports of isolated neck laceration 
injuries [25,26] and an open laryngeal injury in a patient with 
multiple injuries [27]. Management included a pre-hospital 
cricothyroidotomy [27], surgical tracheostomy [25] and intubation 
directly though the defect [26,27]. #ere was a case report 
concerning a crush injury to the chest resulting in complete tracheal 
transection. #is was managed with a surgical tracheostomy as 
the patient developed subcutaneous emphysema in the neck and 
anterior chest following orotracheal intubation [28].
Penetrating Neck Injuries
Case reports included a bullet fragment in the supraglottic region 
[29] and GSWs [30-32] to the neck. #ese were managed by 
orotracheal intubation [30], inhalational induction of anaesthesia 
[31], "exible bronchoscopy [32] and use of a light wand following 
failure of direct laryngoscopy [29]. Case series of penetrating neck 
injuries from US Trauma Centres [33,34] reported a combination 
of techniques including RSI, surgical tracheostomy, AFOI and 
orotracheal intubation without paralysis in comatose patients. A 
Canadian case series [11] also reported the use of AFOI and RSI. 
Another case series from a Level 1 Trauma Centre in the USA [35] 
reviewed the airway management of 89 patients with penetrating 
neck injuries who had undergone blind nasal intubation. #e 
authors concluded that this technique was a valuable tool for 
the management of patients with penetrating neck trauma. 
#ere were three case reports in the literature of soldiers who 
sustained penetrating neck injuries as a result of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). Management included emergency 
cricothyroidotomy following failed orotracheal intubation [36], 
Database Search Terms
Pubmed [14]
Sciencedirect [15] 
Google Scholar[16]
Ballistic airway
Blast airway
Penetrating airway
Laceration airway
Fragmentation airway
Gunshot airway
Knife airway. 
AMED
BNI
EMBASE
HMIC
MEDLINE
PsycINFO
CINAHL
HEALTH BUSINESS ELITE
Ballistic-airway
Ballistic AND airway 
Blast-airway
Blast AND airway
Penetrating-airway
Penetrating AND airway
Laceration-airway
Laceration AND airway
Fragmentation-airway
Fragmentation AND airway
Gunshot AND airway
Knife AND airway
Table 1. Literature Search Terms
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surgical tracheostomy in the operating theatre following failed 
orotracheal intubation [37] and orotracheal intubation followed 
by surgical tracheostomy [38]. 
!e DMS survey reported several cases of penetrating neck 
injury these included:
• A GSW causing damage to the posterior tracheal wall associated 
with bleeding into the airway, managed with a RSI. 
• An IED blast to the face and neck, managed by transferring 
the patient to theatre in the prone position to maintain their 
airway. RSI was performed as soon as the patient was turned 
supine. A trauma surgeon was ready to perform a surgical 
airway if needed. 
• A penetrating neck injury, managed by orotracheal intubation 
following gaseous induction using the Tri-service Anaesthetic 
Apparatus [39] with two Oxford Miniature Vaporizers "lled 
with Sevo#urane. 
• A GSW through the larynx was managed by direct 
intubation through the defect and then a subsequent surgical 
tracheostomy. A GSW injury disrupting the cricoid ring was 
managed with RSI.
Results from the JTTR included four cases of penetrating neck 
injury of which one was managed by RSI. In addition to this 
there were seven case reports of injury to the trachea and larynx. 
Of these, four patients underwent RSI, (one of which failed and 
required cricothyroidotomy), one received a primary surgical 
tracheostomy and one had an endotracheal tube placed directly 
through the tracheal defect. 
Carotid Artery Injury
One case reported the use of AFOI to manage a penetrating neck 
injury tearing the common carotid artery that was causing a rapidly 
expanding haematoma [40]. Another case report describing a 
patient with neck compression due to strangulation with a chain 
and this was managed by conventional orotracheal intubation [41]. 
!ere was also a case report of a patient who sustained internal 
and external common arteries injuries following a laceration from 
a #ying metal sheet, this was managed by intubation into the 
perforation of larynx [42]. A case report from the DMS survey 
described a casualty with a GSW to the neck associated with a 
laceration to the carotid artery resulting in respiratory distress and 
this was managed by inhalational induction of anaesthesia. !ere 
were an additional three cases of penetrating neck injury on the 
JTTR database (all as a result of IED blast) resulting in laceration 
of the carotid artery. Anaesthetic details were entered for only one 
of these cases, which was managed with an RSI.
Discussion
!ere are multiple potential approaches to the airway management 
of casualties penetrating injuries [43] and although the incidence 
is low, we felt that it was important to develop guidelines to allow 
planning and anticipation of these cases prior to deployment as 
an aide memoire. !e anaesthetist may wish to base their decision 
making process on the clinical scenario rather than a preset algorithm 
taking into account their own skills and equipment available [11]. 
It has already been commented that most case series only contain 
small numbers of patients and that the injuries are diverse, meaning 
a didactic treatment algorithm would be unhelpful [12]. Our three 
di$erent methods of investigating the anaesthetic management of 
penetrating airway injury resulted in a wide variety of opinions and 
our conclusions are enumerated below. 
!e anatomical site of the injury
!is is a crucial consideration as penetrating neck wounds are best 
approached on a zonal basis [44] 
Zone I - between the clavicles and the cricoid cartilage.
Zone II - between the inferior margin of the cricoid cartilage and 
the angle of the mandible 
Zone III - between the angle of the mandible and the base of the 
skull. 
Reference to a zone allows the prediction of potential injuries 
and so the potential for urgent airway management problems 
[12]. It should be noted that wounds in the anterior and lateral 
aspects of the neck compromise the airway more often than those 
in the posterior region [12]. Once the zone(s) involved have 
been identi"ed the clinician should then consider the presence of 
injury to the airway’s lumen (with associated blood and debris), 
injury within the airways wall itself or injury outside the wall 
(e.g. expanding haematoma or surgical emphysema). Optimal 
intubation conditions may be di%cult to achieve and injuries may 
compromise positive pressure ventilation with bag-valve-mask 
devices [11]. Not all patients will be in extremis however and there 
may be time to consider additional investigations to characterise 
the injury. CT is considered the "rst-line investigation in stable 
patients with penetrating neck injuries [45] to identify the 
location, nature and extent of any airway injury.
Airway bleeding/facial distortion and patient positioning
Blood and debris may be soiling the airway and if the casualty 
is maintaining their airway satisfactorily they do not require 
immediate airway intervention apart from a jaw thrust. !ey 
should be allowed to adopt their most comfortable position. 
Lateral, sitting and prone positions have all be described in case 
reports and the importance of this must be reinforced during 
patient handover.
Anaesthetic approaches to penetrating airway injury
!e principle clinical features mandating early tracheal 
intubation are acute or worsening respiratory distress, an airway 
that is compromised by blood and secretions, extensive surgical 
emphysema, tracheal deviation by haematoma and a decreasing 
level of consciousness [46]. Although anaesthetists perform 
endotracheal intubation routinely, it should be approached with 
great caution in a patient with a penetrating airway injury [47]. 
Direct Laryngoscopy/ Rapid Sequence Induction (RSI)
It is important that anaesthetists are aware that despite the 
laryngeal inlet appearing intact, there may be a tracheal tear 
present below this and placing an endotracheal tube under direct 
laryngoscopic vision could lead to the tip passing through the 
defect. !is may go unrecognized and risks airway obstruction, 
pneumomediastinum and the creation of a false passage [47] as 
this is in e$ect a ‘blind technique’, which may completely disrupt 
the larynx. !e incidence of these phenomena is unknown but is 
most likely lethal and di%cult to reverse even with an emergency 
surgical airway (especially if gross surgical emphysema has been 
created) [12]. Others recommend an ‘awake look’ under topical 
anaesthesia but this will obviously not indicate if there are any 
injuries distal to the vocal cords [11].
Some authors hold that RSI should be the default method of 
airway control [48]. Evidence is available to suggest that it is safe 
[49] and has a high success rate [33,34,50]. Despite this, there are 
others who argue against RSI in certain cases [36,37], where the 
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airway is penetrated below the vocal cords (risking unrecognized 
misplacement of the ETT). It is also not recommended in cases 
of near or total airway transection, where paralysis will abolish the 
supportive muscle tone, which may be all that is holding the airway 
together [11,51]. For these reasons, some authors actively support 
the casualty maintaining spontaneous ventilation at all costs [47]. 
Current UK anaesthetic practice includes the use of cricoid pressure 
[52] during an RSI but this may distort the airway, change the 
anaesthetist’s view and result in a more di!cult airway [47,53].
Blind Nasal Intubation
"e consensus of opinion is that blind intubation methods 
including blind nasotracheal intubation should not be used in 
patients with penetrating neck injury because further injury or 
complete airway obstruction may be induced [54]. A single paper 
reviewing a case series of patients successfully managed with blind 
nasotracheal intubation has challenged this advice [35]. As this 
technique is rarely taught in UK hospitals, we would discourage its 
use by clinicians for whom it is not part of their regular practice. It 
also requires extension at of the upper cervical spine while the lower 
cervical spine is extended, as part of the technique, which may risk 
neurological injury in the unstable cervical spine in trauma.
Fiberoptic Intubation
AFOI is the gold standard for safely securing the airway in a 
casualty with a traumatic airway injury. "is technique allows the 
lumen of the airway to be identi#ed by direct vision throughout the 
intubating process and allows the anaesthetist to be con#dent about 
siting the endotracheal tube (ETT) distal to any visualized tear. 
"is technique depends on availability of a #berscope, the co-
operation of the patient [47,55] and the skills of the operator. 
Another confounding factor to this method of securing the 
airway is that any foreign bodies or blood will hinder the use 
of the #berscope [47] although in skilled hands it has proved 
very e$ective [17-20, 23,24,40]. Di!culties regarding AFOI 
in the #eld hospital also arise from the sterilization aspect of 
the #berscope, however recently disposable versions have been 
developed, but are yet to be evaluated in this setting.
Surgical Airway
A case could be made to consider surgical airway as the #rst choice 
intervention for laryngeal injuries [47,56] as it is done under 
direct vision reducing the potential for worsening an injury by 
misplacement the endotracheal tube. Both cricothyroidotomy 
and tracheostomy have been described as safe techniques to 
perform in an awake, spontaneously ventilating patient with local 
anaesthetic in#ltration [47]. Cricothyroidotomy itself has further 
been described as a safe, rapid technique of obtaining an airway 
in an emergency setting [57]. Tracheostomy should be performed 
at least one tracheal ring below the injury to avoid complications 
[12]. Whenever a di!cult intubation is suspected it is advisable to 
have the patient’s neck prepared and the surgeon ready to perform 
a surgical airway [47]. "e anaesthetist should be mindful that 
the rapid creation of a surgical airway might be a di!cult task for 
the surgeon, particularly if there is overlying haematoma or other 
gross anatomical disruption.
Recommendations
Despite the variety of anaesthetic management strategies present 
in the literature, there are certain key principles we believe should 
be considered in all cases. "ese are listed in Table 3. Human 
factors play an important role in ensuring that individuals in a 
clinical team perform to the highest standard [58]. We believe 
that the principles of Anaesthesia Crisis Resource Management 
(ACRM) [59] are crucial to ensuring the best possible outcome 
when faced with a patient with severe blast or ballistic injuries. 
Potential Pitfalls
"e literature review and DMS Anaesthetists experience and 
JTTR search have enabled us to suggest certain pitfalls when 
dealing with patients with penetrating airway injuries. "ese 
should be considered when constructing a plan of securing the 
airway and are listed in Table 4. 
Monitor patient with full AAGBI standard monitoring 
[60] (especially ETCO2)
Preoxygenation (even in patients with marginal functional 
reserve [43,47,54])
Airway optimization
• If conscious allow patient to adopt  
most comfortable position [46].
• If unconscious use jaw thrust
Consider the urgency with which a secure airway is 
required
Consider the site of injury 
Availability of suction (preferably two devices) 
Table 3. Key principles to consider for all casualties with a penetrating 
airway injury
Ventilation: Positive pressure ventilation risks enlarging tears 
and causing surgical emphysema
• Try to preserve spontaneous ventilation prior to 
intubation
• Use bag-valve-mask ventilation is a last resort
• Avoid LMA in injuries distal to cords
• Avoid transtracheal jet ventilation
Intubation: Blind placement of the tube risks the tip 
passing through the defect and lying outside the airway 
and is only avoided by !breoptic intubation or a surgical 
airway.
Intubation: Endotracheal intubation should be 
approached with caution
• Avoid oral intubation when the injury is distal to the 
vocal cords
• Avoid blind nasal intubation
• Fibreoptic intubation is likely to be di"cult/ 
impossible when there is bleeding into the airway
Surgical Airway
• Is potentially extremely di!cult in face of subcutaneous 
emphysema or an expanding haematoma (direct 
laryngoscopy is also likely to also be di!cult).
Drugs: Avoid muscle relaxants in near/complete airway 
transection
• Muscle tone may be important for airway integrity
Table 4 Potential Pitfalls to consider when drawing up plans to secure 
the airway.
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In proposing initial guidelines for DMS anaesthetists, we have 
been strongly in!uenced by the comments made in the review 
article by Abernathy [47] regarding the placing of an endotracheal 
tube when a distal airway injury has not been excluded. In such 
cases a primary surgical airway may be the most appropriate plan 
[43]. Whether it is the anaesthetist or the trauma surgeon who 
performs this will be decided by the skills and experience of the 
individuals within the team. 
Our initial guidelines based on site of injury are summarized 
in Table 5. We anticipate that this preliminary work will now 
lead to further studies to develop guidelines and training systems. 
We also hope to work with national bodies such as the Di"cult 
Airway Society to further develop our guidelines.
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2.4 Commenting on Creating Airway Management Guidelines for Casualties with 
Penetrating Airway Injuries Mercer SJ, Lewis SE, Wilson SJ, Groom P, Mahoney 
PF. Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2010; 156: S357-362  
 
 
2.4.1 Why this paper was written? 
 
This article was published following research looking into publishing a series of guidelines for 
deploying anaesthetists from the UK Defence Medical Services. At the time, there was no 
consensus amongst the anaesthetic community on the management of casualties with 
penetrating airway injuries despite there being published guidance on the management of the 
unanticipated difficult intubation (29) that has subsequently now been revised (93). This study 
looked to examine the current literature on the management of airway injuries in trauma and 
analyse recent experience from operations in Iraq (Operation TELIC) and Afghanistan 
(Operation HERRICK). The latter was performed by a questionnaire of all serving UK-DMS 
anaesthetists and by reviewing patients who had been captured on the Joint Theatre Trauma 
Registry (JTTR). It was hoped that once written, then a series of guidelines would be published 
and then incorporated into training on the Military Operational Surgical Training Course (86). 
This would serve to prepare Consultant Anaesthetists working primarily in a civilian 
environment to deploy to a conflict zone with casualties suffering with primarily penetrating 
trauma. 
 
2.4.2 What was known at the time? 
 
Prior to conducting this research, it was appreciated that experience of penetrating neck 
injuries in recent conflicts was rare, although not formally quantified. It was agreed by the 
Academic Department of Military Anaesthesia Pain and Critical Care that a review of this topic 
be conducted so that the latest evidence and experience could be incorporated into the Military 
Operational Surgical Training Course to prepare UK-DMS Anaesthetists about to deploy. 
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In reality, very little was formally agreed on the management of penetrating neck injuries. The 
Difficult Airway Society of the United Kingdom had produced guidelines for the management 
of the unanticipated  difficult airway (29), however there was little guidance available on the 
management of the anticipated  difficult air a . 
 
 
2.4.3 What the paper contributed to the g ba  c i ica  c i  
The incidence of traumatic injury to the airway was confirmed to be extremely low. This was 
determined by the limited recent deployed experience found by interrogation of the Joint 
Theatre Trauma Registry and reported experience of current UK-DMS Anaesthetists. The 
three areas of investigation did reveal the five themes listed below. 
 Penetrating injury though the mouth  
 Injuries to the Face  
 Laceration to the neck  
 Penetrating Neck Injuries  
 Carotid Artery Injury  
 
Despite determining the five common themes above, we were unable to summarise these into 
the meaningful guidelines that we had hoped and had previously been achieved for the 
unanticipated  difficult air a  (29) and this is a limitation to our work. What this paper was 
able to do however, was to summarise a series of different case reports and report on the 
different management techniques that had been employed by anaesthetists. This has led to 
the development and improvement of guidelines and allowed us to incorporate an airway 
workshop into the MOST Course (94). This in itself has enabled those deploying to a war zone 
with the potential for airway trauma to be better prepared should such cases present. 
 
 
2.4.4 Where are we now?  
 
Since publishing this article I have subsequently undertaken a systematic review on the 
management of non-iatrogenic airway injury (95). This manuscript is included and discussed 
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later in this thesis and allowed the development of specific flow diagrams and the construction 
of individual mental models.  We have also published a discussion paper on the human factors 
required to manage the anticipated difficult airway (96) and this manuscript is also discussed 
at a later stage of this thesis. This article was initially produced to support anaesthetists in the 
Defence Medical Services who were deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan and this is why it was 
published in the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps. Recently, and much regrettably 
there has now been a rise in terrorist attacks on the UK-Mainland with a suicide bomber attack 
in Manchester at a busy concert venue recently producing complex trauma injuries that were 
previously only experienced in times of war (97). These guidelines and other work I will 
describe in this thesis is now very relevant to consultant anaesthetists involved in the treatment 
of victims from terrorist attacks in civilian major trauma centres. 
 
2.4.5 Reflections on methodology 
 
2.4.5.1  Literature Review  
A literature review of all papers published after 1995 was performed and the results 
summarised with relevance to the anaesthetic management of penetrating head and neck 
injuries and case reports summarised. The literature review revealed 51 papers that were 
considered relevant to this study; 23 were civilian case reports and three contained military 
case reports. This number of articles is reasonably low and was an indication of how rare this 
potential problem is.  
 
2.4.5.2  Survey of Anaesthetists in the Defence Medical Services 
At the time of research there were 185 anaesthetists in the UK-Defence Medical Services. 
These were all contacted by email and asked to describe any cases of blast or ballistic airway 
injury that they had treated. There were 17 case reports submitted by DMS Anaesthetists and 
the cause of injury in all cases was either Gunshot wound (GSW) or Improvised Explosive 
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Device (IED). Limitations to this survey were that not all UK-DMS anaesthetists replied and 
we did not ask anaesthetists to reply if they had not experienced any cases of penetrating 
neck injury. With this in mind there could well have been other examples that were not reported 
and hence not included in the paper. 
 
2.4.5.3  Search of the UK Joint Theatre Trauma Registry (JTTR)  
The UK Joint Theatre Trauma Registry (JTTR) (98) is maintained by the Academic 
Department of Military Emergency Medicine at the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine. 
Essentially this registry contains continuous data from 2003 for all casualties who trigger a 
trauma team activation in either the deployed field hospital or the Primary Casualty Receiving 
Facility (currently the Hospital Ship RFA Argus). Over 3000 records were searched on the 
JTTR and 19 were identified of soldiers with penetrating head and neck injury. These injuries 
were either caused by blast (from an improvised explosive device, mine, mortar or rocket 
propelled grenade) or were due to a gunshot wound. Again, the incidence of needing to 
manage airway trauma during a conflict was low and this suggested the development of 
guidelines were important to inform and allow UK-DMS anaesthetists to rehearse prior to 
deployment. This registry is a comprehensive record of casualties presenting to active military 
medical facilities. As the review was retrospective, it relied on the data entered into the system 
to be accurate. There is the possibility that cases inaccurately entered were not retrieved and 
hence not included in the review. 
 
2.4.6 Contribution of the Paper to Clinical Practice and what It says about me as a 
Researcher? 
 
This article has been cited in the medical literature 16 times and has an Altmetric Score of 5 
(9 mentions on Twitter). This article was published in 2010 in the Journal of the Royal Army 
Medical Corps. Although this journal only has an Impact Factor of 0.833 it has a readership of 
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current Military Personnel and individuals interested in and practicing dealing with patients 
with complex trauma. As described above, there were already guidelines for the management 
of the unanticipated difficult airway published by the UK Difficult Airway Society (29) which 
have now subsequently been revised (93) but there was no such guidance on the 
management of anticipated difficult airway in complex trauma patients. At the time this 
guidance was deemed to be essential by the Professor of Defence Anaesthesia, Colonel Peter 
Mahoney CBE L/RAMC who is a coauthor on this manuscript. This particular journal was 
selected as it was the one being currently read at the time by members of the Defence Medical 
Services preparing to deploy to Afghanistan. 
 
The contents of this publication were used to generate a series of workshops and high fidelity 
simulation scenarios for the Military Operational Surgical Training Course (MOST) (13) and 
subsequently train UK-DMS consultants who were deploying to Afghanistan as part of 
Operational HERRICK. Feedback from these sessions was favorable and enabled UK-DMS 
consultants to further develop their own mental models prior to deployment on the 
management of anticipated difficult airway in trauma. These guidelines also were practiced as 
part of the multi-disciplinary team so that the Operating Department Practitioners (ODPs) 
present as part of the trauma team were aware of the management of the airway in penetrating 
trauma. 
 
Following publication, a letter was written by several military anaesthetists who suggested the 
use of a gum elastic bougie with all intubations (99). Our subsequent systematic review article 
that will be discussed later suggests that this would be unwise when there is penetrating 
trauma belo  the level of the vocal cords as there is a potential for a blind passage  of the 
bougie (or subsequent endotracheal tube) into a false passage. The consequences of this 
would be devastating. 
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I have used the basis of this publication to develop the following further publications. These 
have further added to the literature around the management of the airway in penetrating 
trauma by anaesthetists involved in the care of patients with Complex Trauma. I have 
highlighted that actually the appreciation of human factors is paramount in decision making 
and designing the systems in which we work. 
 
Military Publications 
 
 Mercer SJ, Heames RM. Anaesthesia and Critical Care Aspects of Role 2 Afloat. 
Journal of the Royal Navy Medical Services 2013: 99: 141-143 
 Mercer SJ, Tarmey N, Mahoney PF. Military Experience of Human Factors in Airway 
Complications Anaesthesia 2013; 68: 1081-1082 
 Mercer SJ, Jones CP, Round J, Parkhouse D. Military Anaesthesia in Contingencies: 
What Skill Sets Are Required and How Will We Prepare Our Trainees? Journal of the 
Royal Army Medical Corps 2017: 163; 226-232 
 Mercer SJ, Read J, Sudheer S, Risdall JE, Connor D. What do we need for airway 
management of Adult Casualties on The Primary Casualty Receiving Ship? A Review 
of airway management on Role 3 Afloat Journal of the Royal Navy Medical Services 
2015; 101: 155-158 
 
 
Civilian Publications 
 
 Mercer SJ, Jones CP, Bridge M, Clitheroe E, Morton B, Groom P A Systematic 
Review of The Anaesthetic Management of Non-Iatrogenic Acute Adult Airway 
Trauma. British Journal of Anaesthesia 2016: 117 (S1): i49 i59 
 Mercer SJ, Tarmey N, Park C. Human Factors in Trauma BJA Education 2015; 15: 
231-236 
 
 
The articles listed in Table 2.4 have also cited this publication (I have only listed articles in 
English  there are three papers published not in English) 
 
Table 2.4. Publications citing Creating Airway Management Guidelines for Casualties 
with Penetrating Airway Injuries Mercer SJ, Lewis SE, Wilson SJ, Groom P, Mahoney PF. 
Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2010; 156: S357-362  
 
Paper Summary 
Pugh HEJ, LeClerc S, Mclennan J.  
A review of pre-admission advanced 
airway management in combat 
casualties, Helmand Province 2013.  
Journal of the Royal Army Med Corps 
2015; 161: 121-126  
In this paper, the authors undertook a retrospective 
review of all casualties who required advanced airway 
management prior to arrival at the Role 3 Hospital in 
Afghanistan over a 30-week period from 1 February 
2013 to 23 August 2013. In effect, this was a review of 
the management of the airway in the pre-hospital setting 
in trauma patients prior to being admitted to the field 
hospital. This review of the advanced airway 
management prior to Role 3 in Helmand Province 
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showed a high morbidity. Recommendations were 
subsequently made to improve the training of personnel 
operating in the pre-hospital environment. 
Sh e  ST. E a di g He a a  
Life-Threatening Neck and Face 
Emergency Management of Ballistic 
Injuries J Craniofac Surg 
2016;27:1282 1285  
 
This is a predominantly a surgical paper, however it 
does cite our publication and mentions the potential 
pitfalls of endotracheal intubation that we described and 
that it should be approached with caution. The paper 
also describes that blind nasal intubation should be 
avoided and that fiberoptic intubation is likely to be 
difficult when there is bleeding into the airway. This 
citation demonstrates that my work has been read and 
been cited in surgical journals and the knowledge that 
was proposed in the original research is being translated 
to a wider field than just anaesthesia. 
Suay RN, Bariain RT, Perez SC et al.  
Anesthesiological and Surgical 
Experiences of the Spanish Role 2 
Enhanced in Herat, Afghanistan.  
J Arch Mil Med 2015;3:e26799 
This publication is a summary of the experience of the 
Spanish Role 2 team in Afghanistan at the same time as 
the UK Operation HERRICK. Our paper is cited as we 
described from our research that the most common 
method to secure the airway in military trauma is using 
a traditional laryngoscope with an endotracheal tube. 
Hindle A, Cheng J, Thabane L, Wong 
A. Web-Based Learning for 
Emergency Airway Management in 
Anesthesia Residency Training.  
Anesthesiology Research and 
Practice. 2015 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/971406) 
Our paper is quoted as e pert option  in this review of 
anaesthesia residency training. 
 
Seltz Kristensen M, McGuire B. 
Managing and securing the bleeding 
upper airway: a narrative review. 
Canadian Journal of Anesthesia 2019 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12630-019-
01479-5  
This is a narrative review is to identify techniques and 
strategies to be employed when severe bleeding in the 
upper airway renders traditional airway management 
impossible because of impeded vision. Our article was 
identified in the literature review and cited to 
communicate that the patient may require induction of 
anaesthesia sitting up . 
 
 
2.4.7 Where this paper places me with reference to being at the forefront of my area 
of professional practice. 
I am now a recognised expert in the management of non-iatrogenic airway trauma and have 
spoken on this subject as an invited podium speaker at the following national conferences. 
These meetings were all approved by the Royal College of Anaesthetists for Continuous 
Professional Development points and delivered to a national audience of interested 
anaesthetists. 
Title:   Bombs, Bullets and Bicycles. Management of Airway Trauma 
Meeting: Difficult Airway Society Annual Scientific Meeting 
Location: Mermaid Theatre, London 
Date:  24 November 2017 
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Title:   Lessons from the Battlefield 
Meeting: Difficult Airway Society Annual Scientific Meeting 
Location: East Midlands Conference Centre, Nottingham 
Date:  5 November 2011 
 
 
Title:   Creating Airway Guidelines for Ballistic Airway Injuries  
Meeting: Tri-service Anaesthetics Society Meeting  
Location: Royal College of Anaesthetists, London 
Date:  2 November 2010 
 
 
Title:   Creating Airway Guidelines for Ballistic Airway Injuries  
Meeting: Learning for each other: Civilian & Military Emergency Care Conference,  
Location: International Convention Centre, Birmingham 
Date:  September 2010 
 
 
 
The publications that have resulted from this article have already been discussed earlier in 
this thesis. 
 
The information and knowledge that resulted from this research paper was used to develop a 
multi-disciplinary workshop on the management of the airway in complex trauma on the 
Military Operational Surgical Training Course from 2011. This important pre-deployment 
course for all senior anaesthetists in the Defence Medical Services ran four times a year and 
prepared individuals to deploy to a busy war zone. The feedback received was excellent 
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Section 3  
 
Systematic Review  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
I have worked with a team at Liverpool University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust in Liverpool 
to produce two systematic reviews. The first paper reviews the importance of human factors 
in the complex trauma patient and summarises the literature on human factors highlighting 
work in several recent national audit reports and guidelines. The second paper concentrates 
on a more sub-specialist area of anaesthesia management; non-iatrogenic airway trauma. A 
patient who has sustained injury to their airway via either penetrating or blunt trauma will 
require a multi-disciplinary approach to their management, and this will require the use of 
exemplary human factors.  Knowledge that is discovered and summarised in the systematic 
reviews will be discussed in further detail in Section 4. 
 
This section of the thesis will demonstrate my involvement in the process of systematic review. 
It is suggested that synthesizing knowledge from a heterogenous body of literature in a clear 
and accurate manner can be challenging (100) but that such reviews are an increasingly 
influential source of useful information about the effectiveness of interventions in health care 
and other areas of public concern (101). In order to translate research and deliver the key 
messages to front line workers, the systematic review is thought to be the least biased and 
most rational way to summarize research evidence and then publish in the medical literature 
(101). The two systematic reviews I have selected have been published in the British Journal 
of Anaesthesia (Impact Factor 6.499 in 2018) and Anaesthesia (Impact Factor 5.431 in 2018).  
A systematic review is a method used to combine evidence of multiple studies and does this 
by identifying relevant research, then appraising the study quality, and finally by summarising 
findings. Light & Pillimer commented that without a clear picture of where things stand now, 
simply adding one new study to the existing morass  was unlikely to be very useful (102). The 
basic steps of a systematic review include formulating a research question; finding relevant 
studies via a literature search; selecting and assessing the studies; summarizing and 
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synthesizing study results; interpreting the review results; and then maintaining and updating 
the review (101). Common to all knowledge synthesis methods are an explicit aim, the 
development of a methodological protocol, a comprehensive search strategy to find relevant 
research articles, a method or tradition of evaluating quality and potential risk of bias in 
individual studies and an explicit data collection and synthesis procedure (100). 
A good systematic review can generally give us the most reliable estimate of the effectiveness 
of a specific intervention, and it can identify gaps in our knowledge that require further research 
(101). The two systematic reviews that are described in this section summarise research in 
the field of human factors in anaesthesia and also the anaesthetic management of non-
iatrogenic airway trauma. These systematic reviews have been published in the anaesthetic 
literature and presented at national conferences (the process) to deliver the message to the 
anaesthetic community (the stakeholders). 
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Summary
Human factors in anaesthesia were !rst highlighted by the publication of the Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills
Framework, and since then an awareness of their importance has gradually resulted in changes in routine clinical
practice. This review examines recent literature around human factors in anaesthesia, and highlights recent national
reports and guidelines with a focus on team working, communication, situation awareness and human error. We
highlight the importance of human factors in modern anaesthetic practice, using the example of complex trauma.
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Introduction
There is widespread recognition that human factors
are key to the safe delivery of healthcare in the UK.
Human factors are de!ned as: “enhancing clinical per-
formance through an understanding of the effects of
teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, culture and
organisation on human behaviour and abilities and
application of that knowledge in clinical settings” [1];
or more simply, “the science of improving human per-
formance and well-being, by examining all the effectors
of human performance” [2].
There has been research into how human factors
for anaesthetists [3], surgeons [4] and scrub
practitioners [5] are translated into clinical practice.
Safe and ef!cient task performance requires both
technical and non-technical skills [6]. De!ciencies in
non-technical skills at the individual level increase
the chance of errors and adverse events [7]. There is
also evidence that teamwork glitches, communication
failures, and cultural and hierarchal barriers con-
tribute to safety failures [8–10]. Sir Liam Donaldson,
a previous Chief Medical Of!cer, stated that “to err
is human, to cover up is unforgivable, and to fail to
learn is inexcusable” [11]. It is hoped that the recent
concordat signed by 16 organisations including the
General Medical Council, NHS England and the
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Care Quality Commission will lead to further
embedding of human factors into everyday practice
[12].
This review article examines the literature around
human factors in anaesthesia, and highlights recent
national reports and guidelines, with a particular focus
on how their adoption can promote safer delivery of
care.
Methods
We searched Medline and CINAHL for papers
reporting on human factors and non-technical skills
in anaesthesia. We limited the search to articles pub-
lished from the year 2000 onwards, to represent con-
temporary practice. The search included full-text
reports of articles from peer-reviewed journals pub-
lished in English with no restriction to study method-
ology. In addition, we manually searched anaesthesia-
speci!c journals by typing ‘human factors’ into the
search box for Anaesthesia, Anesthesiology, Anesthesia
and Analgesia, The British Journal of Anaesthesia, the
Canadian Journal of Anesthesia and European Journal
of Anesthesiology, accepting articles (not abstracts pre-
sented at conferences) from after 2000. In addition,
reference lists of the manuscripts reviewed were
scrutinised for additional relevant articles and book
chapters.
The titles and abstracts of the references obtained
were reviewed by two independent reviewers (SM and
CJ). Inclusion criteria were: papers referring to
human factors; non-technical skills; team resource or
crew resource management; and papers published on
or after 2000. Exclusion criteria were: animal studies;
and papers not referring to human factors, non-tech-
nical skills team resource management or crew
resource management in theatres, anaesthesia, trauma
or critical care. Articles were removed if both review-
ers agreed independently to exclude. In the event of
agreement to include, or a discordant opinion, articles
were reviewed in full by one out of !ve independent
reviewers (SM, CJ, JC, CL and PG). Our full protocol
and search strategy are registered with and published
by PROSPERO (http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROS
PERO).
The results of the literature search are described in
Fig. 1.
Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills
Work performed by the University of Aberdeen on
Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) [3]
Figure 1 Systematic review literature search "ow.
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provides a practical framework for clinical practice
(Table 1). Initial analysis showed that the ANTS sys-
tem had a satisfactory level of validity, reliability and
usability in an experimental setting [3]. The increasing
importance of human factors has been recognised in
the recommendations of several recent national reports
and guidelines. In this review, we highlight some of
the individual components of human factors described
in the literature, and examine their importance in clin-
ical practice by considering complex trauma manage-
ment in the emergency department (ED) and in the
operating theatre, as this is our subspeciality interest.
National reports and guidelines
We highlight two recent reports and two national
guidelines that demonstrate the importance of human
factors in anaesthesia. They share common themes
that will be explored in more depth below.
The 4th National Audit Project (NAP4) [13] was
the !rst prospective study of all major airway events
occurring throughout the UK, and resulted in a review
of any complications resulting from airway manage-
ment that led to either death, brain damage, the need
for an emergency surgical airway, unanticipated ICU
admission or prolongation of ICU stay. After !nal
review, 184 reports met the inclusion criteria, and sub-
sequent in-depth analysis identi!ed human factors as
having been a relevant in"uence in every case. Latent
Table 1 The Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills
Framework [3].
Categories Elements
Task
management
• Planning and preparing
• Prioritising
• Providing and maintaining standards
• Identifying and utilising resources
Team
working
• Coordinating activities with team
members
• Exchanging information
• Using authority and assertiveness
• Assessing capabilities
• Supporting others
Situation
awareness
• Gathering Information
• Recognising and understanding
• Anticipating
Decision
making
• Identifying options
• Balancing risks and selecting options
• Re-evaluating
Table 2 Human factors recognised by NAP4 taken
directly from the published report [15].
Individual
and team
non-technical
skills
• Casual attitude to risk/overconfidence
• Peer tolerance of poor standards
• Lack of clarity in team structures
• Incomplete or inadequate briefing and
handovers/poor or non-existent
debriefing
• Poor or dysfunctional
communication – especially between
specialties
• Failure to follow advice from a senior
colleague
• Inadequate checking procedures
• Failure to request previous patient
records
• Failure to take and document a
comprehensive history
• Failure to undertake appropriate
pre-operative investigations
• Wrong interpretation of clinical
findings/test results
• Failure to use available equipment
(e.g. capnography)
• Attempts to use unfamiliar
equipment in an emergency situation
• Failure to cope with stressful
environment/interruptive workplace
• Failure to formulate back-up plans
and discuss with the team members
• Fixation errors, resulting in a failure
to recognise and abort a plan which
is not working, and move to
another potential solution
• Frequent/last minute changes of plan
System design
and
management
• Equipment shortages
• Inadequate maintenance of equipment
• Incompatible goals (e.g. conflict
between financial and clinical need)
• Reluctance to undertake a formal
analysis of adverse events/learn
from errors
• Loss of documentation (e.g.
previous patient records not available)
• Inadequate systems of communication
• Highly mobile working arrangements
leading to difficulties in communication
• Inexperienced personnel working
unsupervised
• No scheduled training sessions for
updating staff in the use of new
techniques/equipment
• Incomplete training/inadequate
knowledge or experience
• Heavy personal work-loads/lack of time
to undertake thorough assessments
• Organisational and professional
cultures which induce or tolerate
unsafe practices
• No requirement at organisational
level to undertake formalised
checking procedures
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threats (poor communication, poor training and team-
work, de!ciencies in equipment, and inadequate sys-
tems and processes) predisposed to loss of situational
awareness and subsequent poor decision making [14].
We have divided human factors errors into individual
and team non-technical skills and system and design
management (Table 2).
The 5th National Audit Project (NAP5) [16] on
accidental awareness during general anaesthesia
(AAGA) reported that two-thirds of awareness
occurred during induction and emergence. Contribut-
ing factors included: the use of thiopentone; rapid
sequence induction (RSI) of anaesthesia; obese patients;
dif!cult airway management; neuromuscular blockade;
and transfers to theatre [16]. Of those cases of AAGA
reported, 73% were deemed to be avoidable, with mis-
communication found to be the main contributory fac-
tor in greater than 80% cases of AAGA associated with
sedation. Human factors recognised by NAP5 are
described in Table 3.
The Dif!cult Airway Society (DAS) guidelines for
unanticipated dif!cult airway 2015 [17] included a
whole section on human factors, and incorporated rec-
ommendations made by the NAP4 report. The guideli-
nes highlight the importance of clinician awareness
that poor communication, poor training and team-
work, de!ciencies in equipment, and inadequate
systems and processes predispose to loss of situation
awareness and subsequent poor decision making. In
stressful situations such as cannot intubate, cannot
oxygenate (CICO), anaesthetists can become over-
loaded, and the DAS guidelines provide explicit
instructions for the team to ‘stop and think’. A ‘decla-
ration of the emergency’ ensures that all members of
the team start this critical situation on the ‘same page’
and can follow the same mental model (i.e. follow the
DAS Guidelines).
It is also important that teams rehearse together
and consider using simulation to develop non-techni-
cal skills, such as: leadership; team co-ordination; com-
munication; and shared understanding of roles [17]. A
team brief before the start of each anaesthetic, particu-
larly between anaesthetist and operating department
practitioner (ODP) is also considered to be good prac-
tice, and encourages thinking about speci!c challenges
and checking availability of appropriate equipment.
The DAS guidelines for the management of tra-
cheal extubation [18] recognised that human factors
compound problems related to tracheal extubation.
Problems arise when there is inadequate equipment,
inadequate skilled assistance, suboptimal patient posi-
tioning, limited access to airway (e.g. due to dressings/
gastric tubes/rigid !xators), interruption of oxygen
supply during patient transfer, communication dif!cul-
ties (e.g. language, mental capacity) and the removal of
oxygen by agitated or uncooperative patient.
Human factor components
Teamwork
The term ‘teamwork’ describes a number of beha-
vioural processes and emergent states [19] and is
de!ned as “a distinguishable set of two or more people
who interact dynamically, interdependently, and adap-
tively towards a common and valued goal, who have
each been assigned speci!c roles or functions to perform,
and who have a limited life-span membership” [20].
Although teams consist of individuals, it is important
to work towards maximising the mental and physical
problem-solving capabilities of the group, such that
the sum is greater than its parts [21]. In complex
teams, teamwork is more than just subordinates doing
what their leader tells them to do, and relies on good
followership; followership is ‘the active engagement of
Table 3 Human factors recognised by NAP5.
Induction of
anaesthesia
• Drugs errors (mislabelling, syringe
swaps, failure to mix drugs,
underdosing due to lack of
knowledge)
• Distraction (by colleagues or by
unexpected difficulty)
• Timing (rushing, busy lists with
multiple changes)
• Fatigue
• Seniority (unsupervised juniors, lack
of knowledge)
Maintenance of
anaesthesia
• Underdosing (due to cardiovascular
instability, risk to fetus, inattention/
judgement errors)
Emergence from
anaesthesia
• Switching off anaesthetic agents
too early due to poor communication
or lack of knowledge
• Failure to monitor neuromuscular
blockade
• Rushing and mistiming
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followers in helping the group achieve its goals’ [22].
Good teamwork is associated with improved produc-
tivity, innovation and job satisfaction [23]. Teams who
demonstrate similar mental models move quicker
through the phases common to most crises. This is
important, particularly in complex trauma [24].
Communication
It is estimated that communication failures account for
43% of errors in the operating theatre in the USA
[25]. Communication failures can be categorised as fol-
lows: the provision of insuf!cient information; poor
timing of the communication (e.g. too late); unresolved
issues at the end of the communication; or the absence
of key personnel [26]. In time-critical situations, it is
important that there is a team leader who can impart
critical information without the potential for misinter-
pretation or misunderstanding, irrespective of the situ-
ation or the composition of the team.
Effective communication relies on clarity (‘keeping
it clear’), brevity (‘keeping it brief)’, empathy, (‘how will
it feel to receive this?’), with provision for a feedback
loop. Directed communication and closed-loop commu-
nication is particularly important when rapid response
is critical, and involves speci!cation of who the order or
communication is directed towards, usually by using a
hand signal or saying the person’s name [27]. It is vital
that an atmosphere of open information exchange is
achieved by empowering all team members to speak out.
Barriers to challenging include poor communication
skills [28, 29] and poor intra-operative communication
between seniors and juniors [30], and should be taught
as part of the anaesthetic curriculum [31].
A shared mental model promotes an accurate
understanding of the facts, defends against error and
allows the cognitive resources of the entire team to be
fully leveraged for decision making and error detection
[32]. This model can be facilitated by a team brief,
which needs to include the following: the introduction
of all team members by name and role; a brie!ng as to
what is expected to happen; and allocation of tasks. An
example of this is the World Health Organization
(WHO) Safety Checklist [33]. To maintain effective
communication during a critical emergency, it is vital
that increased noise does not cause distraction. A ‘sterile
cockpit’ has been described in the airline industry
during key moments, and is also vital in emergency
patient care [34]. This is achieved by the noise level
being kept to an absolute minimum, and is reliant on
good ‘crowd control’ so that excessive noise levels are
kept low.
It is important to adopt a culture of good commu-
nication. There is evidence that nurses and trainee
doctors do not feel suf!ciently empowered during
interactions with senior doctors. Factors responsible
for this include: hierarchy; sex; differing patient care
responsibilities; differing perceptions of requisite com-
munication standards; and differences in the training
methods [35].
Situational awareness
Situational awareness is the continuous monitoring of
the task, detection of events, and changes in the
environment. Almost all aspects of anaesthetists’ intra-
operative tasks rely heavily on their vigilance and
situational awareness skills [36]. Situational awareness
can be de!ned by three questions: ‘Where have we come
from?’; ‘Where are we now?’; and ‘Where are we going?’
[37]. Practically, factors such as clinical signs and physi-
ology seen on the monitors, the rest of the operating
theatre team and other technology are vital to inform
situational awareness [38]. The importance of a shared
situational awareness is key to effective teamwork, and
in the military this is improved by regular updates by
the team leader in the form of situational updates (‘sit-
reps’) [24]. The three levels of situational awareness and
an error taxonomy are described in Table 4.
Human error
It is reported that there is an average of one error in
every 133 anaesthetics, and 130 errors for every 1000
patient ICU days [39]. Anaesthetic drug errors are
commonly caused by slips and lapses, !xation errors
(failure to revise a situation assessment as new evi-
dence emerges) [40], mistakes, knowledge-based errors
and deliberate violations [41]. Recommendations to
avoid drug errors include the following:
• Careful inspection of labels before a drug is drawn
up or injected.
• Optimise label legibility and contents on syringes,
according to agreed standards.
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• Formal organisation of drug drawers and work-
space.
• Second checker for labels before a drug is drawn
up or administered.
• Thorough reporting and review of intravenous drug
administration errors.
• Manage drug inventory to focus on minimising the
risk of drug error.
• Avoid similar packaging and presentation of drugs
where possible.
Accidents occur due to the interrelationship
between real-time ‘unsafe acts’ by front-line operators
and latent conditions [42]. In Reason’s classical ‘Swiss
cheese’ model, this is thought to be due to ‘holes’
appearing in the multiple levels of the system, and that
when these holes line up, as in multiple slices of Swiss
cheese, an accident can occur. ‘The Parmesan cheese
model’ [43] may be a better representation of the clini-
cian’s responsibility in routine patient care, and the
importance of minimising any de!ciencies in routine
practice. In this analogy, small shavings from the
cheese occur every time our practice contributes to sub-
standard practice; ‘with each shave – no matter how
small – we remove from the whole’, thereby decreasing
the chances of optimal patient outcome [43].
Observable team errors may be classi!ed into !ve
basic types.
1 Task execution – an unintentional physical act
that deviates from the intended course of action.
2 Procedural – an unintentional failure to follow
mandated procedures.
3 Communication – a failure to transmit informa-
tion, failure to understand information or failure
to share a mental model.
4 Decision – a choice of action unbounded by pro-
cedures that unnecessarily increase hazard and
5 Intentional non-compliance – violations of formal
procedures or regulations [44]. Latent errors in the
operating theatre are further classi!ed as follows [45]:
• Equipment, design and maintenance (availability,
functioning, standardisation of design and mainte-
nance of machines).
• Staf!ng (adequate staf!ng and skills).
• Communication (work-directed communication,
openness, interrelation and atmosphere).
• Training (training for machines, procedures and
team training).
• Teamwork and team training (team performance).
• Procedures (presence of protocols and adherence to
protocols).
• Situational awareness (awareness of present situa-
tion, own tasks and future developments).
• Incompatible goals (balance between goals and
safety).
Table 4 Levels of situational awareness and error taxonomy – adapted from Endsley [37].
Level 1 situational awareness: failure
to correctly perceive the situation
‘Where have we come from?’
• The data are not available
• The data are difficult to detect or perceive
• There is a failure to scan or observe data due to
o Omission
o Attentional narrowing or distraction
o High taskload of individual
• There is misperception of the data
• Individual memory failure
Level 2 situational awareness: failure
to comprehend situation
‘Where are we now?’
• Lack of or a poor mental model
• Use of the incorrect mental model
• Over-reliance on default values in the mental model
• Individual memory failure
Level 3 situational awareness: failure
to project situation into the future
‘Where are we going?’
• Lack of or a poor mental model
General • Failure to maintain multiple goals
• Habitual schema
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• Planning and organisation (process of care).
• Housekeeping (hygiene).
The importance of human factors in
clinical practice
The authors work in a busy major trauma centre in
the North-West of England. We have taken the results
of the literature review and applied this to our clinical
practice. Much of these !ndings are generalisable into
other areas of clinical anaesthesia.
Emergency department
Anaesthetists are frequently called to support critically
unwell, time-critical patients in the ED. At the time of
the call, patients may physically be in the department
or en route. This can result in overwhelming or inade-
quate clinical information, respectively. Both circum-
stances provide an immediate cognitive load and
increased risk of cognitive errors. These patients fre-
quently require high-risk anaesthetic interventions to
promote safety, but there is minimal time to consider
factors that may prevent poor critical decision-making
(Table 5).
There are increased distractions, mental workload
and cognitive pressures in ED that further increase the
risk of team errors. These include in particular deviation
from standardised operating procedures, not using cog-
nitive aids (checklists), violations of formal procedures
or regulations and intentional non-compliance [44].
Lack of familiarity and poor ergonomic design of ED
resuscitation bays can have a signi!cant negative impact
on situational awareness. Fatigue, frequently encoun-
tered on call, can further exacerbate this situation. Fati-
gue has been reported to degrade or cause variability in
performance by reducing attention–vigilance, slowing
cognitive throughput, impairing memory and decision
making, prolonging reaction time and disrupting com-
munications. When managing high-acuity patients in
ED, it takes only a moment of reduced performance
during a critical task to have a negative outcome [48].
The reception and resuscitation of a critically
unwell patient in ED can be divided a number of
stages.
Initial handover
Pre-hospital teams should give a pre-alert noti!cation
for admission of all critically unwell patients to the
ED. This allows time to assemble appropriately-skilled
resources and can trigger several de!ned protocols for
preparation of key interventions and additional logisti-
cal, specialist support (e.g. activation of trauma vs
medical cardiac arrest teams, major haemorrhage pro-
tocol, paediatric and obstetric teams, and ensuring an
emergency theatre is on stand-by to receive). On
Table 5 Emergency department contributory factors to
poor critical decision making, delayed diagnosis and
missed injury. To be considered before delivery of high
risk anaesthetic interventions.
Patient
factors
Evolving pathophysiology (medical and
surgical)
Altered level of consciousness – inability
to take a history
Haemodynamic and respiratory
compromise
Minimal clinical assessment completed
so far
Distracting injuries
Multiple injuries
Child vs. adult
Urgency of clinical problem
Provider
factors
Lack of knowledge, inexperience
Failure to adapt (low to high mental
work-load)
Lack of skilled assistance
Complacency
Fatigue
Emotive case
Practical difficulties and frustration
Failure to re-assess
Confirmation bias
Poor team dynamics
Ineffective communication
• Hierarchical gradients [46]
• Loss of situational awareness
• Poor followership
Environmental
factors
Unfamiliar clinical environment
Increased auditory and physical distractions
• Raised noise levels – crowd control
• Multiple equipment alarms [47]
• Increased staff observation &
movement
Ergonomic design – visibility of patient
monitor
Equipment familiarity and maintenance
Remote from specialist anaesthetic
equipment
Remote from immediate senior
anaesthetic support
Delayed access to specialist surgical
support and imaging
Standardised operational procedures
and cognitive aids
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arrival, the handover must be delivered in a standard-
ised manner. Although there is variability among ser-
vices, many use the AT-MIST acronym (Table 6).
Early and robust decisions are required from the team
leader, often in conjunction with the anaesthetic team
and other specialties present. A formalised handover
process ensures that the team is prepared and
‘switched on’ to receive crucial information in com-
plete silence, and ready to assimilate this information
into orders of priority. However, this process may fall
short when handovers are inadequate and the mental
model is no longer ‘shared’; this is referred to this as
‘the Bermuda Triangle of healthcare’ [49].
Primary systematic assessment
The role of the designated team leader is to allocate roles
(according to clinical competencies) and facilitate a pri-
mary systematic assessment and other subsequent tasks
in a ‘horizontal fashion’ [50]. Systematic re-assessments
are vital for the management of complex critically unwell
patients. This process permits shared understanding
(especially important in evolving pathophysiology), the
formulation of clear mental models and supports subse-
quent critical decisions. Failure to perform re-assessment
promotes cognitive bias and may impact on critical deci-
sion, for example, computed tomographic (CT) imaging
vs. immediate surgical intervention, or critical care sup-
port vs. recognition of futility and palliation.
Communication for critical decisions
Best practice management of critically unwell patients
in the ED requires a multidisciplinary team approach
with excellent communication. The key to delivering
damage control resuscitation and surgery has been
shown to be effective communication [51]. Although
this requirement is self-evident, the principles to
achieving this can be forgotten or be suboptimal in
stressful situations. In response to this, the Trauma
WHO checklist has been proposed to improve and
streamline communication during the damage control
resuscitation [24]. This checklist has been tested and
modi!ed in a military !eld hospital in Afghanistan
[52], and the main elements are described in Table 7.
The key features of the Command Huddle (described
below) could be applied within NHS practice to all ED
medical and surgical resuscitations. Following initial
assessment and resuscitation the team leader should
have formulated their own mental model and plan.
Before presenting it to the team, the team leader
should share and exchange critical information with
key members (anaesthetist, surgeon, medical physician,
intensivist, theatre lead etc.). Once agreed on a shared
mental model, the team leader presents their plan and
explores opinions from key members. The objective of
the command huddle is to formulate a plan of action
with clear order of priorities.
Emergency department rapid sequence induction
During the command huddle, the anaesthetist needs to
justify why an ED RSI of anaesthesia is required, and
complete their own risk vs. bene!t analysis (Table 8).
The less situationally aware anaesthetist may immedi-
ately agree to delivering an RSI, especially for a patient
with a ‘solid’ indication(s). This is fraught with danger
unless there is clear understanding of the patient’s
pathology, consideration of speci!c anaesthetic cau-
tions and contingency planning to manage unantici-
pated dif!culty with tracheal intubation. As outlined in
NAP4, the incidence of serious airway complications
causing death or brain damage is signi!cantly greater
in the ED, with at least one in 50,000 anaesthetics
requiring a surgical airway [13]. The 2015 Dif!cult
Airway Society guidelines suggest waking a patient up
when both tracheal intubation and supraglottic airway
Table 6 Elements of the AT-MIST pre-alert and han-
dover.
Trauma Medical
Age (include name
for handover)
Age (include name for handover)
Time of incident Time of onset
Mechanism of injury Medical complaint/history
Injuries top to toe Investigations (brief examination
findings)
Vital signs (first set
and significant
changes)
Vital signs (first set and significant
changes)
Treatment Treatment
Additional pre-alert
information:
Estimated time
of arrival
Mode of transport
Specialist resources
standing by
Additional pre-alert information:
Estimated time of arrival
Mode of transport
Specialist resources standing by
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device insertion have failed [17], however, this may
not be possible for patients receiving an RSI for indi-
cations 1–3 (see below), and requires careful discussion
and planning.
Improving safety requires engagement. Emerging
evidence regarding safer practices offer substantial
gains in safety, but only if effectively implemented
[44]. Developing methods for a systematic approach to
the safety of ED RSI is supported by results in other
high-reliability organisations [45]. Without this, the
effectiveness of human factor training and awareness
would necessarily be limited. Safety culture, speci!cally
for the use of ED RSI checklists, has increased since
the implementation of the WHO surgical safety check-
list [53] and following recommendations from NAP4
[13] to use cognitive aids for emergency anaesthesia. A
systematic approach to safety around RSI in the ED is
described in Table 9.
It is not uncommon to perform complex proce-
dures in ED (e.g. emergency resuscitative thoracotomy),
or to undertake prolonged resuscitation before critical
care admission or performing a tertiary transfer to a
specialist hospital. When this occurs, there is often a
transfer of leadership to the anaesthetist.
The operating theatre
The operating theatre is recognised as a high-risk, acci-
dent-prone environment where the consequences of
failure can be catastrophic [53], and failures in non-
technical skills, particularly communication [25] and
teamwork have contributed to adverse events [54]. To
elucidate these, we have focused on four speci!c areas:
handover; hierarchy; checklists; and equipment. Again,
we have used complex trauma as an example, as this is
often a complex situation that is highly stressful,
involving a multidisciplinary team and where individu-
als are frequently placed out of their own comfort
zones.
Handover
The use of checklists and protocols has been shown
to improve the routine handover of patients [55]. In
an evolution of these, electronic handovers have been
tested and also found to be useful [56]. Failed com-
munication upon transfer of care may lead to adverse
events [56]. In the example of complex trauma, there
should be a formal handover from the trauma team
leader to the lead anaesthetist in the operating the-
atre. This process ensures that the whole trauma
team are aware of who the team leader is at all times
[57].
Hierarchy
In emergency situations, it is important that members
of the team are empowered to challenge their seniors.
‘Speaking-up’, or the ability to effectively challenge
erroneous decisions, is essential to preventing harm;
despite signi!cant multifactorial barriers, systematic
training in effective ‘speaking up’ could improve the
con!dence and ability of juniors to challenge erro-
neous decisions [31]. Perceived barriers to challenging
include the following: assumed hierarchy; fear of
embarrassment of self or others; concern over being
misjudged; fear of being wrong; fear of retribution;
jeopardising an ongoing relationship; natural avoidance
of con"ict; and concern for reputation [58]. In the
Table 7 The Trauma World Health Organisation
checklist.
Command
Huddle
Following the primary and secondary survey
the team leader uses the information gleaned
from the handover from the pre-hospital
team, the physical examination, imaging
and blood test to arrive at a decision on
the next step in patient care. This is often
transfer to the CT scanner, but may involve
direct transfer to the operating theatre or
critical care.
Snap
Brief
Before commencing surgery there is a
reconfirmation of vital information to
ensure the right patient is in theatre
followed by a recap of the mechanism
of injury, the injuries sustained, any
additional radiology results and then the
surgical and anaesthetic plans.
Sit-Reps Every 10–30 min there will be an update
or ‘sit-rep’, usually when additional
information is known. The acronym STACK
acronym can be used to facilitate this.
• S = Systolic BP
• T = Temperature
• A = Acidosis
• C = Coagulation
• K = Kit (Including blood products used)
Debrief At a convenient moment when the case has
finished there will be a debrief for all team
members.
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airline industry, the acronym ‘CUS’-‘I’m concerned,’
‘I’m uncomfortable,’ and ‘this is unsafe or I’m scared’
is used to challenge in a crisis situation [59].
Further steps that we think are important in fur-
ther !attening the medical hierarchy include [60]:
• Encouraging staff to address each another by their
"rst name.
• Trying to create an inclusive atmosphere.
• Consultants speci"cally inviting juniors to ask
questions and vocalise uncertainties
• Agreeing at departmental and national professional
level to a ‘two-challenge rule’ triggering the
involvement of a second consultant, without threat
of professional sanction.
• Regular consultant assessment by juniors.
Checklists
The primary purpose of checklists is to avoid uninten-
tional harm by accounting for mental fallibility [61].
There are cultural hurdles to implementing checklists
[62], and acceptance of these cognitive aids requires a
certain amount of humility in a profession known for
independence and authority [61]. ‘Smart Checklists’
Table 8 Indications for emergency department anaesthesia – a risk vs. bene"t analysis of ‘hard’ (1–3) and ‘soft (4–6)
indications.
Indication Consider?
Actions, specialist equipment and
additional personnel
1 Actual or
impending
airway
compromise
Ensure mechanism fully understood (blunt, penetrating, burn
injuries, anaphylaxis, foreign body, malignancy, infectious etc.)
Videolaryngoscopy
Fibreoptic bronchoscope
Difficult airway trolley
ENT surgeon present
2 Ventilatory failure Risk stratify patients at high risk of apnoeic desaturation [74]. Optimise patient position, consider
adding PEEP, provide apnoeic
oxygenation ! positive pressure
ventilation pre-intubation.
3 Unconsciousness Could this be secondary to an unsecured intracranial aneurysm? Caution with RSI drugs used –
avoid hypertensive response to
laryngoscopy.
4 Unmanageable
and agitated
after head injury
Consider ‘delayed sequence induction’ to improve oxygenation
and i.v. access before completing RSI [75].
Use small boluses of ketamine to
achieve sedation, preserve airway
reflexes and maintain spontaneous
breathing.
5 Anticipated
clinical course
This rarely applies in a hospital setting.
Analyse clinical progression and risk of performing RSI later in
theatre.
Continue to improve physiology
and re-assess.
6 Humanitarian need Dependent on patient cooperation. Consider multi-modal analgesia
and sedation for anxiolysis vs.
delayed sequence induction to
get control.
PEEP, positive end-exporatory pressure; RSI, rapid sequence induction; ENT, ear, nose and throat; i.v., intravenous.
‘Code Red’ patients: ensure there is large bore i.v. access, that the major haemorrhage protocol activated and consider starting
blood pre-RSI using a rapid transfuser.
Blunt trauma: at the level of the larynx or below can be dif"cult to diagnose. The hallmark of airway management for such
patients is the maintenance of spontaneous ventilation, intubation under direct vision to avoid the creation of a false passage, and
avoidance of both intermittent positive pressure ventilation and cricoid pressure (the latter for laryngotracheal trauma only) dur-
ing a rapid sequence induction of anaesthesia [76].
Severe metabolic acidosis: often seen in patients with septic shock or metabolic crises (e.g. diabetic ketoacidosis). Consider ventilat-
ing these patients through the apnoeic phase, as a mixed respiratory and metabolic acidosis during this time can cause the pH to
fall sharply and precipitate cardiac arrest.
Table 9 A systematic approach to the safety of emer-
gency department rapid sequence induction (RSI).
• ‘Stop and Think’
• Consider indication for emergency anaesthesia (risk
stratification for apnoeic hypoxia)
• Consider RSI drug regime as per a standardised
approach
• Use of Emergency Department RSI checklist
• Strict clinical governance
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are designed not to threaten provider autonomy, but
to mentally of!oad the many repetitive tasks in health-
care that must be completed in a largely predictable
sequence [63]. Displaying cognitive aids during emer-
gencies reduces omissions, time to perform tasks and
improves team skills, communication and performance
in most instances [64].
As described above, the WHO surgical safety check-
list [53] was introduced in 2009 with the primary aim of
eliminating ‘never events’, and has recently been
reported to reduce hospital mortality [65]. This process
involves a team brief and then a series of questions to
review key aspects of the operation, any patient-speci"c
factors and any unusual steps in the process.
It has been suggested that during an emergency
there is potential unwillingness or inability to revert to
more systematic thinking [66]. During stress, there is an
increase in cortisol and other stress hormones, which
can lead to cognitive and behavioural changes. This may
account for de"ciencies in recalling information, missed
treatment steps or mistakes in sequential procedures
[67]. The use of cognitive aids during simulation scenar-
ios has demonstrated improvements in the management
of anaesthetic emergencies such as malignant hyper-
pyrexia [68] and local anaesthetic toxicity [69]. Indivi-
dual anaesthetists’ decisions to follow or deviate from
guidelines are in!uenced by the beliefs held about the
consequence of their actions, the direct or indirect in!u-
ence of others, and the presence of factors that encour-
age or facilitate particular courses of action [70].
Accepting a cognitive aid like a checklist requires a
certain amount of humility. Use of such aids is now seen
as a sign of strength, whereas failing to use them may be
regarded as a weakness, and of perhaps taking on
unwarranted risk. To avoid complacency, completion of
an RSI checklist is a two-person task, following a ‘chal-
lenge’ and ‘response’ process. Visual and tactile checks
are completed before the responder con"rming a posi-
tive or negative response. A ‘pre-induction of anaesthe-
sia checklist’ has been shown to signi"cantly improve
information exchange, knowledge of critical information
and perception of safety in anaesthetic teams [71].
Equipment
The design of equipment is crucial in the "eld of
human factors. One very topical equipment issue
currently is the universal Luer connector and its role
in intrathecal administration of drugs. In the UK, in
2001, Wayne Jowett, a teenager who was in remission
from leukaemia, died following the intrathecal admin-
istration of vincristine [72]. The Luer lock connection
had enabled the vincristine syringe to be attached to
the spinal needle, thereby removing the "nal safeguard
for the patient [72]. Similar tragedies have been
reported with chlorhexidine cleaning solution adminis-
tered epidurally [73]. Although this problem was
recognised over 40 years ago, there is still no satisfac-
tory solution. NHS trusts and independent healthcare
institutions in England and Wales were supposed to
have taken action to use spinal needles with non-Luer
connectors by 1 April 2011, but unfortunately this still
has not been achieved. Although there are other exam-
ples of unresolved equipment safety issues, this is per-
haps the most serious unresolved equipment risks that
anaesthetists regularly encounter.
Conclusion
Recognition of human factors is now "rmly embedded
into clinical anaesthetic practice, and has been high-
lighted in several recent national reports and guide-
lines. We have reviewed the current literature and
described the human factor components of teamwork,
communication and situation awareness; we have also
commented on human error. The importance of
human factors in clinical practice has been highlighted
using the example of complex trauma in the ED and
the operating theatre.
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3.2 Human Factors in Preventing Complications in Anaesthesia. Jones CP, 
Fawker-Corbett J, Groom P, Morton B, Lister C, Mercer SJ. Anaesthesia 2018; 73(S1): 
12-24  
 
3.2.1 Why this paper was written? 
This paper was written following an invitation from the editor of the journal Anaesthesia based 
on my previous publications and national reputation and was to be included in a patient safety 
supplement. I was also keen to summarise the current literature around human factors in the 
operating theatre, particularly for acute care, including trauma. 
3.2.2 What was known at the time of writing? 
At the time of writing (summer 2017) human factors in healthcare was starting to be 
relaunched. As described earlier in this thesis, initial interest around this subject commenced 
ith the seminal papers To Err is H man  (22) and An Organisation with a Memo  (23). 
Despite these important documents, the human factors culture was not firmly established in 
healthcare and this was despite the introduction of the World Health Organisation Surgical 
Safety Checklist  (103). A number of key institutions signed up to a Concordat in Human 
Factors  (30) and it was hoped that this would renew interest and raise the profile of this aspect 
of healthcare 
3.2.3 Wha  he a e  added  c ib ed  he g ba  c i ica  c i ? 
One of the purposes of this thesis is to demonstrate that I have developed a national reputation 
in the field of human factors in complex trauma. I have used the knowledge discovered in this 
paper to develop lectures at the following invited national meetings 
 Simulation for Trauma Training. Trauma Care Conference, Yarnfield Conference 
Centre, Stafford, 6 March 2019 
 
 Wrong Site Block, Royal College of Anaesthetists Updates Meeting, Hilton Hotel, 
Liverpool, 26 November 2018 
 
 Improving Trauma Teams. Understandi g Wh  Tea  D  W , Cambridge 
Trauma Conference, Churchill College Cambridge, 28 April 2018 
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 Human Factors in Complex Trauma, Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and 
Ireland Annual Congress, BT Convention Centre, Liverpool, 28 September 2017 
 
3.2.4. Where are we now? 
 
This article has been cited in the medical literature 14 times and has an Altmetric score of 269 
(404 mentions on Twitter, citation in 2 blogs and 2 Facebook pages, also 67 Mendeley 
engagements). I have further used the basis of this publication to develop the following further 
publications. 
  
 Team-working, communication and use of communication aids and checklists (Book 
Chapter). Mercer SJ. Chapter in Section 2 - The impact of human factors in clinical 
practice in Decision-Making and Simulation in Obstetric Anaesthesia. Cambridge 
University Press. 2019 Chapter 8 Pg 45-51 
 Education Training and Human Factors. Mercer SJ, Khan M, Matthews JJ, Reavley P, 
Gurney I, Glover N, Jones CP. Military Medicine in Iraq and Afghanistan. A 
Comprehensive Review. Edited by Ian Greaves. 2019 Chapter 22: 485-509, CRC 
Press, Boca Raton, FL 
 Followership in complex trauma. Fadden S, Mercer SJ Trauma 2019; 21: 6-13 
 
 
The following articles listed in Table 2.5 have also cited this publication (I have only listed 
articles in English) 
 
Table 2.5 Articles citing Human Factors in Preventing Complications in 
Anaesthesia. Jones CP, Fawker-Corbett J, Groom P, Morton B, Lister C, Mercer 
SJ. Anaesthesia 2018; 73(S1): 12-24  
 
Paper Summary 
Loh LWW, Lee JSE, Goy RWL. 
Exploring the impact of overnight 
call stress on anaesthesiology 
e i  e ide  e cei ed abi i  
to learn and teach in an Asian 
healthcare system: A qualitative 
study. Trends in Anaesthesia and 
Critical Care (In Press: Accepted 
25 March 2019) 
 
This project looked at acute stress in terms of senior 
residents in anaesthesia and explored the nature of the 
stressors, and their influence on trainees  perceived learning 
and teaching using focus groups. There were four different 
types of stressors identified which included emergency 
work, physical and mental exhaustion, concerns over 
supervisory roles and incurring clinical risks, and concerns 
with appearing deficient. Our article was cited as it was 
described that errors in anaesthesia have been attributed to 
deficiencies in non-technical skills. They also quoted that 
fatigue reduces vigilance, slows cognition, increases 
reaction time and worsens decision making abilities.  
Ahmad I, El-Boghdadly K. From 
evidence based on practice to 
evidence-based practice: time for a 
difficult airway management 
research strategy.  
Anaesthesia 2019; 74: 135 139  
This editorial discusses a proposed roadmap for the 
development of a difficult airway research strategy. Our 
article is cited in the context that critical incidents in airway 
management are often unpredicted and are associated with 
high levels of cognitive load and stress. 
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Barrington MJ, Lirk P. Reducing 
the risk of neurological 
complications after peripheral 
nerve block: what is the role of 
pressure monitoring?  
Anaesthesia 2019; 74: 9 12  
 
This editorial discusses the introduction of pressure 
monitors for use when undertaking peripheral nerve blocks. 
Our article is cited in the context that it is important to provide 
education and core skills development to trainees and that 
non-technical skills such as situational awareness, 
adequate organisation, preparation and standardisation of 
processes using safety checklists are also important. These 
are issues that our discussed in our article. 
Chrimes N, Marshall SD. Attempt 
XYZ: airway management at the 
opposite end of the alphabet.  
Anaesthesia 2018, 73, 1464 1468  
 
Our article is cited in terms of fixation errors and it discusses 
the management of a difficult airway. The use of XYZ is to 
define the last three upper airway instrumentations before 
performing an emergency surgical airway. Fixation 
errors occur when the practitioner concentrates solely upon 
a single aspect of a case to the detriment of other more 
relevant aspects (104). 
Chrimes N, Bradley WPL, Gatward 
JJ et al. Human factors and the 
e  ge e a i  ai a  e .  
Anaesthesia 2019; 74: 427 433 
 
This article discusses the key principles for incorporating 
human factors into airway trolley design and implementation 
so as to enhance team performance. Our article is cited as 
a definition of human factors in terms of the operating 
theatre where anaesthetists must consider the impact of 
aspects of the individual, environment, processes and 
culture on human performance.  
Evain JN, Perrot A, Vincent A, et 
al. Team planning discussion and 
clinical performance: a 
prospective, randomised, 
controlled simulation trial.  
Anaesthesia 2019; 74: 488 496  
This study investigated whether a brief planning discussion 
improved team performance in a simulated critical care 
situation.  The authors concluded that a 4-minute planning 
discussion before a simulated critical care situation 
improved clinical team performance and cognitive appraisal 
ratios. Our article is cited as it describes the importance of 
human factors in patient safety. 
Evans DJR, Pawlina W, Lachman 
N.  Human Skills for Human[istic] 
Anatomy: An Emphasis on 
Nontraditional Discipline-
Independent Skills. Anatomical 
Sciences Education 2018; 11: 221
224 
This article discusses human factors concerning anatomists. 
Out article is cited as a definition of human factors. 
 
Greenland KB, Irwin MG. Big data: 
breaking new ground in airway 
research. Anaesthesia 2018: 73; 
674 678  
This article discusses analysis of cases of emergency front 
of neck access. Our article is cited to make reference to 
the case of Elaine Bromley who died as she did not receive 
this treatment. 
Pavithran P, Rajesh MC, Rekha K. 
Survey of change in practice 
following simulation-based 
training in crisis management. 
Indian Journal of Anaesthesia 
2018; 62: 991-994 
This publication reviews the effectiveness of a simulation 
experience on management of crisis situations. Our article 
is cited to emphasise that human factors impact our 
efficiency and management which is a significant factor 
contributing to the medical errors. 
Valchanov K, Sturgess J. 
C ica i : a  a ae he i  
a he  ha  a ge  e  
(with apologies to Atul Gwande). 
Anaesthesia 2018; 73(S1): 3 6  
This is the editorial that introduces the journal article that our 
article is published in.  
 
Barrington MJ, Lirk P. Reducing 
the risk of neurological 
complications after peripheral 
nerve block: what is the role of 
pressure monitoring? Anaesthesia 
2019; 74: 9-12 
This is an Editorial in the Journal of Anaesthesia looking at 
human factors and peripheral nerve blocks 
Pavithran P, Rajesh MC, Rekha 
K,Sajid B. Survey of change in 
practice following simulation-
This article reported a survey among the anaesthetic 
participants of a simulation-based learning workshop, and 
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based training in crisis 
management. Indian Journal of 
Anaesthesia 2018; 62: 991 994. 
investigated attitudes, change in knowledge and effects of 
the training on practice. 
Casali G, Cullen W, Lock G. The 
rise of human factors: optimising 
performance of individuals and 
ea   i e a ie  
outcomes. Journal of Thoracic 
Disease 2019; 11(S7): S998-S1008  
This is a theoretical paper that supports the adoption of a 
broader model of human performance as a function of 
technical and non-technical skills. It also looks at culture 
and organisation. Our article is cited as latent threats are 
predisposed to loss of situational awareness and poor 
decision-making 
 
This article was also cited in the following thesis 
 
Deniz Dishman  
 Title: Adaptation and Validation of the Situation Awareness Global Assessment 
Technique for Student Registered Nurse Anesthetists (2019) 
 Institution: Virginia Commonwealth University  
 
Following publication of this paper I was invited to sit on the Royal College of Anaesthetists 
(RCoA) Simulation Steering Committee who have recently published their strategy that was 
approved by the RCoA Council (105). 
3.2.5 Reflections on the methodology/method(s) 
 
3.2.5.1 Literature review and article selection 
 
Our full protocol and search strategy were registered with and published by PROSPERO 
(http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROSPERO). By registering with this organisation a peer review 
of our methodology was undertaken of the project and it was deemed to be acceptable and 
was registered on a national database to ensure transparency. Medline and CINAHL 
databases were searched and papers reporting on human factors and non-technical skills in 
anaesthesia were included with the search limited to articles published from the year 2000 
onwards. The year 2000 as a cut off was chosen to reflect contemporary practice. The search 
included full-text reports of articles from peer-reviewed journals published in English with no 
restriction to study methodology. To ensure a comprehensive search, we manually searched 
anaesthesia-specific journals b  t ping human factors  into the search bo  for Anaesthesia, 
Anesthesiology, Anesthesia & Analgesia, The British Journal of Anaesthesia, the Canadian 
Journal of Anesthesia and European Journal of Anesthesiology, accepting articles (not 
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abstracts presented at conferences) from after 2000. Finally, in addition, reference lists of the 
manuscripts reviewed were scrutinised for additional relevant articles and book chapters. This 
ensured that the literature had been reviewed as comprehensively as possible. 
The titles and abstracts of the references obtained from the database search were reviewed 
by two independent reviewers. The inclusion criteria being papers referring to human factors; 
non-technical skills; team resource or crew resource management; and papers published on 
or after 2000. Articles were removed if both reviewers agreed independently to exclude. In the 
event of agreement to include, or a discordant opinion, articles were reviewed in full by one 
out of five independent reviewers. The year 2000 was chosen to focus on recent practice and 
does exclude the seminal paper To E  i  H man; B ilding A Safe  Heal h S em  (22). This 
paper (22) does not directly refer to anaesthetic management in the operating theatre and its 
ideas and suggestions are mentioned in many subsequent papers. A limitation to this study 
was that a risk of bias assessment was not performed which could itself have led to a bias in 
the studies that were selected in the final paper. 
This article summarises the literature around Human Factors in Anaesthesia particularly in 
dealing with a patient involved in complex trauma. Examples are cited of teamworking, 
communication, situational awareness and human error ending with a review of human factors 
in clinical practice looking at trauma. National guidelines and publications that are specifically 
mentioned include the following 
 Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills (ANTS). Work from a team at the University of 
Aberdeen has extensively reviewed how non-technical skills are classified for working 
as an anaesthetist (106,107). Similar frameworks have been devised for Surgeons 
(108) and Scrub Practitioners (36). 
 National Audit Project 4 (NAP4). This National Audit Project was sponsored by the 
Royal College of Anaesthetists and the Difficult Airway Society (25). This article 
highlights the human factors elements that were noted in the final report including 
individual and system errors. Subsequent analysis of unanticipated difficult airways 
included in the report has further highlighted the importance of human factors in 
emergency airway management (66) and this can be translated to trauma. 
 National Audit Project 5 (NAP5). This National Audit Project focused on awareness 
in anaesthesia. Human factors are discussed under induction, maintenance and 
emergence from anaesthesia (109). 
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Despite registering the systematic review methodology with the peer reviewed organisation 
PROSPERO (International Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews) (110) and searching 
two of the largest medical databases, there were still 16 journal articles that were missed in 
the initial search only to be found later in the process when mainstream anaesthesia journals 
were searched by hand or references in other articles were reviewed. I will discuss this further 
in section 3.3.5. 
3.2.3 Summary 
This systematic review summarises the recent literature on human factors related to 
anaesthesia. Two recent national audits have strongly commented on the importance of 
human factors in clinical practice. Our article described how human factors are important in 
the setting of complex trauma. This article has been useful to inform the anaesthetic 
community on the importance of human factors in anaesthesia. 
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Abstract
Introduction: Non-iatrogenic trauma to the airway is rare and presents a signi!cant challenge to the anaesthetist. Although
guidelines for the management of the unanticipated dif!cult airway have been published, these do not make provision for the
‘anticipated’ dif!cult airway. This systematic reviewaims to informbest practice and suggestmanagement options for different
injury patterns.
Methods: A literature searchwas conducted using Embase,Medline, andGoogle Scholar for papers after the year 2000 reporting
on the acute airwaymanagement of adult patients who suffered airway trauma. Our protocol and search strategy are registered
with and published by PROSPERO (http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/PROSPERO, ID: CRD42016032763).
Results: A systematic literature search yielded 578 articles, of which a total of 148 full-text papers were reviewed. We present
our results categorized by mechanism of injury: blunt, penetrating, blast, and burns.
Conclusions: The hallmark of airway management with trauma to the airway is the maintenance of spontaneous ventilation,
intubation under direct vision to avoid the creation of a false passage, and the avoidance of both intermittent positive pressure
ventilation and cricoid pressure (the latter for laryngotracheal trauma only) during a rapid sequence induction. Management
depends on available resources and time to perform airway assessment, investigations, and intervention (patients will be
classi!ed into one of three categories: no time, some time, or adequate time). Human factors, particularly the development of a
shared mental model amongst the trauma team, are vital to mitigate risk and improve patient safety.
Key words: airway management; blast injuries; blunt injuries; burns; wounds, penetrating
Trauma to the airway may cause acutely life-threatening airway
laceration, obstruction, haemorrhage, and aspiration of blood;
this presents the anaesthetist with a major challenge.1 2 Fortu-
nately, airway trauma is a relatively infrequent complication of
major trauma, in both the UK civilian (National Health Service)
and UK Defence Medical Services settings.3 4 However, complica-
tions related to this injury can be catastrophic without optimal
management. For example, in a patient with blunt or penetrating
airway trauma, advancing a bougie or tracheal tube blindly be-
yond the vocal cords risks penetration through an airway lacer-
ation, leading to airway obstruction, pneumomediastinum, and
the creation of a false passage.1 5 Guidelines for themanagement
of the unanticipated dif!cult airway have recently been revised
by the Dif!cult Airway Society;6 however, these do notmake pro-
vision for an ‘anticipated’ dif!cult airway that could be experi-
enced in complex trauma, and if followed, could even worsen
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the traumatic airway. Our aimwas to inform best practice for air-
way trauma and suggestmanagement options for the various in-
jury patterns to reduce serious sequelae.
Methods
Search strategy
We searched Embase, Medline, and Google Scholar for papers re-
porting on the acute airway management of adult patients who
had suffered airway trauma. We limited the search to articles
published from the year 2000 onwards to represent contempor-
ary practice. The search included full-text reports of articles
from peer-reviewed journals and conference abstracts published
in English, and therewere no restrictions to the studies reviewed.
In addition, the reference lists of the articles reviewed were scru-
tinized for additional relevant articles and book chapters.
Article selection
Titles and abstracts of the references obtained were reviewed by
two independent reviewers (M.B. and C.P.J.). Articles were cate-
gorized for inclusion or exclusion. Articles were removed if both
reviewers agreed independently to exclude. In the event of agree-
ment to include or a discordant opinion, articles were reviewed
in full by one of four independent reviewers (C.P.J., P.G., E.C., and
S.J.M.). Inclusion criteria were as follows: adults older than 18 yr
of age with airway trauma; papers published on or after 2000;
and papers reporting airway trauma (blunt, burn, penetrating,
blast, or miscellaneous injuries) and anaesthetic management.
The exclusion criteria were as follows: children (<18 yr old);
animal studies; papers not dealing with acute trauma and airway
trauma; and papers that did not have an airway management
focus. Our full protocol and search strategy are registered
with and published by PROSPERO (http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/
PROSPERO, ID: CRD42016032763); this includes the search terms
and keywords used.
Results
Our systematic literature search yielded 578 articles (see Fig. 1).
Two hundred and sixteen were excluded after title review. After
abstract review, a further 214 articleswere excluded. A total of 148
full-text paperswere reviewed, ofwhichwe included 35 in this re-
view. Figure 1 details reasons for inclusion and exclusion. We
present our results categorized by mechanism of injury, as fol-
lows: blunt, penetrating, blast, and burns.
Blunt injury
Blunt airway traumausually involves high-energy transfer; exam-
ples include assault, crush, fall from height, road traf!c collision,
pedestrian vs vehicle, hanging, accidental strangulation, and the
‘clothesline’ mechanism. Table 1 describes the various mechan-
isms of injury in blunt trauma and their associated injuries.
Patients who suffer blunt injury develop complex airway
injuries, often as part of severe multisystem trauma. Failure to
intubate, secure, and protect the airway in these patients
are common factors that lead to an increase in morbidity and
mortality.7–9 Blunt airway trauma includes maxillofacial trauma,
laryngotracheal trauma (LTT), and disruption of the trachea and
bronchi. The sternum, cervical spine, and mandible shield the
airway during trauma such that the incidence of blunt airway in-
jury is low (!0.4%).7–9 Despite being a rare pathology, the impact can
be signi!cant, with mortality rates of traumatic lesions below the
vocal cords quoted as high as 63%.10 Bronchial disruption occurs
in 1% of chest trauma; most of these patients die at the scene.11
Maxillofacial trauma is the most common type of blunt air-
way trauma but does not usually present a problem because tris-
mus is usually attributable to pain and therefore resolves on
induction. The main issues to consider are then airway haemor-
rhage, hypoxia, and the risk of aspiration. Very rarely, trismus is
the result of impaction of a condylar head fracture, causing a
physical obstruction tomouth opening,which becomes apparent
only after rapid sequence induction.12
The cricoid cartilage and cricothyroidmembrane are involved
in 50% of instances of blunt airway trauma with airway com-
promise; injury to the thyrohyoid membrane, thyroid cartilage,
and extrathoracic trachea account for the remainder.1 13 Laryngo-
tracheal separation occurs in up to 63% of instances, usually be-
tween the cricoid and fourth tracheal cartilage.14 15 The airway
can remain patent if spontaneous respiration is maintained by
splinting of peritracheal connective tissue.16 This situation is
precarious and can deteriorate rapidly.17
Blunt trauma at the level of the larynx or below can be dif!cult
to diagnose and life threatening if managed poorly. Patients can
present with non-speci!c signs and symptoms, such as cough,
dyspnoea, aphonia, stridor, laryngeal crepitus, haemoptysis,
and subcutaneous emphysema. These symptoms do not correl-
atewell with the anatomical site of the lesion;14 15 however, com-
plaints of haemoptysis and stridor at presentation have been
associated with severity of injury.16 18
In view of the poor relation between signs and severity of in-
jury, the clinicianmust have both a high index of suspicion and a
low threshold for further investigations, including plain X-rays
(chest and lateral cervical spine) to rule out surgical emphysema,
pneumothorax, or both. Nasendoscopy is useful and permits
assessment of vocal cord movement, integrity of the laryngeal
mucosa, and airway patency.13 Computed tomography is the
gold standard and detects the site of injury in 94% of blunt
trauma.19 Bronchoscopy is considered the best diagnostic tool
for suspected lesions below the vocal cords,11 14 20 but utility in
acute airway compromise is limited because it is a skilled tech-
nique and access to equipment may be limited. The severity of
blunt airway trauma has been classi!ed by Schaefer and
Close21 (Table 2).
Trauma to the upper and lower respiratory tract should be
managed on a patient-by-patient basis. Minor instances of blunt
airway trauma should be observed in the critical care unit, with re-
assessment of the airway at regular intervals for at least 48 h. The
management ofmajor blunt airway trauma is governed by the de-
gree of patient cooperation and a risk–bene!t analysis. The safest
approach to patients requiring intubation is to instrument the tra-
chea under direct vision to avoid entering a tear, creating a false
passage, or disrupting the airway completely.1 It is preferable to
do this with the patient awake and breathing spontaneously.
Following these principles, there are three judicious ap-
proaches to airway management . First, performing an awake
tracheostomy under local anaesthesia is a common intervention
of choice for LTT.18 However, this technique requires a high
degree of operator skill, may be dif!cult, and is limited by
patient cooperation and teh time taken to assemble skilled
assistance.16 22 23 It is important to note that surgical cricothyroi-
dotomy and percutaneous cricothyroidotomy are contraindi-
cated in these patients because they may lead to further airway
disruption.11 18 24 This is not the case for tracheobronchial trau-
ma because the lesion is commonly more distal, with 76% of in-
juries occurring within 2 cm of the carina, and 43% occurring
within the !rst 2 cm of the right main bronchus.25 26
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Second, awake !breoptic intubation is an alternative tech-
nique, which maintains spontaneous ventilation and allows
simultaneous airway assessment and placement of a tracheal
tube distal to any pericarinal defect.22 23 Care must be taken
when railroading the tracheal tube so that its bevel does not
catch on a tear, extending the injury.27 This can be avoided by
using a lubricated small-diameter tube, !tting snuggly onto the
scope, and twisting the tube so that its bevel faces any lesion dur-
ing its advancement into the trachea. The use of the Lightwand in
blunt trauma has also been described.28
Third, conventional intubation is a rapid way of securing the
airway but risks intubating a tear, creating a false passage, or dis-
ruption of the larynx or trachea.21 29 Consequently, we recom-
mend !brescope-assisted direct or videolaryngoscopy as part of
a modi!ed rapid sequence induction (with no cricoid pressure
or positive pressure ventilation because both may aggravate the
injury).30 31 A small-diameter tracheal tube should be placed at
the introitus of the larynx under direct vision, and then a !bre-
scope is passed through the tube and into the trachea. The tra-
cheal tube can then be delivered past the lesion safely if the
bevel is orientated to face the lesion. Modi!ed rapid sequence in-
duction and rigid bronchoscopy is an alternative choice, because
airway inspection is simultaneous with intubation. This tech-
nique requires a high degree of operator skill and needs appropri-
ately trained personnel but can deal effectively with distal
tracheal or bronchial disruption.11 18 32 A summary of the asso-
ciated problems and cautions in relation to the anatomical terri-
tory is presented in Table 3. The technique of choice depends
upon the patient’s condition, urgency, and the experience of
the anaesthetist and surgeon.33
Literature search
Assessed for eligibility
(n=578)
Title
Abstract
(n=362)
Full article review
(n=148)
•  82 Paediatric
•  12 Animal
•  84 Not airway trauma
•  38 Not airway management
•  63 Duplicate
•  92 Not airway trauma
•  39 Paediatric
•  8 Abstract unavailable
Plus 68 papers 
extracted from 
reference scouring 
and additional 
Papers include in the 
review
(n=93)
•  108 No airway management described
•  5 Papers unobtainable
Fig 1 Systemic review literature search "ow chart.
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Penetrating and blast injury
Penetrating injuries to the face and neck are uncommon in both
civilian25 34 and military3 35 populations. However, the incidence
is increasing inmilitary personnel becausemodern body armour
does not protect the face and neck.26 34 36–38 Airway wounds can
cause immediate life-threatening compromise34 because of the
density of vital structures within the neck.1 2 39 40 Indeed, on ex-
ploration, a clinically super!cial stab wound may reveal a vascu-
lar or aerodigestive injury.3 4 32 Blast-induced injuries result from
direct or indirect exposure to an explosion and have high poten-
tial for an associated upper airway injury,5 34 41 themost severe of
which is complete disruption of the airway.1 35 42
The causes of penetrating airway trauma are diverse and
include assault or self-in"icted injuries with !rearms or
knives.36–38 40 Facial wounds are usually the result of gun-
shot2 7 9 38 39 43–45 or blast injuries.4 10 46–53 Objects or projectiles can
trans!x the mouth and limit mouth opening.11–15 25 34 40–45 54 55
Patients may also present with neck lacerations and open
wounds to the airway.2 16 38 40 Gunshot and blast injuries result
in penetrating neck trauma,25 46–53 so the clinician must always
consider the likely trajectory of projectiles or fragments and
their potential airway effects. The location of great vessels in
the neck adjacent to the airwaymeans that haemorrhage can im-
pact airway patency,14 15 54 56 with high mortality.16 18 34 43 44 45 54
When assessing these patients, an effective approach is to div-
ide the structures of the head and neck into three zones.13 39 55
Zone 1 is from the clavicles to the cricoid cartilage, zone 2 from
the cricoid cartilage to the angle of the mandible, and zone 3
from the angle of the mandible to the base of the skull. Zone ana-
lysis predicts potential injuries and the need for urgent airway
management solutions.5 19 25 Blood loss andupperairwayobstruc-
tion are the major determinants of injury severity.14 38 40
Wounds in the anterior and lateral aspects of the neck com-
promise the airway more often than those in the posterior re-
gion.11 20 25 40 42 The clinician should also consider the presence
of blood and debris within the lumen of the airway, injury within
the airway wall itself, or injury outside the wall (e.g. expanding
haematoma or surgical emphysema). If possible, computed tom-
ography is the !rst-line investigation in stable patients with
penetrating neck injuries21 35 56 in order to identify the location
of an airway injury.
As with blunt injuries, major penetrating and blast airway
traumamanagement is governed by the degree of patient cooper-
ation and a risk–bene!t analysis. Potential dif!culties to consider
are neck haematoma or subcutaneous emphysema around the
airway that can distort anatomy and impair tracheostomy. Fi-
breoptic intubation is dif!cult if blood or debris is present within
the airway. Regardless, awake !breoptic intubation in skilled
hands has proved effective.1 18 39 41 43–45 54 57
The literature suggests that the safest approach to patients re-
quiring intubation is to instrument the trachea under direct vi-
sion in order to avoid entering a tear, creating a false passage,
or disrupting the airway completely.5 16 22 23 50 58 It is preferable
to do this with the patient awake and breathing spontaneously.
Similar to blunt trauma, awake tracheostomy is the intervention
of choice,5 11 18 22 23 25 26 35 38 40 42 59–64 and surgical or percutan-
eous cricothyroidotomy are contraindicated.27 59 It is important
to consider thoracotomy if a patient presents with chest trauma,
and low tracheal or bronchial transection standard tracheostomy
in this situation will result in malposition distal to the defect.
Awake !breoptic intubation is an alternative option to permit
simultaneous airway assessment and placement of a tracheal
tube distal to any laceration.21 29 41 45 57 65 66 As emphasized al-
ready, great care must be taken when railroading the tracheal
tube so that its bevel does not extend a laceration. A modi!ed
Table 1 The mechanisms of injury associated with blunt trauma to the airway7
Type of trauma Mechanisim of injury Airway injury
Road traf!c collision
Fall
Severe "exion/extension
Rapid deceleration
Tracheal tears
Fractures of the larynx
Laryngotracheal separation
Hanging
Accidental strangulation
‘Clothesline’ mechanism
Assault
Direct blows Fractured thyroid or cricoid cartilages, or both
Layrngotrachael separation
Crush
Pedestrian vs vehicle
Crush injuries to chest
Sudden, explosive increase in intrathoracic pressure
against a relatively closed glottis
Tracheobronchial disruption
Rapid deceleration shears airways at !xed points:
cricoid cartilage and carina
Transection at carina or cricotracheal junction
Pulmonary compression tears the airway at the level
of the carina
Carinal tear
Table 2 Classi!cation of the severity of blunt airway injury (adapted from Schaefer and Close)21
Group 1
Minor endolaryngeal haemotoma, laceration, or both
No detectable laryngeal fracture
Group 2
Laryngeal oedema, haemotoma, or both
Minor mucosal disruption, but no exposed cartilage
Group 3 Massive oedema, large mucosal lacerations, exposed cartilage, displaced fracture, vocal cord immobility
Group 4 As group 3 plus comminuted or unstable fracture
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rapid sequence induction and !breoptic-assisted direct or video-
laryngoscopymay beundertaken if a general anaestheticmust be
administered immediately. However, the clinician should avoid
neuromuscular blocking agents (muscle tone may be important
for airway integrity in airway transection)30 50 58 67 and be cogni-
zant that conventional intubation risks intubating a tear.5 31 68
We suggest that this may be mediated by !brescope-assisted
direct or videolaryngoscopy as part of a modi!ed rapid sequence
induction (with no cricoid pressure or positive pressure ventila-
tion). A tracheal tube should be placed above the vocal cords
under direct vision and then a !brescope passed through the
tube and into the trachea. The tracheal tube can then be delivered
safely as described above. Large neck wounds can be intubated
directly over a !brescope in this manner. Combined usage of an
Airway Scope and gum elastic bougie for emergency airwayman-
agement in a patient with a neck stab wound has also been
described,69 as has the use of the AirTraq in traumatic asphyxi-
ation,70 and the use of the Lightwand.28 A summary of the asso-
ciated problems and cautions in relation to the anatomical
territory for non-iatrogenic injury to the airway caused by pene-
trating injury is presented in Table 4.
Burns
Burns to the upper airway caused by direct heat and steam injury,
electrocution, or contact with corrosive chemicals can lead to
marked swelling of the face, tongue, epiglottis, and glottis and re-
sult in airway obstruction.11 18 25 32 34 60–64 71 Airway swellingmay
not occur immediately but may develop over a period of
hours (exacerbated by "uid resuscitation). Therefore, a high
index of suspicion and frequent re-evaluation of the airway are
essential.3 35 65 72–74 Thermal injury is primarily restricted to
structures above the vocal cords, unless steam is inhaled,
because the oropharynx and nasopharynx act as an ef!cient
heat sink.26 34 36–38 66 74 Smoke inhalation delivers a pathological
insult to the lungs as a result of the particulates, respiratory irri-
tants, and systemic toxins that it contains.34 75 In this context, it
is necessary to look for and treat carbonmonoxide76 and cyanide
poisoning.77
Inhalation injury is a greater contributor to overall morbidity
andmortality than either body surface area percentage or age57 67
and is present in 60% of central facial burns.61 68 Burns patients
without smoke inhalation have a mortality of 2%, compared
with a mortality of 30% with this type of injury.78
Patients who present acutely with facial and neck burns have
two predominant airway issues: airway obstruction and smoke
inhalation. These risks prompt the early intubation of high-risk
patients,75 79 80 because the rate of dif!cult intubation increases
from 11.2 to 16.9% if delayed (owing to the development of airway
oedema).61 62 71 81 However, intubation is not without risk, and
the clinician should carefully evaluate individual patients.72–74 82
Nasendoscopy is an important tool to diagnose the extent and
severity of an airway burn, and serial nasendoscopy of vocal fold
oedema has been used to predict the need for intubation in pa-
tients at risk.66 74 Fibreoptic bronchoscopy supports the diagnosis
of smoke inhalation and may reveal carbonaceous debris, ery-
thema, or ulceration.
Intubation ismandated in instances of heat and smoke inhal-
ation injury combined with facial, neck, or extensive body burns.
In contrast, physiologically stable patientswith smoke inhalation
injury but no facial or neck burns may be monitored by nasal en-
doscopy and intubated later.57 In addition to airway oedema,
other causes of dif!culty include limited mouth opening and
intractable trismus in electrical burns.61 Mask ventilation may
also be challenging because of the presence of dressings and exu-
dates,42 78 and the application of nasal oxygen should be
Table 3 A summary of the the associated problems and cautions in relation to the anatomical territory in blunt injury. LTT, laryngotracheal
trauma
Anatomical
territory
Associated problems Caution: red !ag signs and symptoms
Maxillofacial Traumatic brain injury and
base of skull fracture
Cervical spine fracture
Ophthalmic injury
Vascular injury
Aspiration of blood and debris
Signs of elevated intracranial presssure
Neurological de!cit
Neurogenic shock
Signi!cant bleeding from fracture displacement
Bilateral anterior mandible fractures
and airway obstruction
Ventilatory failure
Laryngotracheal Cervical fracture
Vascular injury
Oesophageal injury
Rib fractures and "ail segment
Pneumothorax
Haemothorax
Pneumomediastinum
Pulmonary contusion
Haemoptysis and stridor have previously been
reported as cardinal features of severe LTT
Massive surgical emphysema
Ventilatory failure
Cardiovascular collapse
Trachea and
bronchi
Vascular injury
Oesophageal injury
Rib fractures and "ail segment
Pneumothorax
Haemothorax
Pneumomediastinum
Pulmonary contusion
Haemoptysis
Massive surgical emphysema
Ventilatory failure
Cardiovascular collapse
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considered. This can signi!cantly boost the effective inspired
oxygen and can be left on during tracheal intubation attempts.
The application of additional nasal oxygen during intubation
has been termed NO DESAT).83
For an anticipated dif!cult airway, clinical examination and na-
sendoscopy will provide vital information; however, this does de-
pend on the degree of patient cooperation and the severity of the
injury. Minor injuries can be managed conservatively in a moni-
tored (high-dependency unit) setting. For major burns requiring
immediate treatment, for cooperative patients awake !breoptic in-
tubation should be considered if the preoperative evaluation re-
veals concern for upper airway patency or dif!cult mask
ventilation.79 For severe injuries or non-compliant patients, a pri-
mary surgical airway is mandated.61 62 81 Tracheostomy may also
be indicated if a laryngeal injury is suspected.82 84 In uncooperative
patients or those with less severe pathology on clinical examin-
ation and nasendoscopy, rapid sequence induction followed by vi-
deolaryngoscopy is appropriate. One article described the use of
the Combitube in the airway management of burns patients.85
After intubation, the tube should be secured carefully because
accidental extubation may have fatal consequences.86 Fixation
methods include wiring the tube to a tooth and the use of
archbars. The tracheal tube should be left uncut because facial
swelling can cause it to retreat into the oropharynx, requiring
re-intubation at the worst possible time. A summary of the
associated problems and cautions in relation to the anatomical
territory for non-iatrogenic injury to the airway caused by burn
injuries is presented in Table 5.
Conclusion
Our systematic review of the literature on acute adult non-iatro-
genic airway trauma has highlighted common themes that
should guide the clinician. The hallmark of airway management
in these patients is the maintenance of spontaneous ventilation
if at all possible, intubation under direct vision to avoid the cre-
ation of a false passage, and the avoidance of both intermittent
positive pressure ventilation and cricoid pressure during a rapid
sequence induction. This situation is distinct from the manage-
ment of an unanticipated dif!cult airway. Here, adherence to the
Dif!cult Airway Society 2015 guidelines6 could even worsen the
situation in this patient population because cricoid pressure,
positive pressure ventilation either via a face mask or a supra-
glottic airway device, and surgical cricothyroidotomy are all
contraindicated.
Consequently, if the primary intubation plan fails, there is
only one rescue plan to avoidmaking the situation worse, name-
ly surgical tracheostomy. The management of burns patients
is broadly similar but with the caveat that the Dif!cult Airway
Society 2015 guidelines6 apply throughout because the clinician
is not faced with the problem of an airway laceration or
transection.
Ultimately, when considering all these types of airway trau-
mas, the clinician is faced with a time-management issue, with
a patient being classi!ed into one of three groups: no time,
some time, or adequate time for airway assessment, investiga-
tion, and intervention. If the patient is in extremis and there is
no time for assessment, the anaesthetist must manage the pa-
tient urgently while planning for the worst-case scenario; a
false passage in blunt, penetrating, and blast trauma, for ex-
ample. If the airway appears stable then there is adequate time
for assessment, planning, and intervention in optimal condi-
tions.Most patients are somewhere between these two extremes,
such that informed decision making is crucial for the anaesthe-
tist because the situation can be worsened or stabilized by their
subsequent actions. For example, allowing a patient to assume
their most comfortable position, be that sitting, lateral, or
prone, may ‘buy enough time’ to undertake nasal endoscopy or
computed tomography.4 Objects that impale the patient should
be trimmed carefully so they do not impede subsequent airway
interventions.42 87 Finally, location is very important; it could be
safer to transfer the patient to theatre to secure the airway, espe-
cially if a tracheostomy is required, because there is more space,
better lighting, and staff more familiar with the intervention.
Human factors are key to the management of a complex
anticipated airway problem.88 89 The recently revised Dif!cult
Airway Society Guidelines for the management of an unantici-
pated dif!cult airway6 devote a signi!cant section to these. Lead-
ership, followership, teamwork, and situational awareness and
communication amongst the team are all vital to ensure that
the airway is safely secured. A trauma team will often have
10–15min to prepare to receive a patient once they have been ac-
tivated.84 During this period, the anaesthetist should consider
the likelihood of airway trauma and the possible investigations
Table 4 A summary of the the associated problems and cautions in relation to the anatomical territory for non-iatrogenic injury to the
airway caused by penetrating injury
Anatomical
territory
Associated problems Caution: red !ag signs and
symptoms
Zone 3 Cranial nerve injury Oesophageal injury
Vascular injury (to branches of the
external carotid artery, internal carotid artery,
vertebral artery, and internal jugular and facial
veins)
Neurological de!cit
Neurogenic shock
Odynophagia
Haematemesis
Air bubbling from wound
Massive surgical emphysema
Expanding or pulsatile haematoma
Active bleeding
Cardiovascular collapse
Haemoptysis
Zone 2 Oesophageal injury
Vascular injury
(to common carotid, carotid bifurcation, vertebral
arteries, and jugular veins)
Zone 1 Oesophageal injury
Vascular injury (to subclavian and
innominate vessels, common carotid and lower
vertebral arteries, and jugular veins)
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and airway interventions required. This includes consideration
of what personnel and equipment are needed and speci!cally
who will perform a tracheostomy or surgical cricothyroidotomy
if required. The UK Defence Medical Services have developed
the concept of a ‘command huddle’,90 where decisions are
made by a senior team about further management after the pri-
mary survey. A conversation around airway management (if it
has not already taken place) should occur here, with a discussion
around the airway technique of choice.
The majority of anaesthetists have limited exposure to com-
plex airway trauma and need to develop shared mental models
to optimize management techniques; examples of these are in-
cluded in Figs 2 and 3. Our review presents contemporary evi-
dence in management of airway trauma to inform clinical
practice. The clinician should also consolidate knowledge
through mechanisms such as high-!delity simulation scen-
arios91 and by attending workshops speci!cally for the manage-
ment of airway trauma.
Burns and maxillofacial trauma
(Blunt and penetrating)
Cooperative patient
Not time 
critical
Perform diagnostic 
imaging and formulate plan
Risk vs benefit analysis: 
Transfer to theatre
Time critical
Awake tracheostomy under local 
anaesthesia
Uncooperative patient
Time critical
Plan A: 
Standard RSI
Plan B: 
Surgical cricothyroidotomy
Fig 2 An example of shared mental model maps for burns and maxilliofacial trauma. RSI, rapid sequence induction.
Table 5 A summary of the the associated problems and cautions in relation to the anatomical territory for non-iatrogenic injury to the
airway caused by burn injuries
Anatomical territory Associated problems Caution: red !ag signs and symptoms
Ensure primary survey completed to assess for
other traumatic injuries
Avoid task !xation with burns
Face, tongue, and
oropharynx
Pulmonary oedema
Cardiovascular
dysfunction
Carbonmonoxide and
cyanide poisoning
Evidence of thermal or chemical
injury to face, lips, mouth, pharynx,
or nasal mucosa
In"ammation, blistering,
oedema, and mucosal lesions
Hair singeing
Soot in mouth
Larynx Stridor
Hoarseness
Trachea, bronchi, and
distal airways
Carbonaceous sputum
Dyspnoea
Hypoxaemia
Increased concentrations of
carbon monoxide and cyanide may
not cause cyanosis
Decreased level of
consciousness, confusion, or signs
of cerebellar dysfunction
Mortality increases signi!cantly
with inhalation injury
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Laryngotracheal trauma
(Blunt and penetrating)
Cooperative patient
Not time critical
Perform
diagnostic
imaging and
formulate plan
Risk vs benefit
analysis
Transfer self
ventilating to theatre.
Perform awake
fibreoptic
intubation
Time critical
Awake Tracheostomy
under local
anaesthesia.
Fibreoptic scope to
identify distal lesion,
Tracheal tube
advanced under
direct vision.
(Surgical and
percutaneous
cricothyroidotomy are
contraindicated)
Perform
awake
fibreoptic
intubation
Uncooperative patient
Time critical
Plan A:
RSI
Fibreoptic scope assisted
direct laryngoscopy or
videolarygoscopy.
Avoid cricoid pressure and
positive pressure ventilation
until Tracheal tube cuff 
inflated distal to lesion.
( Tracheal tube placed at
introitus of cords and
only advance
under direct vision via
fibrescope)
Plan B:
Emergency tracheostomy
Fibreoptic scope to identify
distal lesion, Tracheal tube
advanced under direct vision.
Trachea and bronchi trauma
(Blunt and penetrating)
Cooperative patient
Not time critical
Perform diagnostic
imaging and
formulate plan
Risk vs benefit
analysis
Transfer self ventilating
to theatre.
Perform awake
fibreoptic intubation
Time critical
Perform awake
fibreoptic intubation
Uncooperative patient
Time critical
Plan A:
RSI
Fibreoptic scope assisted direct laryngoscopy
or videolarygoscopy.
(Tracheal tube
placed at introitus of cords and only
advance under direct via fibrescope)
Plan B:
Emergency surgical cricothyroidoyomy or
Tracheostomy
Fibreoptic scope to identify distal lesion, Tracheal
tube advanced under direct vision.
(If a lesion is at the level of carina, or distal,
extending into a unilateral main bronchus -consider
using a double lumen tube or advancing a standard
uncut Tracheal tube into opposite bronchus and
perform one lung ventilation)
Fig 3 A shared mental model map for laryngotracheal trauma (blunt and penetrating). RSI, rapid sequence induction.
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At the time of writing, it was known that the management of non-iatrogenic trauma to the 
airway was rare (113) and it was proposed that exceptional human factors were required to 
manage patients with complex airway problems (96). The UK-Defence Medical Services were 
running workshops on the management of trauma to the airway on the Military Operational 
Surgical Training Course (94) to prepare Military Anaesthetists to deploy on operations. 
Mental models for the management of blunt and penetrating trauma were yet to be formally 
developed and was an area of practice that we wished to concentrate on during this project. 
3.3.3 Wha  he a e  added  c ib ed  he g ba  c i ica  c i ? 
 
This paper has been cited in the medical literature 14 times. I have used the basis of this 
publication to develop the following further publication.  
 
 Human Factors in Preventing Complications in Anaesthesia. Jones CP, Fawker-Corbett J, 
Groom P, Morton B, Lister C, Mercer SJ. Anaesthesia 2018; 73(S1): 12-24  
 
I am now regularly invited to review articles on the management of airway trauma by the British 
Journal of Anaesthesia. I have also been invited to speak at the Annual Congress of Japanese 
Society of Anaesthesiologists on this subject in June 2020. This project has been discussed 
during the following invited national presentations. 
 
 Simulation for Trauma Training. Trauma Care Conference, Yarnfield Conference 
Centre, Stafford, 6 March 2019 
 Wrong Site Block, Royal College of Anaesthetists Updates Meeting, Hilton Hotel, 
Liverpool, 26 November 2018 
 I i g T a a Tea . U de a di g Wh  Tea  D  W , Cambridge 
Trauma Conference, Churchill College Cambridge, 28 April 2018 
 Bombs, Bullets and Bicycles. Management of Airway Trauma, Difficult Airway Society 
Annual Scientific Meeting, Mermaid Theatre, London, 24 November 2017 
 Human Factors in Complex Trauma, Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and 
Ireland Annual Congress, BT Convention Centre, Liverpool, 28 September 2017 
 
The articles listed in Table 3.1 have also cited this publication (I have only listed articles in 
English) 
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Table 3.1.  Articles citing A Systematic Review of The Anaesthetic Management of 
Non-Iatrogenic Acute Adult Airway Trauma. Mercer SJ, Jones CP, Bridge M, Clitheroe 
E, Morton B, Groom P. British Journal of Anaesthesia 2016: 117 (S1): i49 i59 
Estime SR, Kuza CM. Trauma 
Airway Management. Induction 
Agents, Rapid Versus Slower 
Sequence Intubations, and Special 
Considerations. Anesthesia Clinics 
2019; 37: 33-50 
This article is an overview of the management of the airway 
in trauma and discusses the mental models developed in 
our publication. 
 
Woolley T, Round JA, Ingram M. 
Global lessons: developing 
military trauma care and lessons 
for civilian practice. British Journal 
of Anaesthesia 2017; 119(S1): 
i135 i142.   
I was asked by the British Journal of Anaesthesia to review 
this article and it gives an overview of military trauma care. 
The mental models and algorithms developed in our article 
are discussed.  
 
Kovacs G, Sowers N. Airway 
Management in Trauma. 
Emergency Medicine Clinics of 
North America 2018; 36: 61 84 
This article is an overview of the management of the airway 
in trauma and cites our systematic review in terms of the 
management models that we describe. 
 
Gadd K. Airway management in 
suspected laryngotracheal trauma 
in an uncooperative patient.  
Anaesthesia Cases. 2017. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.21466/ac.AMIS
LTI.2017  
This is a case review that cites our article to describe the 
different mechanisms of injury that have been quoted in the 
literature for airway trauma.  
 
Yang X, Xu Z, Du J, et al. 
Penetrating injuries to the 
oropharyngeal cavity in children-a 
challenge to the anesthetist.  
International Journal of Clinical 
and Experimental Medicine 
2018;11(4):4290-4294  
The authors of this paper have cited our publication to 
comment on the physiological characteristics of the 
paediatric airway, which is an error as our article only deals 
with adult patients. 
 
Kelbert EW. Assessment and initial 
management of laryngeal injuries. 
Journal of the International Society 
of Head and Neck Trauma (ISHANT) 
2016:5 
This is an overview of the management of laryngeal injuries. 
The authors cite our paper when discussing the use of a 
fiberoptic videolaryngoscope to pass through an 
endotracheal tube and into the trachea to avoid creating a 
false passage.  
Milne B, Kandasamy G. Awake 
tracheal intubation for blunt 
airway trauma. Anaesthesia 
Reports 2019; 7: 39-42  
This is a Case Report that quotes our systematic review and 
centres around the management of blunt trauma to the neck 
following a fall. 
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3.3.4 Where are we now? 
The assimilation of the knowledge from the literature review, particularly from case reports 
and case series allowed us to construct several guidelines based on common themes. The 
three areas that we were particularly keen to highlight were that patients with trauma to the 
airway should maintain spontaneous ventilation if at all possible until induction of general 
anaesthesia, intubation should be under direct vision to avoid the creation of a false passage; 
and that both intermittent positive pressure ventilation and cricoid pressure during a rapid 
sequence induction should be avoided. This direction is at odds with the revised Difficult 
Airway Society Guidelines of 2015 for the unanticipated difficult airway (93). Trauma to the 
air a  is firml  an anticipated difficult air a  and so must be treated differently. 
 
Our systematic review concludes with shared mental model maps for burns and maxilliofacial 
trauma and for laryngotracheal, tracheal and bronchial trauma. These guidelines are important 
to ensure that the team leader (usually the senior anaesthetist) maintains situational 
awareness and can brief the trauma team prior to embarking on securing the patient s airway. 
I have recently been invited to write an editorial on the management of non-iatrogenic airway 
trauma for Trauma (currently inpress). 
 
3.3.5 Reflections on the methodology/method(s) 
3.3.5.1 Literature Review 
Embase, Medline, and Google Scholar were searched for papers published after the year 
2000 reporting on the acute airway management of adult patients who had suffered airway 
trauma. The search included full-text reports of articles from peer-reviewed journals and 
conference abstracts published in English, and there were no restrictions to the studies 
reviewed. The reference lists of the articles reviewed were also scrutinized for additional 
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relevant articles and book chapters. The titles and abstracts of the references obtained were 
reviewed by two independent reviewers and inclusion criteria were papers reporting adults 
older than 18 years of age with airway trauma; papers published on or after 2000; and papers 
reporting airway trauma (blunt, burn, penetrating, blast, or miscellaneous injuries) and 
anaesthetic management. The full protocol and search strategy were registered with and 
published by PROSPERO (http://www.crd.york.ac.uk/ PROSPERO, ID: CRD42016032763) 
and available in Appendix 2. Again, by registering with a national organisation, we ensured 
that our methodology was peer-reviewed and transparent. The literature review summarises 
identified work around the management of blunt trauma, penetrating and blast injury and burns 
injury.  
This systematic review used a more extensive literature review than the first paper discussed 
in the thesis and included Embase, Medline, and Google Scholar. Despite this there were 68 
papers that were identified only when a further trawl of references in individual articles was 
made. This is an interesting observation as despite undertaking a literature review that was 
conducted by a University Librarian, with recognised and established medical databases (and 
also google scholar) a significant number of papers were initially missed. One explanation for 
this could be that the subject being investigated is quite niche  and not in the mainstream 
medical literature, this included single case reports of the management of particular injuries. I 
hope this will demonstrate that I am driving this unique area of medical practice into an arena 
that can be accessed by practicing anaesthetists in hospitals in the United Kingdom.  
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Section 4  
 
Knowledge Translation 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
I am a full-time clinician working in a busy major trauma centre in the North West of England 
and have previously served in the Royal Navy for over 20 years. My priorities are to improve 
the quality, standard and provision of care for patients involved in complex trauma. To facilitate 
this, it is key that new knowledge discovered from research and knowledge that is summarised 
from systematic reviews is disseminated to those working in the frontline. Although not part of 
this thesis, I am an established national speaker on the subjects of complex trauma, human 
factors and simulation in healthcare. I also have regular time in my job plan at Liverpool 
University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust s High-Fidelity Simulation Centre where I 
undertake the training of the trauma team and introduce new concepts around the 
management of complex trauma. I consider myself to be a national expert on the application 
of human factors to the management of complex trauma. 
Knowledge translation is defined as the exchange, synthesis and ethically sound application 
of knowledge to improve health and provide more effective health services (114). This 
definition fits with my aim as a senior leader in complex trauma services and an educator. In 
terms of trauma care, over the last five years, knowledge translation has been assembling the 
lessons learnt from recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (115) and reviewing other research 
from for example the Centre for Blast Injury based at Imperial College, London 
(https://www.imperial.ac.uk/blast-injury/) and disseminating to those working in the frontline in 
the major trauma centres. Barrett describes that by developing interactional expertise from the 
domain of study (in my case the management of the patient with complex trauma), the 
academic's primary goal is to develop a theoretical contribution through journal publication 
(116). It is appreciated that any research findings discovered can only then change population 
health outcomes if adopted and embedded by current healthcare systems, organizations and 
more importantly the frontline clinicians.  
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Kutner has suggested that it is important to explore the most effective ways of implementing 
existing evidence into practice as advances in research knowledge can take years to be 
implemented into, or actually change practice (117). A review of United Kingdom healthcare 
funding by Cooksey concluded that given the pace of innovation and research in the 
healthcare field, a kno ledge gap  no  e ists and this has generated significant concern 
within healthcare research and policy (118). One famous example to demonstrate the 
existence of a knowledge gap, is that it took 200 years between the time that a clear and 
convincing cure for scurvy had been found until the findings were adopted by the Royal Navy 
and deployed sailors were given regular sources of Vitamin C. This example nicely highlights 
the difficult  of kno ledge moving  from research into practice. It ould appear that there are 
two separate groups; the research producers and potential research users, with the notion of 
a kno ledge push  (from researchers to potential users) and kno ledge pull  (from these 
users back to the researchers) (119). Research findings can only change population health 
outcomes if adopted and embedded by healthcare systems, organizations and clinicians 
(120). 
The literature offers a variety of definitions, terminology and models relating to knowledge 
exchange. Pentland explains that in general, explanations of knowledge exchange propose 
an interactive and ongoing process of collaboration, which provides research users with 
information they perceive as relevant in easily usable formats whilst research producers 
receive information about the needs of users (121). 
In 2008, Baumbusch suggests that knowledge translation has the potential to address the 
research-practice gap by bringing together researchers, who are typically academically based, 
and clinically based practitioners in a dynamic process (122). The World Health Organization 
has subsequently adapted the Canadian Institute of Health Research definition and defined 
knowledge translation as he n he i , e change, and a lica ion of kno ledge b  ele an  
stakeholders to accelerate the benefits of global and local innovation in strengthening health 
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systems and improving people  heal h  (123). Mitton also describes knowledge exchange as 
an interactive interchange of knowledge between research users and researcher producers 
(124) which increases the likelihood that research evidence will be used in policy and practice 
decisions and to enable researchers to identify practice and policy‐relevant research 
questions (125). Finally, Graham has written that knowledge translation is about turning 
knowledge into action and encompasses the processes of both knowledge creation and 
knowledge application (126). The context for knowledge transfer and exchange has been 
reported at two levels, local and the wider social, economic and cultural. Mitton identified that 
interactively engaging key leaders or champions is an important factor for successful 
Knowledge-Transfer and Exchange (127). 
Six key components of knowledge transfer and exchange have been described (128).  These 
consist of the knowledge transfer and exchange message, Stakeholders and process, inner 
context, social, cultural and economic context and evaluation. The Message reflects the 
information to be shared and should be needs driven  (128). It also must be credible, 
actionable and accessible and reflects the information to be shared. Within this component, 
the most common operational element was the idea that the message is needs-driven . This 
often‐presented research as a clinical or practical problem. The Process component 
represents the activities intended to implement the transfer of kno ledge (the push‐pull  
dynamic exchange of information) and includes the operational element of marketing 
(communicating) the message in a a  that effectivel  pitched  to the target audience. The 
process itself is an interactive, targeted and skilled exchange of information. The Stakeholders 
represent the people involved on either side of the exchange process and has been described 
in terms of knowledge users (or knowledge consumers (129)) who are the clinicians at the 
front line, knowledge beneficiaries, who often represent the wider group of patients and 
families who benefit from the implementation and multiple stakeholders (130). The message 
itself is influenced by the Stakeholders and based on the message and the stakeholders the 
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knowledge producer should identify the processes to be used to ensure the message can be 
delivered to the stakeholders effectively (128). 
This section of the thesis will describe the knowledge translation from Sections 2 and 3 and 
demonstrate how Human Factors have been introduced into various Military and Civilian 
Trauma Teams and their importance in the management of a patient involved in Complex 
Trauma. Only five articles will be presented for the purposes of this thesis, although a number 
of others will be quoted, and a list of my other publications are described in Appendix 1. 
 
The first of the five papers is Human Factors in Trauma. Mercer SJ, Tarmey N, Park C BJA 
Education 2015; 15: 231-236. This outlines where human factors fit into a trauma call in a 
civilian setting in the Emergency Department. 
 
The second paper entitled Performance Improvement Through Best Practice Team 
Management  Human Factors in Complex Trauma.  Mercer SJ, Arul S, Pugh H, Midwinter 
MJ Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2014; 160: 105-108 outlines the importance of 
human factors in a trauma call in the UK-Defence Medical Services. 
 
The third article, Human Factors in Complex Airway Gleeson S, Groom P, Mercer SJ. British 
Journal of Anaesthesia Education 2016; 16: 191-197 expands on the knowledge of the airway 
article in original research and the systematic review and discusses the importance of human 
factors in the management of the anticipated difficult airway with practical applications. 
 
Current activity in the UK-Defence Medical Services focuses around Contingency Operations 
(these will be defined later in the thesis). The fourth paper, Human Factors on Contingency 
Operations.  Mercer SJ, Khan M, Scott T, Matthews J, Henning D, Stapley S. Journal of the 
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Royal Army Medical Corps 2017: 163; 78-83 is a discussion paper on the importance of 
Human Factors as part of contingency operations. 
 
One of the most neglected Human Factors is that of Followership. The final paper in this 
section, Followership in Complex Trauma. Fadden S, Mercer SJ. Journal of Trauma 2019; 
21: 6-13, highlights the importance of followership in complex trauma. 
 
 
 
  

Human factors in complex trauma
S Mercer MBChB MAcadMEd FHEA FCollT FRCA MMEd
C Park MBE FRCA FFICM DipIMC DipRTM RAMC
NT Tarmey FRCA DICM DipIMC RCS(Ed) RAMC
Human factors are now integrated into everyday
anaesthetic practice, as a result of the work per-
formed over a decade ago looking at anaesthetists
non-technical skills (ANTS).1 Much of this work
was performed after key publications in the USA2
and the UK3 highlighting that human error and
system design was responsible for patient harm.
Subsequent high profile cases relevant to anaes-
thesia4,5 have brought to light where human
factors failures have led to patient death. In 2010,
the Royal College of Anaesthetists dedicated the
entire Anniversary Meeting to Human Factors
and published a supplement to the British Journal
of Anaesthesia. Some of the human factors related
to the trauma team are listed in Table 1.
The 2007 report ‘Trauma: Who Cares?’6
highlighted the deficiencies in the delivery of
trauma care in the UK, some of which resulted
from failures in decision-making, communica-
tion, and team-work. Following on from this
report, there has been the development of trauma
centre networks around the country and a per-
ceived improvement in trauma care delivery.
The UK Defence Medical Services (UK-DMS)
have attributed much of the success of their
trauma care in Afghanistan to exemplary human
factors,7 particularly in the organization, brief-
ing, and co-ordination of the trauma team.8 This
article will focus on a typical complex civilian
trauma case (described in Box 1) arriving in a
UK Major Trauma Centre and will demonstrate
how lessons learnt by the UK-DMS are now
being translated into civilian practice.
Preparing the team
Usually, there is a prehospital alert from the
trauma scene and the trauma team is activated
!10 min before the estimated time of arrival.
The composition of a typical UK civilian trauma
team is listed in Table 2. Many NHS trauma
teams are now led by a consultant (usually
Emergency Physician) and will have activation
criteria to ensure that the team is only mobilized
when required. This is based on the mechanism
of injury, anatomy, and physiology. Typical acti-
vation criteria are listed in Table 3.
By ensuring that the trauma team arrives
before the patient, the trauma team leader (TTL) is
given the opportunity to brief the team. This
allows a projection of mental models of what
the likely clinical sequence is going to be, promot-
ing good followership. During the preparation
phase, there is the opportunity to check equipment
and draw up expected drugs. The anaesthesia team
often has a ‘wet pack’ of intubation drugs,
Key points
Exemplary human factors
are vital to the timely
assessment and treatment of
a complex trauma patient.
The designation of a trauma
team leader allows a ‘hands
off ’ coordination of trauma
team activity and
maintenance of situational
awareness.
Maintaining situational
awareness allows an early
reaction to changing
physiology.
Communication is vital and
can be facilitated by regular
updates or ‘sit reps’.
Followership is essential to
the functioning of the
complex trauma team.
S Mercer MBChB MAcadMEd FHEA
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Box 1 Clinical case
Injury at 20:10
A 25-yr-old male was cycling home in central London when he was hit by and dragged under the
wheels of an articulated lorry as it was turning left. He had been cycling along on the inside of the
lorry, and had gone underneath the rear axle as it turned.
He was managed on scene by two London Ambulance Service Paramedic Crews, and an
ex-Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) team paramedic. HEMS were requested but
were on another mission.
The patient was not trapped, and so was pulled out from under the lorry, with ‘manual in-line stabil-
ization’ in situ and then a cervical-spine collar, orthopaedic scoop stretcher, and pelvic binder were
applied. Oxygen was administered via a 15 litre ‘non-rebreather’ face mask and i.v. access was
obtained with 16 G cannula in the left ante-cubital fossa. One gram of tranexamic acid was given. The
patient was agitated and in pain and was given 10 mg morphine i.v., before being transported to the
nearest major trauma centre.
doi:10.1093/bjaceaccp/mku043
Continuing Education in Anaesthesia, Critical Care & Pain | 2014
& Crown copyright 2014.
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analgesia, antibiotics, and key trauma drugs such as tranexamic acid.
Contingency plans are discussed (such as dealing with a difficult
airway) and telephone alerts are made to the operating theatre (OT),
radiology, and transfusion.
On arrival at hospital, it is important that the handover is con-
ducted in silence. Unless there is an impending airway problem or
visible catastrophic haemorrhage then the patient should not be
touched until the handover is completed. This ensures that everyone in
the trauma team is aware of the handover and can start the resuscita-
tion ‘on the same page’. The UK-DMS use the acronym ‘AT-MIST’,
standing for Age, Time of injury, Mechanism of injury, Injuries sus-
tained, and Treatment given. This is described in Box 2 for the
example patient.
Table 2 Composition of a typical trauma team in an NHS major Trauma centre. ED,
emergency department; ST, speciality trainee; HCA, healthcare assistant
† Trauma team leader (ED consultant)
† Primary survey doctor (ED SpR)
† Anaesthetist 1 (ST4–7)
† ODP
† Scribe (trauma nurse coordinator)
† ED nurse 1 (circulator)
† ED nurse 2 (rapid infuser)
† ED nurse 3 (rapid infuser)
† Runner (HCA)
† Orthopaedic surgeon (ST4–7)
† General surgeon (ST4–7)
† Radiographer
Box 2 Handover: AT-MISTon arrival at 21:00
A 25 yr
T 20:10
M Cyclist vs lorry
I R-sided chest injury, abdominal distension and tenderness, and probable pelvic fracture
S SpO2 89%, airway patient, respiratory rate 35, heart rate 130, no radial pulse present, agitated, GCS 13, moving all four limbs, in pain.
T 15 litre O2, c-spine collar, orthopaedic scoop stretcher, pelvic binder, 16 G i.v. access in left ante-cubital fossa, 1 g tranexamic acid,
10 mg morphine i.v.
Table 1 Typical human factors relevant to the trauma team
Human factor Example
Leadership In the trauma theatre, the anaesthetist is handed over the role of
leader from the TTL. In complex trauma, there are often several
surgical teams working at once and so this requires co-ordination
particularly in the timings of tourniquet release
Situational
awareness
The TTL should be ‘hands off’ as this allows them to maintain an
‘all round look’ (some people ask ‘who is driving the bus?’).
Initial information will come from the patient’s handover from
the paramedics, primary survey, monitoring, and initial tests such
as venous blood gas
Team-working The trauma team is a large, resource-rich unit and it is important
that activity is coordinated with members performing as a team
and not as individuals
Followership Other members of the trauma team are ‘followers’ and must
anticipate changing situations in the trauma bay. This might
include preparing equipment, making phone calls to order tests
or making suggestions to the team leader
Communication There is the potential in a serious trauma for the noise levels to be
raised. The TTL must ensure that noise is kept to a minimum to
avoid communication failures. It is also important that
observations and administered drugs are verbalized so that the
team leader and scribe are aware
Table 3 Trauma team activation criteria (taken from Kings College Hospital, Major
Trauma Service: Information for Members of the Trauma Team). This will apply to
patients arriving at the hospital or who have a prehospital alert
1. Traumatic event and one of the following:
† Oxygen saturation ,90%
† Systolic arterial pressure ,90 mm Hg
† Respiratory rate ,9 or .29 bpm
† GCS ,14
2. Penetrating injury to
† Head
† Neck
† Chest
† Abdomen
† Pelvis
† All gunshot wounds
3. Fractures
† Open or depressed skull fractures
† Pelvic fracture
† Two or more proximal long bone fractures
† Flail chest
4. Traumatic amputation
5. Blast or crush injury
6. Major burns
† 10% total body surface area but lower threshold in child or elderly
† Combination of burns and trauma
7. Road traffic crash
† High speed crash (.30 mph) or pedestrian vs vehicle at .20 mph
† Separation of rider and bike
† Intrusion into passenger compartment
† Ejection from vehicle
† Death in the same passenger compartment
† Bull’s eyed windscreen
† 20 min extrication time
8. Falls
† Height of .3 m
† Paediatrics—consider the age and height of the child in relation to the height
fallen
9. HEMS transfer
10. Drowning/submersion
Human factors in complex trauma
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Management in the emergency department
The initial management in the emergency department (ED) is
described in Box 3.
Situational awareness and the trauma team
The complex trauma patient described in Box 1 requires a full
trauma team response and the potential for the clinical condition to
worsen demands exceptional situational awareness. Having a desig-
nated senior TTL allows one person, who should remain ‘hands-off’
the patient, to retain an overall situational awareness. One commonly
accepted definition of situational awareness is ‘the perception of ele-
ments in the environment within a volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in
the near future’,9 and this accurately describes how the TTL should
be thinking throughout the assessment in the trauma bay. Although
the TTL has overall responsibility for the team response, the anaes-
thetist also has an important responsibility. They must advise the
TTL, provide relevant information at an appropriate time for it to be
received, and assist with the decision-making process.
Damage control resuscitation
The concept of damage control resuscitation includes haemostatic
resuscitation and identification of injuries and therefore the source
of bleeding to achieve haemorrhage control.10 Resuscitation to nor-
motension is necessary after haemorrhage control in order to
achieve adequate peripheral tissue perfusion. This process requires
the activation of a massive transfusion protocol and communication
with the transfusion laboratory. In many trauma centres, the term
‘Code Red’ is used to indicate a patient with major haemorrhage
who requires the massive transfusion protocol to be activated. Code
Red activation criteria include a systolic arterial pressure ,90 mm
Hg (at any time), patients who are non-responders to fluid boluses
and suspected or confirmed haemorrhage. All EDs should have at
least 2 units of red blood cells (RBC) available, but the initial
massive haemorrhage protocol should also initiate ‘shock packs’ in-
cluding clotting products. These may vary in different hospitals but
are likely to contain products as in packs A and B described in
Table 4. Where a HEMS team is in attendance on scene, they will
declare a ‘Code Red’ as soon as possible to the receiving ED, and
may also give prehospital red cell transfusion.
The optimal ratio of blood product transfusion in traumatic
haemorrhage is still being investigated, but the current UK-DMS
massive haemorrhage protocols have been summarized recently.11
The main aim should be to achieve identification of bleeding points
and therefore source control as quickly as possible while replacing
the products that are being lost. It is vital that the decision-making
process around bleeding control is made swiftly and has senior input
to ensure that there are no prolonged delays in treatment.
The trauma team anaesthetist
The trauma team anaesthetist must make their own assessment of the
patient’s physiology and injuries in order to decide on the most ap-
propriate time to perform a rapid sequence induction (RSI) of anaes-
thesia and also to guide the haemostatic resuscitation. Deciding
whether to go to the CT scanner, the angiography suite or the OTs
next will be part of this decision-making process. This requires the
anaesthetist to have good situational awareness regarding the state of
the patient’s physiology and the injuries that are being identified. As
the trauma anaesthetist, there are a number of pitfalls that can occur
Box 3 Management in the ED. *Ketamine used as an induction agent has gained
popularity for haemodynamically compromised patients. It allows a more
cardiovascularly stable anaesthetic when compared with other drugs such as propofol or
thiopental
† 2 units of red blood cells (RBC) given immediately via i.v. in ACF
† RSI with 1 mg kg21 ketamine*, 1 mg kg21 fentanyl, and 1 mg kg21 rocuronium
† Immediate bilateral thoracostomies (large amount of air and some blood release on right). Intercostal chest drains sited
† Subclavian central venous line (8.5 Fr) sited on right
† RBC switched to central line, and 2 further units given
† Code Red pack A arrived from transfusion and fresh-frozen plasma started
† Second tranexamic acid dose of 1 g started as infusion
† CT scan urgently requested and transferred with Belmont Rapid Infuser (Belmont Instrument Corporation, Boston, MA, USA)
running throughout.
Table 4 An example of Code Red ‘shock pack’ contents
Pack A Pack B
4 RBC 6 RBC
4 FFP 4 FFP
Cryopreciptate, 1 adult therapeutic dose (2 pools of 5 units)
Platelets, 1 adult therapeutic dose
Human factors in complex trauma
Continuing Education in Anaesthesia, Critical Care & Pain j 2014 Page 3 of 6
 by Sim
on M
ercer on M
arch 14, 2015
http://ceaccp.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
due to poor human factors in the ED phase. These are summarized
in Table 5.
The patient described in Box 1 has increased respiratory effort,
low oxygen saturations, and a pneumothorax on the right. He
requires intubation immediately to improve oxygen delivery and to
reduce the work of breathing. The patient’s response to blood prod-
ucts must be closely observed in order to guide therapy and identify
whether he is responding to the resuscitation or is still actively
bleeding. The primary survey is conducted simultaneously and is
coordinated by the TTL.8 Concurrent activity is required, ideally
with one anaesthetist inserting large-bore central access such as an
8.5 Fr ‘trauma line’ into the subclavian vein in order to rapidly
infuse the blood products, while the other anaesthetist prepares to
perform the RSI.
In the ideally staffed trauma team, there should be two anaesthe-
tists for ‘Code Red’ patients such as this to enable one to focus on
central access and blood product replacement, while the other
manages the airway and ventilation. However, this is often not pos-
sible, even in many major trauma centres. As the sole trauma
anaesthetist, it is easy for your ‘bandwidth’ (i.e. your available
mental capacity) to become overloaded by a very sick patient requir-
ing immediate multiple interventions. Recognition of this possibility
and effective utilization of other team members is essential during
the RSI.
Trauma patients requiring emergency intubation with simultan-
eous resuscitation have ‘a lot going on’ around them to cause distrac-
tion during the RSI. The option to wake if intubation fails, as
described in the Difficult Airway Society Guidelines,12 is not appro-
priate when they require ongoing resuscitation and immediate surgi-
cal intervention. Based on collective experience and published
literature,13 the UK-DMS have taken a default position of securing
the airway in the majority of trauma patients requiring RSI with a
Macintosh size 4 laryngoscope blade and a gum-elastic bougie with
two suction devices close to hand. No more than three attempts at in-
tubation (with re-oxygenation in between attempts) are permitted
before clear communication of failed intubation with immediate pro-
gression to a surgical airway. RSI in trauma will usually require
manual in-line stabilization and must be performed in a ‘sterile
cockpit’, that is, there should be silence during the RSI to allow
full concentration and identification and communication of prob-
lems.12 The anaesthetist must allocate roles to the team as listed in
Table 6, while the TTL provides situational awareness to avoid fix-
ation errors.
Table 5 Pitfalls for the trauma anaesthetist in ED. TTL, trauma team leader; E0CO2 ,
end-tidal carbon dioxide measurement (measured by caponography)
Pitfall Measures to mitigate risk
Not hearing handover Do not transfer ventilator or check tracheal
tube during the prehospital handover: do it
before or afterwards
Not anticipating injuries sustained Understand the mechanism of injury and
therefore potential injuries sustained
Lack of situational awareness Understand the physiology of the patient,
especially respiratory and cardiovascular
status, and listen to the TTL’s plans. Be
aware that when your ‘bandwidth’ is
overloaded you may not hear everything
Poor followership Ensure that information is delivered to the TTL
when they are ‘ready to receive’ it.
Important information will not be heard or
interpreted if delivered in the wrong way at
the wrong time
Confusion over roles during RSI Clearly allocate roles during preparation for
RSI
Omission of important equipment
during RSI (e.g. E0CO2 )
Use a checklist, especially if assistant is not
regularly assisting at intubations
Lack of situational awareness during
RSI
Use assistant and TTL as your eyes and ears
during intubation. This prevents task
fixation
Attempted insertion of an arterial line
when the arterial pressure is very low
This does not improve the arterial pressure, it
just delays surgical intervention and causes
loss of situational awareness. The arterial
line can be sited once the patient is on the
operating table
Table 6 Team roles for RSI
Manual in-line stabilization
Cricoid pressure/laryngeal manipulation
Drug administration
Intubation
Table 7 The command huddle for critical decision-making in ED. IR, interventional
radiology
Key people
ED TTL
† Provides overall leadership and situational awareness, including an understanding of
the resources available
Lead surgeons (ideally general surgery and orthopaedics)
† Provide expert assessment of the injuries found, surgical options available,
and priorities for surgical treatment
Lead anaesthetist
† Provides expert assessment of physiological stability, response to transfusion,
and priorities for airway management
Key decisions
Treat here or transfer to another hospital?
† Does our hospital have the resources and expertise to manage this case safely?
† What are the relative risks of transferring to a specialist centre vs treating here?
RSI in ED or in the OT?
† How great is the risk of airway obstruction or respiratory failure before reaching the
OT?
† How much safer is it to anaesthetize this patient in the OT vs ED?
† Will this patient be able to tolerate the move to CT/OT without anaesthesia?
CT first or straight to OT or IR?
† How much delay will be caused by getting a CT before surgery?
† Is the patient stable enough to tolerate this delay?
† How likely is it that the CT results will alter this surgery?
If straight to OT, which body cavity should be opened first?
† Where does the most time-critical injury seem to be?
† Is it possible to get proximal control of any bleeding?
If pelvic or stab wound arterial bleeding is IR more appropriate than OT?
† Is it arterial bleeding that is not likely to respond to packing?
† Is there concurrent intra-abdominal bleeding requiring laparotomy?
IR, interventional radiology.
Human factors in complex trauma
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Decision-making
The time spent in ED is important, but it is only a step towards more
definitive investigations and treatment. A successful ED phase will
result in the patient exiting the department quickly, with a tolerable
degree of physiological stability, for timely and appropriate investi-
gations and/or surgery.
The end of the ED phase is a time when critical decisions about
further investigations, treatment, and transfer must be made. These
decisions need a combined approach from at least three senior
members of the team: the TTL; the lead surgeon(s); and the lead
anaesthetist. In the UK-DMS, this short meeting is known as the
‘Command Huddle’.14 Key decisions that must be made at this
stage are shown in Table 7. For timely and effective decisions
to be made, these people must be present in person and must have
sufficient seniority to make difficult decisions. Attempting to
make do with junior staff in ED and telephone communication
with remote consultants can only increase the risk of delayed and
inappropriate care.
The patient described in Box 1 is transferred to the CT scanner
and the information obtained is shown in Box 4. He is immediately
transferred to the OT with a summary of treatment described in Box
5 and further interventions in Box 6.
Team working
On transfer from ED to the OT, team leadership for the resuscita-
tion will move from the ED TTL to the lead anaesthetist. This tran-
sition of responsibility comes at a busy time for the anaesthetist
and must be managed carefully to avoid errors. The safest solution
is probably for the ED TTL to stay with the team and in control
until the patient is safely positioned and established on the ventila-
tor in the OT.
On arrival in the OT, it is important to ensure that the whole team
are aware of the clinical situation and surgical plans. This concise
update, which can be combined with the WHO Checklist, is known
Box 4 CT scanner information
Injuries identified on CT
† Bilateral rib fractures
† Flail chest posteriorly on right (ribs 2–8)
† Single rib fractures posteriorly on left (ribs 3–7)
† Grade 5 liver laceration, actively extravasating
† Unstable open pelvic fracture, actively extravasating
Box 6 Summary of treatment up to
handover in the critical care unit
OT interventions
Trauma laparotomy and packing to the liver
Retroperitoneal packing
External fixation of the pelvis
Ongoing blood product requirements despite the above proce-
dures so progression to interventional radiology for embolization
of a branch of the right internal iliac artery.
Transfer to critical care
Table 8 Human factors pitfalls during trauma surgery
Pitfall Measures to mitigate risk
Unnecessary conflict over basic principles and processes (e.g. refusal of blood bank to
issue sufficient quantities of blood and clotting products)
Establish clear guidelines and standard operating procedures, supported by training and
multi-speciality involvement
Lack of clear leadership (e.g. three anaesthetists working together, but no defined leader
with overall situational awareness)
State clearly the name of the lead anaesthetist to the whole OT team. When other
anaesthetists come to help, establish defined roles for each anaesthetist
Becoming task-focused (e.g. an anaesthetist becoming fixated on inserting an arterial line
or a surgeon becoming fixated on one small aspect of the surgery)
Maintain ‘hands-off’ leadership of the anaesthetic when sufficient assistance is
available. Delegate technical tasks to other team members
Not communicating effectively (e.g. an anaesthetist and surgeon both aware of their own
problems but not of each other’s)
Ensure whole team is aware and prepared for critical moments including:
† clamps or tourniquets going on or off
† packing or mobilizing large structures (e.g. liver, lung, or heart)
Use brief, regular, structured, situational reports (‘sit-reps’)14 to update the team,
including:
† Time spent in OT
† Clotting and transfusion totals
† Physiological status (including temperature and acidosis)
† Surgical findings, progress, and future intent
Box 5 Summary of treatment up
to arrival at the OT (21:30)
Total transfusion 8 RBC and 4 FFP (with next 4 FFP en route
to the OT from blood bank)
Anaesthesia maintained with 1% propofol infusion at
8 ml h21 and midazolam boluses
AP 90/60 but only maintained while actively infusing blood
products
HR 120
Weakly palpable radial pulses
Human factors in complex trauma
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by the UK-DMS as the ‘Snap Brief’.14 The key points of informa-
tion that must be communicated include:
† the main injuries found on CT and clinical examination;
† the physiological status and degree of stability;
† the transfusion given up to this point, ongoing requirements, and
degree of coagulopathy (including results of near-patient testing
such as RoTEMw);
† the surgical plans and expected timescale of the operation.
During trauma surgery, there are a number of human factors-related
pitfalls that must be avoided. A summary of the key risks and mea-
sures that may be taken to mitigate them is shown in Table 8.
The transition to postoperative critical care is unique in the
process so far, in that there is usually enough time for proper plan-
ning and handover. The opportunity should be taken to engage with
the intensive care unit at the earliest opportunity. This ensures that
appropriate resources can be made available and will allow a thor-
ough handover to the receiving clinicians (ideally in the OT) for
seamless continued care.
Summary
The establishment of major trauma centres around the UK has led to
the concentration of trauma experience in key hospitals. Human factors
such as communication, situational awareness, team working, and
decision-making are all key to the timely assessment and treatment
of a complex trauma patient. This article describes some of the key
human factors required by the trauma team with notorious pitfalls
and strategies to avoid them.
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4.2.1 Why this paper was written? 
This article was an invited publication by the Editor of the BJA Education Journal and is one 
of the first published accounts of how human factors theory, particularly in non-technical skills 
and the lessons learnt from conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan translate into practice in the 
National Health Service. In 2012 there was a reorganisation of trauma services in England 
which lead to the creation of major trauma centres (MTC) that were supported by trauma units 
in a regional network (56). A recent national review of data from the National Trauma Audit 
Research Network (TARN) published a paper that concluded that a change in the organisation 
of care for patients with severe injuries, including the development of Major Trauma Networks 
that cover the entire national population, was associated with a significant 19% (95% CI 3%
36%) increase in the odds of survival for trauma victims who reach the hospital alive (p=0.012) 
(2) (Figures 1.6 and 1.7). Although there is no strong evidence as yet, it seems sensible to 
postulate that the reorganization of services and an increased flow of patients with complex 
injuries to the Major Trauma Centres has allowed expertise and the trauma team as a whole 
to develop. I have observed this at Liverpool University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust where 
I work. A knowledge transfer paper was required to inform those working in the frontline in 
Major Trauma Centres in England of the importance of Human Factors in complex trauma and 
to offer suggestions to improve practice. 
4.2.2 What was known at the time of writing? 
The aim of this article was to describe a typical trauma call involving a patient with complex 
trauma presenting to a Major Trauma Centre. Although the technical and clinical aspects of 
the case are very important, we have highlighted many of the human factors already discussed 
in the first three sections of the thesis and the use of an actual case has allowed individual 
aspects of human factors theory and their importance to be demonstrated. Examples of these 
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are described below in Table 3.2. This article also allowed the opportunity to highlight certain 
pitfalls that arise from poor human factors. These include 
 Not hearing the handover  
 Not anticipating the injuries sustained  
 A lack of situational awareness  
 Poor followership  
 Confusion over roles during a rapid sequence induction of anaesthesia 
 Omission of important equipment during rapid sequence induction of anaesthesia 
(e.g. end tidal CO2 monitoring) 
 A lack of situational awareness during rapid sequence induction of anaesthesia  
 Attempted insertion of an arterial line when the arterial pressure is very low  
 
Table 3.2 Specific Examples of Human Factors in Trauma Calls  
Preparation to 
receive a patient 
 
There is a specific activation criterion so that members of the team are 
only activated when they are actually required to be present. This may 
promote the prevention of trauma fatigue 1 
 
Once arrived, the personnel involved will undertake introductions, 
including their name and role, and their clinical competencies. This is 
thought to encourage good followership.  
 
The team leader will give a brief to the team on what is expected. They 
may at this time impart their clinical mental model and ensure that 
others understand it. There is an opportunity here also for contingency 
planning and discussion of specialised roles such as surgical airway or 
chest drain insertion. 
 
There needs to be communication with the wider hospital at this point, 
particularly if a serious casualty is expected. This will include 
discussion with the operating theatre to ensure that there is a theatre 
staffed and ready with the correct equipment, the blood bank and also 
radiology to ensure the CT scanner available. 
 
Specific equipment is prepared, such as the Belmont Rapid Infuser. 
 
Special 
Circumstances 
 
Code Red  This is often declared by the pre-hospital team and criteria 
include systolic blood pressure of <90mmHg, active bleeding or where 
the patient is not responding to fluid boluses and suspected or 
confirmed haemorrhage (131). Activation of a Code Red will ensure a 
shock pack (4 units of packed red blood cells and 4 units of fresh frozen 
plasma) are ready on arrival of the patient and that senior clinicians 
attend the trauma call. 
 
 
1 The term trauma fatigue  has been mentioned at a fe  national conferences recently. There is no 
reference in the literature, but it refers to members of the trauma team becoming disengaged  from 
attending multiple trauma calls where their input was not required. These trauma calls will have arisen 
where the activation criterion was not followed correctly. 
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Code Black  This is where the casualty moves directly with pre-
hospital team to CT scanner prior to arrival in the trauma bay and then 
hands over the patient. MTCs that use a Code Black aim to obtain the 
CT scan results quicker and thus aid rapid decision making. 
 
 
The Handover 
 
It is crucial that all team members are aware of the initial information, 
particularly the mechanism of injury. 
 
One member of the team will check for a central pulse, patent airway 
and control of external catastrophic haemorrhage and then signal to 
the pre-hospital team member to conduct the handover. 
 
The pneumonic AT-MIST (Age, Time of injury, Injuries Sustained, 
Signs and Symptoms and Treatment Given) and if conducted in the 
same format every time then team members can listen process the 
information, they require 
 
This is conducted in silence and ensures that all team members are 
no  on the same page . 
 
The Primary 
Survey 
 
This is like a formula 1 pit stop (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). The UK-
DMS changed the way that the primary survey was conducted so that 
it follows a <c>ABC (132) format in complex trauma (catastrophic 
haemorrhage control first). The following roles are undertaken in a 
horizontal fashion(133) 
 Checking of tourniquets and pelvic binder positioning if applied  
 Administration oxygen (15 L via non-rebreather mask)  
 Cervical spine mobilisation  
 
In order to facilitate the passage of information and the maintenance of 
situational awareness, The Trauma Team Leader maintains a hands-
off role (Figure 3.2). The team feeds in information and the TTL has a 
role similar to the conductor of an orchestra (134) 
 
The Secondary 
Survey 
 
This allows further information to be appreciated to aid the decision-
making process and continues to be in a horizontal manner. The 
following roles are undertaken 
 
 Additional IV access inserted  
 Blood samples taken for full blood count, thromboelastometry, 
venous blood gas, group and save  
 Focused assessment with sonography for trauma scan (FAST)  
 Chest and pelvis X-rays  
 Commencement of haemostatic resuscitation if appropriate via 
a rapid infuser (Belmont)  
 Rapid sequence induction may be required.  
 
Timings of 
interventions 
 
Certain key procedures may need to be considered 
The need for a Rapid sequence Induction of Anaesthesia (RSI) 
 If an RSI is to occur, then roles must be allocated 
 There is a checklist for RSI outside the operating theatre 
environment 
 A silent cockpit  is assumed 
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 Does the patient require a whole body CT or transfer to the 
operating theatre or Interventional Radiology or Critical Care. 
A typical patient pathway is shown in Figures 1.9 and 1.10. 
 
4.2.3 Wha  he a e  added  c ib ed  he g ba  c i ica  c i ? 
This article provides a summary of the importance of human factors in managing complex 
trauma in a civilian setting at a major trauma centre. It has been cited 14 times although only 
4 by articles that I have not been involved with. A low citation rate may be expected, given the 
paper s readership is those clinicians and the ider multi-disciplinary team involved in trauma 
who may not regularly publish. The BJA Education Journal is peer reviewed and is published 
monthly along with the British Journal of Anaesthesia and is delivered to all anaesthetists who 
are registered with the Royal College of Anaesthetists. My intention was to write an article to 
publicise the importance of human factors in complex trauma and I considered this journal to 
be the best vehicle to achieve this. I am not surprised that the article has not been cited many 
times as the readership are predominantly not academics but frontline  trauma anaesthetists. 
A limitation to this paper is that it has been written based on expert opinion only, with all three 
authors being very experienced trauma anaesthetists working in both the UK-Defence Medical 
Services and busy Major Trauma Centres in England. This could potentially be a source of 
bias.  
The following concepts are introduced and discussed in terms of the civilian major trauma 
centre . 
 
Command Huddle 
The Command Huddle is a particularly important part of the trauma call and was first described 
in a discussion paper on improving the communication during trauma calls (14). The following 
key individuals are present. 
The Trauma Team Leader 
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 Role is to provides overall leadership and situational awareness, including an 
understanding of the resources available 
Lead surgeons (ideally general surgery and orthopaedics) 
 To provide expert assessment of the injuries found, surgical options available, and 
priorities for surgical treatment 
Lead anaesthetist 
 Provides expert assessment of physiological stability, response to transfusion, and 
priorities for airway management  
 
4.2.4 Where are we now? 
This article allowed key decisions to be highlighted and the need for good human factors when 
making them; and the following key decisions are discussed. This provides individuals with 
the opportunity to develop their own mental models in the context of their own mature system. 
The following 4 decisions are discussed 
4.2.4.1 Decision 1. Treat here or transfer to another hospital?  
To make this decision, it must be clear as to whether the receiving hospital has the resources 
and expertise to manage this case safely. If it does not, then an early transfer to a sub-
speciality hospital might be required. The relative risks of transferring to a specialist centre 
versus treating in situ must also be considered.  
4.2.4.2 Decision 2. RSI in in the Emergency Department or in the Operating Theatre? 
A rapid risk assessment must be made as to how great the risk of airway obstruction or 
respiratory failure is before reaching the operating theatre (OT).  Additional questions that add 
to this decision will be how much safer is it to anaesthetize this patient in the OT vs ED? Will 
this patient be able to tolerate the move to CT/OT without anaesthesia? Should a rapid 
sequence induction be required, this ould ideall  occur in silence similar to a cock pit 
moment  such as the take off  or landing of a plane (135), with all team members focused. 
4.2.4.3 Decision 3. CT first or straight to OT or IR (Interventional Radiology)? 
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It is beneficial to have a pan-CT (CT Scan of the whole body) prior to surgery to aid decision 
making and clarify the injuries sustained. One question would be how much delay will be 
caused by getting a CT before surgery and can the patient tolerate this? The underlying 
question will also rotate around how likely is it that the CT results will alter this surgery? 
4.2.4.4 Decision 4. If the patient is to be transferred to straight to operating theatre, 
which body cavity should be opened first?  
This is vital prior to the start of surgery. The choreography of personnel in the operating theatre 
is highlighted in Figure 3.3 and a leadership handover will take place between the trauma 
team leader and the lead anaesthetist. This time the leader in theatre is the Consultant 
Anaesthetist ho has the abilit  to be relativel  hands off  at the head of the operating table 
and maintain situational awareness. Questions that the team leader must be aware of include 
where is the most time-critical injury? Is it possible to get proximal control of any bleeding 
(control of bleeding above the injury)? If there is pelvic or stab wound arterial bleeding is 
interventional radiology actually more appropriate than the operating theatre? Is it arterial 
bleeding that is not likely to respond to packing? Is there concurrent intra-abdominal bleeding 
requiring laparotomy? Communication amongst the team is vital to address these questions 
early so that patients are transferred to the correct location for treatment as soon as possible. 
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Figure 3.1  A trauma team at a trauma call will initially behave in the same manner as a 
Formula One Pit Crew. There are several sub-teams in operation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Trauma Team Members undertaking the primary survey using a horizonal 
approach to activity. 
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Figure 3.3  Position of team in the operating theatre. The Lead Anaesthetist (circled) is 
maintaining situational awareness 
 
 
4.2.5 Conclusions 
 
This article allowed the description of a common complex trauma call to highlight many of the 
human factors in trauma that were described in the first three sections of the thesis. This 
certainly has applied the knowledge to allow trauma teams in major trauma centres in England 
to use this model to improve patient care.  
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Performance improvement through
best practice team management:
human factors in complex trauma
Simon Mercer,1 G S Arul,2 H E J Pugh3
ABSTRACT
Human factors or non-technical skills are now
commonplace in the medical literature, having
taken the lead from the airline and nuclear
industries and more recently Formula One
motor racing. They have been suggested as
playing a vital role in the success of the
trauma teams in recent con!icts. This article
outlines the background to human factors,
referring to early papers and reports and also
outlines high pro"le cases that highlight their
importance. We then describe the importance
of human factors in the deployed setting and
some of the lessons that have been learnt
from current con!icts.
INTRODUCTION
The last 13 years have seen a busy oper-
ational period for the United Kingdom
Defence Medical Services (UK-DMS)
primarily supporting con!icts in Iraq (Op
TELIC) and Afghanistan (Op HERRICK).
Experience in both theatres of operation
has led to many lessons learnt in the clinical
management of complex trauma including
the re-introduction of combat application
tourniquets,1 novel haemostatics2 and near
point coagulation testing.3 A ‘damage
control resuscitation–damage control
surgery’ (DCR-DCS) sequence has also
been developed to allow a seamless transi-
tion from the Emergency Department to
the Operating Theatre and then Critical
Care.4 In addition to the technical aspects
of dealing with complex trauma, much of
the success of the current trauma team in
the Role 3 Hospital in Camp Bastion,
Afghanistan, has been linked to the exem-
plary human factors or non-technical skills
within the ‘Complex Trauma Team’.5 This
paper sets out to illustrate the importance
of human factors in the deployed setting
and to describe some of the lessons that
have been learnt in current con!icts.
HUMAN FACTORS
The concept of human factors or ‘non-
technical skills’ in healthcare have taken
their lead from industry, in particular
airline, nuclear, European railways and
more recently Formula One motor racing.
A common de"nition is ‘the cognitive,
social, and personal resource skills that
complement technical skills, and contrib-
ute to safe and ef!cient task perform-
ance’.6 Catchpole et al have also de"ned
human factors as a means of ‘enhancing
clinical performance through an
understanding of the effects of teamwork,
tasks, equipment, workspace, culture,
organization on human behaviour and
abilities, and application of that knowl-
edge in clinical settings’.7 The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration was
one of the "rst to realise that it was
‘human factors’ and not machine failures
that were responsible for tragedies. They
concluded that approximately 70% of
errors investigated were attributable to
failed communication, poor decision-
making and ineffective leadership.8 The
development of ‘the black box’ (!ight
data recording system) further allowed the
analysis of key conversations on the !ight
deck during critical incidents and a
detailed examination of the behaviours of
the !ight crew. This work led to a culture
change with all !ight crew now being
mandated to undergo regular human
factors training termed ‘crew resource
management’.9
The seminal paper reviewing human
factors in medicine is ‘To err is human’10
and has now been well publicised in the
medical literature. A similar review in the
UK led by the then Chief Medical Of"cer,
Sir Liam Donaldson, showed similar
trends in behaviour and culture.11
Research into behaviours and attitudes in
healthcare led to the development of fra-
meworks for assessment and training in
non-technical skills for anaesthetists,12
surgeons13 and scrub nurses.14 These
allow practice in training exercises and for
debrie"ngs to be conducted following crit-
ical incidents.
In the UK, initiatives such as ‘patient
safety week’15 have highlighted the
importance of human factors in clinical
practice and raised their pro"le in the
medical community. High pro"le cases
have also highlighted the importance of
human factors,16 as have analysis of
unanticipated critical incidents.17 Two
such cases are described in Box 1. There
is evidence that more effective clinicians
use "rst-rate non-technical skills as part of
their working routine.18 Important
human factors in dealing with complex
trauma include communication, situ-
ational awareness, leadership, followership
and teamwork. For the UK-DMS, pre-
deployment training on the Military
Operational Surgical Training Course19
and the Hospital Exercise20 allow
rehearsal and consolidation of this valu-
able corporate knowledge.
HUMAN FACTORS IN THE INITIAL
ASSESSMENT OF THE CASUALTY IN
THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
The initial assessment and management of
a casualty is under the control of
Emergency Medicine Consultant who is
the nominated team leader. The presence
of a single identi"ed trauma resuscitation
team leader has been noted to lead to a
better secondary survey, ATLS guideline
adherence and team coordination.24 The
process of assessing the trauma patient,
transferring to CT and then subsequent
DCR is colloquially known as ‘The
Bastion Way’ and is practiced during pre-
deployment training. This allows
members of the team to ‘hit the ground
running’ as they might be asked to partici-
pate in a major trauma on their "rst day
in the theatre of operations.25
The Complex Trauma Team is now a
resource rich unit, the composition of
which is outlined in Box 2 and allows
‘consultant delivered care’. The team is
often activated at least 20 min prior to the
arrival of a seriously injured casualty. This
allows time for the team leader to brief
the team, determine names, roles and
competencies, prepare contingency plans,
check equipment and mentally rehearse
any expected mental models.
On arrival of the casualty, the handover
is given by the pre-hospital physician in
exactly the same way every time. This is
the age, time of injury, mechanism of
injury, injuries sustained, signs and symp-
toms and treatment given (AT-MIST)
handover and is outlined in Box 3. This is
also rehearsed in pre-deployment training
and allows the team to focus on listening
to the handover so that they are all clear
of the patient’s injuries and physiology
prior to any further interventions and key
points and concerns are identi"ed. This
obviates the need for multiple repetitions,
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when those who were not listening or
present realise that they have missed vital
information.
At this moment and throughout the
remaining time in the Emergency
Department, the team leader has an
important role in noise and crowd
control. High levels of background noise
have already been noted to be detrimental
in team communication and cognition in
the surgical team with an associated
increased mortality in complex trauma
operations.27 Certain key moments such
as the handover and intubation require
complete silence, which are termed the
‘sterile cockpit’ in aviation. The concept
of sterile cockpit re!ects the requirement
of the Aviation Safety Agency of the
United States28 where ‘No command
pilot, and no !ight crew member may
allow any other activity during a critical
phase of the !ight, which may confuse any
!ight crew member from the performance
of his/her duties or to interfere in any way
Box 1 Two high pro!les cases highlighting the importance of human factors in healthcare
Case of EB21
! On 29 March 2005, a 37-year-old woman attended for routine nasal surgery. Her pre-operative assessment revealed congenitally
fused cervical vertebra but was otherwise unremarkable.
! Anaesthesia was induced with an infusion of remifentanil (0.3 !g/kg/min) and an intravenous injection of propofol 200 mg. There
was dif!culty inserting a laryngeal mask (LMA), so a further 50 mg of propofol was administered and a second attempt at insertion
undertaken. Two sizes of LMA (sizes 3 and 4) were unsuccessfully attempted.
! Two minutes after induction of anaesthesia, the patient was cyanosed with an oxygen saturation (SaO2) of 75% which dropped to
40% after 4 min. Attempts were made to ventilate the lungs with 100% oxygen using a facemask and oral airway but this proved
dif!cult.
! Six minutes after induction of anaesthesia, SaO2 remained at 40% and the patient’s heart rate had dropped to 69 beats per minute.
Atropine 0.6 mg and suxamethonium 100 mg were administered. A second consultant anaesthetist arrived to assist and a !rst
attempt at tracheal intubation was made but it was impossible to view the laryngeal anatomy.
! Additional nursing staff arrived and an Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) consultant.
! Ventilation remained extremely dif!cult—a situation described as ‘can’t intubate, can’t ventilate’ in the Dif!cult Airway Society
Guidelines.22
! Between 13 and 15 min after the induction of anaesthesia, further attempts at laryngoscopy and intubation were made by both
consultant anaesthetists and an attempt was also made to perform a !breoptic intubation.
! Between 16 and 20 min post-induction of anaesthesia, the ENT consultant attempted to intubate.
! After 20 min, an intubating LMA (iLMA) was inserted and attempts were made to insert an endotracheal tube though this.
! After 35 min post-induction of anaesthesia it was decided to abandon the procedure and the patient was transferred to the recovery
area.
! She was later transferred to a Critical Care Unit in another hospital where she died 13 days later from a hypoxic brain injury.
A video reconstruction and discussion of this case are available on the Clinical Human Factors Group website (http://www.chfg.org)
which demonstrates a breakdown in human factors in the anaesthetic room. There was a !xation error with intubation and not following
the Dif!cult Airway Society Guidelines,22 where an emergency cricothyroid airway would have been required following the declaration of
‘can’t intubate, can’t ventilate’. There was also a loss of situational awareness with the SaO2 remaining very low for a signi!cant period
of time.
Case of GE23
! On 4 May 2006, a 45-year-old man underwent a surgical procedure to repair a fracture of a !nger.
! The pre-operative assessment noted that the patient had a suspected hiatus hernia and suffered from oesophageal acid re"ux; he
also weighed 124 kg with a Body Mass Index of 40. There were no other problems encountered with the assessment of his airway.
As the patient wished to have this procedure under general anaesthesia a decision was made to undergo a rapid sequence induction
(RSI).
! Induction of anaesthesia was performed with 100 !g fentanyl, 500 mg thiopentone and 100 mg suxmethonium.
! It was impossible to view the larynx on the !rst attempt at laryngoscopy with a Macintosh Size 3 Blade and so a second attempt at
intubation was made with a Polio Blade. At this time it was noticed that there was blood in the airway.
! A call for help was made after 3 min of induction of anaesthesia.
! An LMA was inserted and with an additional jaw thrust, ventilation was achieved.
! The anaesthetist decided to then attempt intubation via an iLMA and while this was inserted the SaO2 dropped to 80%.
! It was dif!cult to pass an endotracheal tube through the iLMA, 1 mg of alfentanyl was administered and passage of a smaller ET
tube was successfully attempted and the iLMA was removed.
! A decision was then made to insert a Cook Exchange Catheter through the ET tube and there were then several attempts to ‘railroad’
an ET tube over the Cook Exchange Catheter.
! Additional oxygen was attached to the Cook Exchange Catheter, but this was set at 15 litres per minute and surgical emphysema
was noted immediately.
! A cricothyroidotomy was attempted.
! The patient then suffered a cardiac arrest and subsequently died.
This case also shows a deviation from the Dif!cult Airway Society Guidelines.22 In a patient undergoing an RSI, once it was
impossible to conventionally intubate the patient then he (according to the Guidelines) should have been woken up and intubation
attempts terminated.
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in the performance of their duties.’ For
this reason, the handover is completed in
silence and unless there is impending
airway catastrophe or exsanguination, the
patient is not touched by the trauma
team.
The DMS have changed their assessment
paradigm to <C> ABC29 for battle!eld
injuries with a ‘hands off ’ team leader
coordinating them. Horizontal resuscitation
is used for the primary survey so that it can
be completed relatively quickly using
concurrent activity.30 This relies on a highly
skilled and experienced team who display
good followership. This has been de!ned as
‘….the ability to effectively follow the direc-
tives and support the efforts of a leader to
maximize a structured organization….’31
and ensures that all team members have a
responsibility to proactively react to chan-
ging situations to support the team leader.
In essence, this means that people are not
standing still constantly waiting for instruc-
tions, but know their role in the team and
are able to perform by holding their own
mental models.
Situational awareness has been
described as ‘the perception of the ele-
ments in the environment within a
volume of time and space, the compre-
hension of their meaning and the projec-
tion of their status in the near future’.32
This concept is crucial in complex
trauma as a patient’s physiological state
can change rapidly. There are three ele-
ments including gathering information,
interpreting information and anticipating
future states. The !rst of these comprises
of information from the ‘9 liner’, the
AT-MIST handover and the initial
Primary Survey. With a mental model
from previous experience and pre-
deployment rehearsal, the team leader
can interpret all the information and
plan future steps in the treatment
pathway. In order to maintain situational
awareness, the team leader must not
become distracted by participating in
technical tasks or touching the patient. A
loss of situational awareness can be detri-
mental and lead to !xation errors and
incorrect decision-making.
Another key human factor in complex
trauma is communication. Communication
was found to be a causal factor in 43% of
errors made in surgery in three teaching
hospitals in the USA.18 To appreciate the
importance of communication among the
Complex Trauma Team and other support-
ing agencies in the hospital, the need to
maintain situational awareness and con-
tinue with good leadership and follower-
ship, the following concepts were
developed.33
! Command Huddle
– A brief meeting of the senior clini-
cians to determine the immediate
plan for the casualty (eg, to CT or
theatre) or make decisions on futility.
! Snap Brief
– A two-way communication between
surgical and anaesthetic teams for
the whole team in theatre to
determine:
" The clinical and imaging !ndings
and the surgical plan.
" Blood and blood products trans-
fused and current rate of transfu-
sion, coagulopathy and any other
clinical problems.
! Sit-Reps
– A regular update between anaes-
thetic and surgical teams which
occurs every 15–30 min. A sug-
gested sit-rep is shown in Box 4.
CONCLUSIONS
Human factors play an important role in
DCR-DCS in ensuring that key informa-
tion is communicated accurately within
the trauma and theatre teams to allow
early robust decision-making and to avoid
miscommunication and !xation errors.
The challenge for the future will be to
ensure that the current corporate memory
is translated into contingency training and
is also adapted for future facilities such as
high readiness units and maritime
platforms.
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Box 2 Composition of a typical
Complex Trauma Team (after26)
(consultants are highlighted in bold)
! Clinical Team
– Team Leader (Emergency
Consultant)
– Primary Survey Doctor (ED SpR)
– Anaesthetist 1 (airway)
– Anaesthetist 2 (central venous
access)
– ODP
– Scribe (trauma nurse coordinator)
– ED Nurse 1 (intravenous access
and !rst blood sample)
– ED Nurse 2 (drugs)
– ED Nurse 3 (rapid infuser)
– ED Nurse 4 (rapid infuser)
– Runner
– Orthopaedic Surgeon
– General Surgeon
– Plastic Surgeon
– Radiologist
– Radiographer
– Deployed Medical Director
! Logistic Support
– Laboratory Technician
– Theatre Manager
– Ward Master
! Front of House
– Regimental Sgt Major
– Interpreter
– Padre
ED, Emergency Department; ODP,
Operating Department Practitioner; SpR,
Specialist Registrar.
Box 3 AT-MIST handover
! A: Age of patient
! T: Time of injury
! M: Mechanism of injury
! I: Injuries sustained
! S: Signs and symptoms
! T: Treatment given
Box 4 Suggested sit-rep33
Anaesthetist
! The time since the start and the
duration of the procedure
! Blood and blood products transfused
! The current rate of infusion of blood
products
! Relevant blood gas results
(particularly the pH and base excess),
coagulopathy (ROTEM results) and
temperature
! Any developing problems
Surgeon
! The surgical progress (eg, vascular
control, therapeutic packing)
! Any new developing problems or
!ndings
! Future intentions
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4.3  Performance Improvement Through Best Practice Team Management  Human 
Factors in Complex Trauma. MERCER SJ, Arul S, Pugh H Journal of the Royal Army 
Medical Corps 2014; 160: 105-108 
 
4.3.1 Why this paper was written? 
This article puts into context the improvements that were achieved in the management of 
military casualties during recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. I deployed to both of these 
war zones as part of the complex trauma team and a subsequent analysis performed by Penn-
Barwell and colleagues revealed a year on year improved survival (Figure 1.1) (5). The article 
starts with a summary of the important aspects of human factors taken from the airline industry 
and key reports (22,23) that I have discussed in the introduction to the thesis and also 
summarises the cases of Elaine Bromley (28) and Gordon Ewing (136) to set the scene. The 
article describes a military trauma call in Camp Bastion summarising the importance of human 
factors throughout the trauma call. A knowledge transfer paper was required to inform serving 
members of the Defence Medical Services about the advances in Human Factors in military 
complex trauma that had been made so that these lessons learnt could be continued in future 
deployments. 
 
4.3.2 What was known at the time of writing? 
The pre-deployment training of UK-DMS personnel is intensive and can take up to one year 
prior to deployment. There is individual training on technical skills and small group simulations 
on the Military Operational Surgical Training Course (13) and then a collective  large scale 
group training on the Hospital Exercise (HospEx) (12). HospEx itself is held in a converted 
aircraft hangar that is laid out exactly as the hospital in Afghanistan was. The exact equipment 
and paperwork are also present to allow teams to rehearse the flow of patients in real time. 
This exercise is geared to ensure that the hospital unit itself is deemed fit to deploy, but also 
that individuals are read  to hit the ground running  hen arising in the theatre of operations, 
sometimes being required to start work on the night of arrival. 
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All members of the UK-DMS work in the NHS and are embedded in the Major Trauma Centres 
in England. They are then deployed for a period of up to 3 months every 6-18 months 
depending on their role (137). The importance of preparation and appreciation of human 
factors is paramount as they will be working within different teams (sometimes multinational) 
using military specific equipment, protocols and standard operating procedures. The patients 
also have a different pattern of injury not experienced in the NHS with blast accounting for 
54% of injuries in one review and high velocity gunshot wounds up to 30% (138). The patient 
population is also different consisting of predominantly young, fit males who have often 
sustained high and multiple traumatic amputations. The severity of injury is also much greater 
than seen in peace times with over 50% of casualties in one review having an injury severity 
score between 36 and 75 (138).  
4.3.3 What the paper added or contributed to the g ba  c i ica  c i ? 
 
This article describes a typical military trauma call and emphasises the importance of the 
human factors that have been described previously to ensure the rapid and successful 
assessment and treatment of a casualty. This article also follows on from a discussion paper 
(14) that lead to the development of the concept of the Trauma WHO  that as tested in Camp 
Bastion and is described earlier in this thesis (42). It has been cited 22 times, but many of 
these citations are further work that I have been involved in and I have used this article to 
develop further work streams. Human factors play an important role in damage control 
resuscitation, particularly in ensuring that key information is communicated accurately to allow 
early robust decision-making and to avoid miscommunication and fixation errors. The contents 
of this article formed the basis for the introductory human factors training on the Military 
Operational Surgical Training Course (13). 
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I have presented the Trauma WHO  at several invited national meetings that I have listed 
already, and it has also now become embedded in the work we do in my own civilian major 
trauma centre. The communication elements are now a vital part of the Damage Control 
Surgery process (64). 
 
4.3.4 Where are we now? 
The Trauma WHO  is no  an integral part of the patient path a  at m  o n institution. This 
is particularly useful for patients who have undergone complex trauma and require immediate 
surgery within 4 hours of admission. We continue to practice the Trauma WHO  ever  3 
months on our in house  high fidelit  trauma simulation course (8). The Trauma WHO  has 
been adopted in several other institutes with a Military presence such as Derriford Hospital 
and there has been interest when I have presented at national conferences. The mainstream 
adoption of such checklists has previously been resisted and my own observations of 
mandating the WHO checklist itself was initially very unpopular amongst some clinicians in 
the NHS. 
 
Despite the Trauma WHO  being tested and evaluated in an active field hospital in a ar one 
(42) it has still not been globally adopted in Major Trauma Centres in England. In order to 
provide further evidence and convince other trauma clinicians a multi-centre observational 
study would need to be organised. This would review times to making decisions and over all 
24-hour and 30-day mortality in groups of matched patients who are treated using and not 
using this communication tool.  
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Key points
• Human factors are vital to the successful manage-
ment of an anticipated dif!cult airway.
• Careful planning and preparation are key to suc-
cess, with a logical strategy being selected and the
airwaymanagement being undertaken by a compe-
tent anaesthetist.
• Careful consideration of the risks of each technique
will assist a thoroughpreoperative assessment to be
undertaken, and the logical plan and equipment
selected.
• A detailed pre-anaesthetic brie!ng of the multi-
disciplinary team is required to ensure that all
personnel are aware of the plan and their role in
the anaesthetic room.
• Situational awareness is vital to ensure that !xation
errors are avoided. Disciplined communication and
thoughtful followership ensure good team dynamics.
Human factors have been de!ned as ‘the environmental, organisa-
tional and job factors, and human and individual characteristics
which in"uence behaviouratwork in awaywhich can affect health
and safety’1 and have been described with particular relevance to
anaesthesia in theAnaesthetists Non-Technical Skills Framework.2
Whendealingwithapatientwithacomplex airway, exceptional at-
tention tohuman factors is vital to success. This has beennoted ex-
tensively in the literature after two high pro!le cases.3,4 Recently,
therehasbeenadoptionof human factors inhealthcare at thehigh-
est level with the signing of a Concordat from the National Quality
Board by organizations such as the General Medical Council, The
Care Quality Commission, and Health Education England.5
The Fourth National Audit Project of the Royal College of
Anaesthetists (NAP4) examined major complications in airway
management and concluded that poor human factors could
have contributed to 40% of the cases reported. In 25% of these
cases, inadequate human factorswere felt to be amajor contribu-
tor to a poor outcome.6 Further analysis speci!cally looking at
human factors in cases reported to NAP4 reported that there
were potentially an average of four human factors issues per re-
ported case.7 This article sets out to describe our experience of
the importance of human factors when dealing with patients
with an ‘anticipated dif!cult airway’ and describes our strategy,
particularly in planning, preparing, brie!ng the team, and con-
ducting the airway management with an illustrated example.
Our hospital experience
Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust is a large teach-
ing hospital situated in North Liverpool. It is a tertiary referral cen-
tre for head and neck surgery providing specialist services to
around 1.5million residents inMerseyside, Cheshire, South Lanca-
shire, and NorthWales. The population served by Aintree includes
some of the most socially deprived communities in the country,
with high levels of illness. The Head and Neck Unit is the largest
in the UK, carrying out !800 cases per year. This provides our
anaesthetists and surgeons with awealth of experience in dealing
with patients with abnormal airway anatomyand frequently, dif!-
cult airways. Our department is the home to the nationally recog-
nized Aintree Dif!cult Airway Management (ADAM) course.8
Speci!c human factors in complex airway
management
Leadership
It is important that the team is aware as towho is in charge of the
case. The leader will usually (although not always) be the most
experienced anaesthetist and their role is to:
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• Formulate the airwaymanagement plan(s) and communicate
this to the team, so they are all ‘on the same page’.
• Allocate roles with the team and identify any limitations in
skill mix.
• Maintain situation awareness and not become task !xated
while the airway is being secured.
• De!ne the trigger points formoving fromPlan A to B (and sub-
sequent plans) if required.
Teamwork
Good teamwork is integral to success in all airway management.
This is particularly important in the anticipated dif!cult airway.
Salas and colleagues9 described a team as ‘a distinguishable set
of two or more people who interact dynamically, interdepen-
dently, and adaptively towards a common and valued goal,
who have each been assigned speci!c roles or functions to per-
form, and who have a limited life-span membership’. It is there-
fore very important that the team is aware of the plan(s) for
airway management, their role in the process, and anything
else that is expected of them. A team brief will ensure that this
is achieved with an opportunity to ask questions and clarify
any differences in opinion.
Situation awareness
Situation awareness itself has been described as ‘the perception
of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and
space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of
their status in the near future’.10 Loss of situation awareness is
one of the most common recurring features in adverse incidents
involving airway management.7 The three stages of situational
awareness include:
• Gathering information. This will start with taking a history
and examining the patient and will be supplemented by
other investigations such as nasendoscopy, CT scan, and dis-
cussion with surgical colleagues. Once airway management
occurs then further information is gathered from monitors,
images on !breoptic cameras, and tactile feedback. Mistakes
may occur if the individual misinterprets task-relevant
information.
• Interpreting the information. Mistakes may occur if an indi-
vidual wrongly perceives speci!c information.
• Anticipating future states. Mistakesmay occur if future status
is wrongly predicted, either from a poor initial mental model
or personal memory failure. (A mental model is an explan-
ation of a person’s thought process, or what they expect to
happen.)
Good situation awareness when performing a complex task can
be maintained in different ways. In the trauma team scenario,
the trauma team leader (TTL) maintains a ‘hands off’ approach
and stands at the foot of the bed so they maintain an all round
view and are effectively ‘driving the bus’.11 In this way, the TTL
is not directly involved in any practical tasks themselves and so
are able to observe the patients management in ‘real time’.
Decision-making
After assessment of the patient before operation, the clinician
should identify the potential dif!culties and problem areas for
that individual. The risks and bene!ts of each potential airway
management method need to be weighed up. These may vary
from case to case. The location of the planned intubation, experi-
ence level of staff available, and clinical urgencyof the case are all
factors thatmay deemanormally suitable technique, unsuitable.
Once a decision has been made and ‘Plan A’ formulated, it is im-
portant to continue to re-evaluate the clinical situation taking
into account any signi!cant changes and ensuring that ‘Plan A’
remains the best plan.
Although the Plan A, B, and C approach is favoured, it is im-
portant to recognize that some airway cases are such that there
mayonly be one plan. In such circumstances, themost senior an-
aesthetist will manage the airway and if this is devolved to a se-
nior trainee, it must be done under close and direct supervision
with a clear plan for stepping in.
Followership
Although good leadership is crucial to good teamwork, so too is
good followership. A follower is de!ned as anyone not acting in
the position of leader and responding to organizational actions;
a person who is active rather than passive.12 In terms of dif!cult
airwaymanagement, this encompasses actions such as anticipa-
tion, support of the team leader, and good communication using
feedback loops. A feedback loop is where the sender (e.g. the
team leader) transmits an instruction to another member of
the team who receives it and then feeds back they have under-
stood the instruction (or decoded the message correctly).
Communication
Good communication is paramount to the successful execution
of securing the patient’s airway and simple steps can ensure
that communication "ows from the team leader to the other
members of the team. Previous work by Gawande and collea-
gues13 cited communication failures as being responsible for
43% of errors in three large teaching hospitals in the USA. We
have found a team brief to facilitate good communication
among the multi-disciplinary team
The team brief allows:
• introduction of team members,
• the team to be reminded of individual levels of training and
competencies,
• allocation of tasks,
• discussion of potential problems and highlighting solutions,
• clari!cation of the team leader’s mental model and the air-
way plan(s).
There are several aspects of communication skills that should be
highlighted, particularly in the management of the patient with
an anticipated dif!cult airway.
• ‘Sterile Cockpit’: During the intubation attempt, the team
should aim for what is described in the airline industry as a
‘sterile cockpit’. This infers that the noise level is kept to an
absolute minimum by having only the required team mem-
bers present. This enables all monitors, comments, and in-
structions to be heard clearly ensuring vital information is
not lost.
Case history
The importance of human factors in the management of an an-
ticipated dif!cult airway will be illustrated by the case described
in Table 1.
Fascial space infections (dental abscesses) can be considered
the archetypal anticipated dif!cult airway;14 they can be life-
Human factors in complex airway management
Page 2 of 7 BJA Education | 2015
 by Sim
on M
ercer on M
ay 5, 2016
http://bjaed.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
threatening and cause serious postoperative problems. They are
heterogenous in their presentation, and can involve the whole
upper airway and all the access routes into the airway.
The anticipated dif!cult airway is different from themanage-
ment of the unanticipated dif!cult airway. The anaesthetist
knows there are going to be problems in advance and conse-
quently has time to select the best intubation plan to deal with
their patient’s particular constellation of problems. It is crucial
that the plan is enacted precisely, necessitating attention to de-
tail at every step of the intubation plan frompositioning and oxy-
genation through to con!rmation of tube placement in the
trachea.
The anaesthetist must have a pragmatic approach to assess-
ment, planning, and execution of the intubation plus the human
factors involved at each stage. To this end, we advocate a six-step
method used by the ADAM website8 if time allows.
Aintree six-step approach to dif!cult airway
management
Q1: How much time do I have?
Q2: What access to the airway is available (nose, mouth,
trachea)?
Q3: How compromised is the airway?
Q4: Which fascial spaces are involved?
Q5: Which management plan(s) best !ts the circumstances?
Q6: Could I make the situation worse? If so, how?
Question 1
Dif!cult airways are time critical emergencies and can be classi-
!ed as follows:
(i) No time for assessment and planning: Need to act immedi-
ately to avoid hypoxic brain injury/death. Correct use of the
DAS algorithms15 is crucial to outcome.
(ii) Some time for assessment and planning: The six-step ap-
proach is used remembering that actions can gain or lose
time; airway management is a "uid situation with often in-
complete information and so it is necessary to take stock re-
peatedly and avoid being too rigid in one’s approach.
(iii) Adequate time for assessment and planning. A structured
approach is required to assess options, evaluate risk, and
maximize success. We use the ADAMwebsite8 and method-
ology and it is used for illustration here, although of course
other methods may be used.
Questions 2–4
The available access routes are !rst considered. Airway com-
promise is multi-factorial and for this patient, sepsis indicates
urgency, in"uences management, and is associated with more
complications. Trismus is not always due to pain: the joint may
be compromised. Pharyngeal involvement causes stridor, drool-
ing, dysphagia, and tongue immobility. Nasendoscopy is the
most important investigation. It is simple to perform, con!rms
nasal patency, and indicates the location of airway distortion
and the degree of oedema. Imaging is useful if the patient can
lie "at as it accurately de!nes the fascial spaces involved, differ-
entiates between cellulitis and abscess, reveals vascular sheath
involvement, and con!rms the diagnosis of mediastinitis if sus-
pected clinically.
Question 5
Once assessment and investigation are completed, the clinician
uses the information to decide which airway management plan
best !ts the patients’ circumstances. Airway management
should not follow a ‘one size !ts all’ approach. The breadth of
techniques means a ‘bespoke’ plan should be sought that is
best suited to deal with the problems at hand. A good way to do
this is by considering the limitations of each plan in the context
of the patient’s problems. When using the ADAM website, each
choice of technique is evaluated against the clinical scenario
and an analysis of limitations, potential complications, and likely
success is used to identify the technique that is most likely to
succeed without complications
Question 6
The last step considers how one’s actions canmake the situation
worse. This is done by constructing an intubation plan detailing
potential pitfalls and to discuss it with the whole team in ad-
vance. The ADAM website generates a printable ‘contingency
plan’ (Table 2) splitting the intubation into its constituent steps
and listing the anticipated problems for each step. The left-
hand column lists generic potential problems likely to be en-
counteredwhenever the equipment is used, in this case awake!-
breoptic intubation. The right-hand column highlights how the
patient’s problems are likely to cause dif!culty and at which
stage in the intubation this may arise. Used at the team brief, it
enables everyone to effectively be on the ‘samepage’; when to ex-
pect speci!c problems, how they will manifest themselves.
Table 2 does not provide solutions but rather highlights potential
pitfalls leaving it to the user to formulate a response. It also deter-
mines in advance when it would be appropriate to abandon the
procedure and consider other options (if any).
How the patient was managed
Assessment and planning
The severe trismus and indurated anterior neck meant
that there was only one viable route into the airway: the
Table 1 Case history
A 62-yr-old male presented to The Accident and Emergency Department with acute dysphagia for liquids arising on a background of a 3 week
history of worsening toothache and facial swelling
On examination, he was pyrexial (39°C), dysarthric, and was drooling as he could not swallow his saliva. He also could not assume the supine
position
He had trismuswith 1 cm ofmouth opening, swelling and erythema over his left cheek, andmandible spreading to the left anterolateral aspect of
his neck. He had an old fracture of his nose
Hewas tachycardic (110 beatsmin!1) but not hypotensive. His SaO2 was 92% on room air. Nasendoscopy revealed only the left nares to be patent.
The anatomy of the oropharynx at nasendoscopy was found to be severely distorted, full of secretions and with a mucosa prone to contact
haemorrhage. The glottis could not be visualized. A full blood count revealed a leucocytosis, and clotting abnormalities
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left nostril. Awake !breoptic intubation was considered the
only option (awake tracheostomy would have been very
dif!cult).
Preparation
All equipmentwas prepared and checked in advance. The patient
was told why an awake intubation was necessary so that they
Table 2 Contingency table for the patient described in Table 1
Generic problems Patient-speci!c problems
1. Check equipment/position patient
Adverse patient position
Inadequate nasal patency
Illumination not satisfactory
Monitor image not optimized
Wrong size tube
Wrong type of tube
2. Prepare nares, oxygenate, start sedation
Omit supplemental oxygen
Increasing airway obstruction (LA effect)
Apneoa (excess sedation)
Respiratory depression (excess sedation)
3. Mount tracheal tube on !brescope
Tube not loaded
Tube loaded via Murphy’s eye
Tube/!brescope interface not lubricated
Omit anti-fog solution
4. Negotiate !brescope through the nose
Fogging of lens
Secretions obscure view
Inadequate nasal patency
Traumatic bleeding obscures view
Friable tissue obscures view (e.g. polyp)
Disorientation
Failure to traverse nose
Nasal congestion/hyperaemia
Naso-pharyngeal obstruction (e.g. adenoids)
Operator traumatizes nasalmucosa causing bleeding: coagulopathy
5. Explore pharynx, larynx, and trachea
Epiglottis obscures glottis
View becomes ‘red out’ (blood) or ‘white out’ (secretions)
Prolapsing pharyngeal wall obscures view
Excessive vocal cord movement
Excessive re"ex glottic closure
Unexpected gastric re"ux
Accumulating pharyngeal secretions
Contaminant obstruction:
spontaneous or iatrogenic abscess rupture
iatrogenic bleeding
Airway distortion (cellulitis)
6. Position !brescope in trachea
Carina not realized
7. Railroad tracheal tube over !brescope into trachea
Tube not loaded/loaded incorrectly
Tube diameter too large to enter nostril
Tube/!brescope step problem
Tube hold up: nostril, epiglottis, arytenoids, or subglottically
Inadvertant removal of !brescope from trachea
Tube advancement problem: nares, epiglottis, arytenoid, subglottic
Bleeding: trauma, abscess rupture
8. Con!rm tube position relative to carina
Cannot identify carina
Patient distress due to iatrogenic total airway obstruction
9. Remove !brescope leaving tracheal tube
Dif!cult !brescope removal (no lubrication)
10. Re-con!rm tube position with CO2/bag movement
No capnograph trace
No ventilation
Dif!cult ventilation
11. Induce anaesthesia and in"ate cuff
Inadvertent loss of i.v. access
12. Con!rm bilateral lung ventilation
Ruptured tube cuff
Endobronchial intubation
Dif!cult ventilation
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understood the reasoning behind the decision and what the pro-
cedure actually involved.We also explained that the nature of his
infection would mean he would be kept sedated and ventilated
on ITU for between 12 and 48 h to allow his airway to improve be-
fore extubation.
We do not premedicate with benzodiazepines nor do we ad-
minister anti-sialogues; in a case such as this, they will be inef-
fectual. We do prepare the nares with a topical vasoconstrictor
to minimize bleeding from the turbinate’s vessel-rich mucosal
bed and avoid any concomitant topical local anaesthetic. We be-
lieve that the use of local anaesthetic in this instance could wor-
sen the airway.16 Our technique for AFOI has previously been
described using single-agent sedation with target-controlled in-
fusion (TCI) remifentanil to facilitate awake !breoptic intub-
ation,17 but this may be considered controversial by other
anaesthetists in the UK and is just one technique. It provides an-
algesia and sedation and we believe it is more likely to preserve
upper airway re"exes than topicalizationwith local anaesthetics.
This advanced airway technique should not be used for the !rst
time on a complex case without !rst gaining experience in lower
risk cases.
It is advisable to anaesthetize such patients on the operating
table rather than a trolley. The former allows better patient posi-
tioning, better access to the patient for the anaesthetist (and sur-
geon should a surgical airway be necessary), and reducing the
chance of an accidental extubation when transferring the anaes-
thetized patient. A decisionwas alsomade as towhere tomanage
the airway: in the anaesthetic room or in the theatre itself? The
advantage of the anaesthetic room is privacy while the advan-
tage of theatre is its space and lighting should a surgical airway
be needed. We elected to anaesthetize the patient in theatre.
All cases of anticipated dif!culty should have their neck sur-
face anatomy assessed beforehand. In this case, the thyroid and
cricoid cartilages were impalpable because of overlying indur-
ation and swelling. The neck itself felt ‘woody’ in terms of its
poor tissue compliance and immobility. This alerted us to the
fact that a surgical airway would be a dif!cult undertaking.
Team brie!ng
The introduction and implementation of the WHO Surgical
Checklist has been reported to reduce in-hospital 30 day mortal-
ity.18 We implemented a team brief at the start of each operating
list led by the consultant anaesthetist. In this instance, he clearly
stated that this was a ‘high stakes’ airway with only one clear
route of access (LEFT nostril) and that an awake !breoptic intub-
ation would be performed. Using the ADAM contingency plan
(Table 2), it was made clear that bleeding was a real threat and
that should the AFOI be abandoned, it would be due to bleeding
or the inability to railroad the tracheal tube. In such circum-
stances, it was extremely unlikely that the sedation could be
aborted and the patient returned to full consciousness with a
clear airway. In which case, a surgical airway would be needed
and that this would be dif!cult to perform. The composition of
the ‘airway team’ is described in Table 3.
Managing the airway
The patientwas arranged in an upright sitting position on the op-
erating table as the patient did not tolerate lying down. Nasal
spectacles were !tted and oxygen commenced at 15 litre min!1.
I.V. access was obtained and an infusion of Hartmann’s solution
commenced. The sedationist titrated the TCI remifentanil while
maintaining constant verbal communication; the endpoint being
a drowsy but cooperative patient. The sedationist was then
tasked with monitoring the patient and not the image of the pa-
tient’s airway on themonitor. Remifentanil has a profound effect
on respiration; the patient can be awake but apneoic. The seda-
tionist placed a hand on the patient’s chest to assist respiratory
monitoring and if movement stopped, he prompted the patient
to breathe.
Once the patient had achieved an appropriate level of sed-
ation, the airway operator instructed the ODP to load a warmed
6.0 nasal RAE tube onto a lubricated !brescope. We ensured the
scope had not traversed the Murphy’s eye and taped the pilot
Table 3 Airway team
Name Role
Consultant anaesthetist Airway team leader
Responsible for !nal plan based on all the available information
Ultimately responsible
Conducts team brief
Supervises advanced trainee
Advanced trainee (ST6–7) in Anaesthesia Perform the airway management within their competency under the supervision of
the consultant anaesthetist
Helps formulate the airway management plan
Intermediate trainee anaesthetist (ST3)
in anaesthesia
Perform sedation using TCI remifenanil
Induces patient once position of the tracheal tube has been con!rmed
Operator department practitioner Prepare the airway equipment
Assist the anaesthetist undertaking the airway management
Support worker Act as a ‘runner’ should an emergency arise or additional equipment is or help is needed
Consultant ENT surgeon Contributes to the airway management plan
Undertake an emergency surgical airway if indicated
Perform a rigid laryngoscopy if indicated
Support the anaesthetic team
ENT speciality trainee (ST4) Work under the supervision of the ENT Consultant and perform the roles of the ENT
consultant under their supervision
Theatre nurse Has available equipment ready to allow an immediate surgical airway or rigid bronchoscopy. Needs
to be ready in the operating theatre
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balloon tubing to the tube adjacent to the connector so it could
not dangle across the patient’s face and eyes. Anti-fog solution
was carefully applied to the lens of the scope, then the position
of the prong of the nasal spec in the left nostril adjusted to
allow the scope to enter the nose and the procedure began.
The nostril was easily traversed without traumatizing to the
mucosa, but once the oropharynx was entered, no anatomical
landmarks could be identi!ed due to tissue oedema and collec-
tions of secretions. However, by only advancing the scope into
black airspace, the operator soon found himself in the trachea,
despite the lack of any recognizable intervening anatomy. The
scope was then held in the mid-trachea, avoiding contact with
the carina (which could trigger coughing) while preparations
were made to deliver the tracheal tube.
The scopewas handed to the ODP, whowas then instructed to
hold its position in the trachea. The airway operator lubricated
the tip and cuff of the tube before using two hands to gently ad-
vance the tube into the nostril ensuring the bevel faced laterally
and sowas less likely to traumatize the turbinates. Once through
the nostril, the tube was rotated 90° clockwise so the bevel faced
the epiglottis (minimizing hold up). Should hold up be experi-
enced the tube would have been rotated 180° anti-clockwise so
the bevel now faced the arytenoids: the next point of hold up.
Once the tube had entered the trachea, we con!rmed its position
visually before smartly removing the scope, allowing the patient
to breathe easily again as the oedematous airway had been com-
pletely occluded by the scope and tube. The anaesthetic circuit
with 100% oxygen at 15 litre min!1 was attached, bag movement
andmost importantly CO2 trace observed before anaesthesiawas
induced with propofol, and surgery commenced. The lowest re-
corded SaO2 during the procedure was 93%. I.V. dexamethesone
was administered.
Intraoperative management
The surgeons incised and drained the collections. The erythema
and induration on the anterior neck extended towards the ster-
noclavicular joints, its extent outlined with a marker pen. As air-
way oedema is expected to worsen in the !rst 12–48 h after
operation, we elected to keep him intubated and sedated. How-
ever, before transferring him to the critical care unit, we per-
formed a CT scan to exclude the diagnosis of mediastinitis
(suspected in view of the extensive cellulitis and the degree of
sepsis). No collection was seen.
Postoperative care
After operation, we closely monitored the airway by nasendo-
scopy and had a low threshold for re-imaging if considered ne-
cessary. Regular reviews were made of microbiology, surgical
drains, and whether all sources of infection had been removed.
The decision to extubatewas taken after 36 h once the airway oe-
dema had resolved. During the interim, great care was taken by
nursing staff to avoid accidental extubation.
Extubation strategy
Extubation can be considered as, if notmore, challenging than in-
tubation.19 Consideration was given as to where the extubation
should take place: critical care or the operating theatre? In our in-
stitution, critical care has the equipment and the personnel with
the experience to deal with a patient such as this. A Cook Staged
Extubation kit was utilized to facilitate blind reintubation as this
was an ‘at risk’ extubation according to the DAS guidelines.19
After siting the kit’s guide wire under direct vision with a !bre-
scope and preoxygenation, the patient was sat up and extubated
easily under remifentanil sedation (so that the patientwas awake
and tolerating the tube with appropriate re"ex suppression),
leaving the guide wire in place. The extubation was successful,
and the patient remained on the critical care unit for another
12 h with the staged extubation guidewire in situ before it was re-
moved and the patient discharged to the ward. Should the pa-
tient have required re-intubation, the Cook re-intubation
catheter would have been advanced over the guide wire into
the trachea and used as a bougie to facilitate rapid blind
reintubation.
Summary
Human factors are vital in the safe and successful management
of a patient presenting with an anticipated dif!cult airway for a
surgical procedure. Careful planning and preparation are essen-
tial and rely on an accurate history and examination supplemen-
ted by specialist imaging such as nasendoscopy. It is important to
determine the ‘best plan’ as sometimes there is only one plan.
A team brief allows all members to be aware of their roles and
responsibilities and to be on the ‘same page’ and this must be
multi-disciplinary. Clear communication is vital not only
with initial intubation but throughout the whole case with an
airway team leader coordinating activities and facilitating
decision-making.
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4.4  Human Factors in Complex Airway Gleeson S, Groom P, MERCER SJ. British 
Journal of Anaesthesia Education 2016; 16: 191-197 
 
4.4.1 Why this paper was written? 
I have previously outlined The Fourth National Audit Project of the Royal College of 
Anaesthetists (NAP4) which set out to examine major complications in airway management. 
Despite not being the primary intention, the reviewing panel concluded that poor human 
factors probably contributed to 40% of the cases reported. In 25% of these cases, inadequate 
human factors were felt to be a major contributor to a poor outcome (139). A further analysis 
concluded that there was probably an average of four human factors issues per reported case 
(65) which puts the importance of human factors into perspective. These findings demonstrate 
the importance of human factors in the management of the difficult airway in emergency 
anaesthesia and complex trauma and this is why I wanted to write an article to publicise and 
bring to the attention of anaesthetists working in centres in the United Kingdom who may come 
into contact and treat patients who have anticipated difficult airways. This was an invited peer 
reviewed article for the BJA Education Journal and I am the senior author. 
 
4.4.2 What was known at the time of writing? 
This article translates the knowledge that was previously recognised by creating guidelines 
for the management on penetrating airway injuries (113) and the systematic review into the 
management of non-iatrogenic airway trauma (95) that have been described already in this 
thesis. The ke  point is that the air a s described in this conte t are anticipated difficult 
air a s  and thus rel  on a different approach to their management. The concepts of 
leadership, teamwork and decision making are described with the roles of the team leader 
and individual team members. 
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4.4.3 Wha  he a e  added  c ib ed  he g ba  c i ica  c i ? 
 
Our current practice is to use a team brief to ensure that all team members have situational 
awareness at the start of the case and understand the mental model. The Aintree six-step 
approach to difficult airway management includes the following six questions and the use of a 
contingency table helps to consolidate ideas and formulate the plan and this is vital to 
communicating to the whole team the plan and mental model for each case. I have presented 
this work at the Difficult Airway Society Annual Scientific Meeting in December 2017; this is 
the largest difficult airway meeting in Europe attended by over 200 delegates. This work is 
also part of the Aintree Difficult Airway Management Course (ADAM Course), a nationally 
recognised difficult airway that trains up to 200 delegates per year and has been running for 
over 10 years. 
 Q1: How much time do I have?  no time, some time, adequate time 
 Q2: What access to the airway is available (nose, mouth, trachea)? 
 Q3: How compromised is the airway? 
 Q4: Which fascial spaces are involved? 
 Q5: Which management plan(s) best fits the circumstances?  
 Q6: Could I make the situation worse? If so, how?  
 
4.4.4 Where are we now? 
This article translates knowledge around human factors in anticipated difficult airway that was 
previously published in an original research article (113) and a systematic review (95). The 
concept of the anticipated difficult airway is potentially life threatening and requires exceptional 
human factors amongst the team leader and their followers with exemplary leadership, 
teamwork and decision making.  
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Human factors in contingency
operations
Simon J Mercer,1 MA Khan,2 T Scott,3 JJ Matthews,4 DCW Henning,5,6
S Stapley7
ABSTRACT
The UK Defence Medical Services are currently
supporting contingency operations following a
period of intensive activity in relatively mature
trauma systems in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Among the key lessons identi!ed, human
factors or non-technical skills played an
important role in the improvement of patient
care. This article describes the importance of
human factors on Role 2 A"oat, one of the
Royal Navy’s maritime contingency capabilities,
and illustrates how they are vital to ensuring
that correct decisions are made for patient
care in a timely manner. Teamwork and com-
munication are particularly important to ensure
that limited resources such as blood products
and other consumables are best used and that
patients are evacuated promptly, allowing the
facility to accept further casualties and there-
fore maintain operational capability. These
ideas may be transferred to any small specialist
team given a particular role to perform.
INTRODUCTION
A ‘contingency’ operation is de!ned in the
Oxford English Dictionary as ‘a future
event or circumstance which is possible
but cannot be predicted with certainty’
and described by a military author as ‘our
Forces training but not deploying’ on a
speci!c operation.1 The nature of these
future operations is currently unknown,
but it is likely to require UK Defence
Medical Services (DMS) personnel to
work in remote and austere environments
at different echelons of care. Those in sec-
ondary care will be deployed at either
Role 2 or Role 3 providing support to
127 Squadron (16 Medical Regiment),
Role 2 Land Based (in support of the
British Army and Royal Marines), Role 2
A"oat (R2A), Vanguard Role 3 Field
Hospital and the Primary Casualty
Receiving Facility (RFA ARGUS).
For more than a decade, the DMS was
operational in both Iraq (Operation
TELIC) and Afghanistan (Operation
HERRICK) with a busy caseload of
patients with complex trauma who suf-
fered predominately blast injuries from
improvised explosive devices and high-
energy ballistic injuries. The majority of
this caseload was managed in a mature
trauma system in a purpose-built facility
that was described as ‘exemplary’ by
external peer review.2 A number of
factors, including re!nement of surgical
techniques,3 the use of blood and blood
products,4 a damage control resuscitation
and damage control surgery (DCR-DCS)
sequence,5 administration of tranexamic
acid6 and advances in physician-led pre-
hospital care,7 all lead to a signi!cant
improvement in survival rates as the con-
"ict matured.8 It is also considered that
human factors played an important role in
the improvement in patient care.9
Deploying personnel underwent training
and rehearsal before leaving the UK on
the Military Operational Surgical Training
(MOST) Course10 and the Hospital
Exercise (HOSPEX), which was a macro-
simulation of the entire hospital unit per-
formed immediately prior to
deployment.11
Human factors are described as ‘enhan-
cing clinical performance through an
understanding of the effects of teamwork,
tasks, equipment, workspace, culture and
organisation on human behaviour and
abilities and application of that knowledge
in clinical settings’12 and also as ‘the cog-
nitive, social, and personal resource skills
that complement technical skills, and
contribute to safe and ef!cient task per-
formance’.13 The importance of human
factors on previous operations has been
described,9 14 as have some of the dif!cult
decisions that were experienced in this
environment.15 Human factors also refer
to team resource management and include
elements such as teamwork, leadership,
followership, communication and situ-
ational awareness with individual systems
developed for anaesthetists,16 surgeons17
and scrub practitioners.18 This paper con-
centrates on the importance of human
factors on a Role 2 A"oat (R2A) platform,
as the authors have considerable recent
experience in this environment, but the
concepts are readily transferable to other
small teams deployed either on military
contingency operations or on civilian dis-
aster relief settings.
ROLE 2 AFLOAT
The modern con!guration of R2A has
already been described19 and the compos-
ition of the team is noted in Box 1. The
anaesthetic20 and surgical21 aspects of the
R2A have also previously been described
in detail but essentially the available per-
sonnel allow damage control resuscita-
tion22 to be conducted within the con!nes
of their scaled equipment and drugs
(referred to as ‘the 370 module’ which is
adapted for the maritime environment). It
includes suf!cient team members to enable
consultant-delivered care to be achieved
for two seriously injured casualties arriving
at the same time with one surgical operat-
ing table and two critical care beds; this is
denoted by the con!guration 2-1-2 (two
emergency department bays, one operating
table, two critical care beds). It is key that
the deployed team support the emergency
Box 1 Con!guration of the Role 2
A"oat team
! Consultant in Emergency Medicine
! Emergency Medicine Nurse 1
! Emergency Medicine Nurse 2
! Emergency Medicine Nurse 3*
! Consultant Anaesthetist 1
! Consultant Anaesthetist 2
! Consultant General Surgeon
! Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon
! Operating Theatre Practitioner/Theatre
Nurse 1
! Operating Theatre Practitioner 2
! Operating Theatre Practitioner 3
! Biomedical Scientist
! Radiographer
! Critical Care Nurse 1
! Critical Care Nurse 2
! Critical Care Nurse 3
! Medical Assistant*
! ±Medical and Dental Servicing
Technician
*These personnel, along with a
nominated physician, also form the
Maritime In-Transit Care (MITC) team.
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medicine consultant who is the nominated
team leader with impeccable followership
de!ned as ‘the ability to effectively follow
the directives and support the efforts of a
leader to maximize a structured
organization’.23
WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES IN
WORKING ON ROLE 2 AFLOAT?
Clinical
The well-resourced complex trauma team
described in Camp Bastion Trauma
Hospital9 has been reduced in numbers
and thus team members are required to
undertake less familiar roles (eg, general
and orthopaedic surgeons are required to
perform a primary survey) and have
reduced rest periods when it is busy.
There is also the risk of clinicians becom-
ing isolated if they are the only person in
their particular !eld of expertise.
Personnel may not have deployed in this
environment before and may need to
prepare for short notice deployments,
perhaps without a predetermined end
date and with individuals they have not
worked with before.
In a resource-limited environment
(equipment, blood products, personnel,
space), there will be capacity, resilience
and ethical implications attached to clin-
ical decisions that were previously not
encountered. Early decision making on
where and how the patient will be evacu-
ated is important to ensure that they
receive their ongoing and enhanced treat-
ment in a timely manner and that the
R2A facility is ready to receive more cas-
ualties if required. All clinicians have dif!-
cult decisions to make as offensive
operations may be compromised if the
medical facility cannot receive casualties.
The emergency physician has to decide if
and when to activate massive transfusion
protocols, how to manage more than two
casualties and be capable of leading mul-
tiple trauma resuscitations in different
locations within the medical complex.
The anaesthetists need to decide whether
a rapid sequence induction (RSI) of anaes-
thesia is required as, if undertaken, that
casualty will be a much greater burden
upon limited resources and will reduce
the number of personnel available for
other activities. The surgeons need to
decide if an operation is required and
when it is required: with limited surgical
sets, there must be an emphasis on life,
limb and sight-threatening injuries only. In
the event of multiple casualties requiring
surgery, then a decision will need to be
made as to which patient to operate on
!rst. This may mandate the use of the T4
(expectant) triage category in the UK or
friendly forces, which will be both a novel
and an emotionally challenging process.
Equipment
The equipment on R2A is made up of
those items present in the 370 A"oat
module and thus there is no CT scanner
or near-point testing of coagulation (eg,
RoTEM). This may require a change in
clinical practice, as investigations from
both of these were previously integral to
the DCR-DCS sequencing.5 Appreciation
of the limited available resources is
important: there is a limited stock of
blood products with an uncertain resup-
ply chain and surgical sets are also
limited, although sterilisable. The resource
constraint will require careful communica-
tion within the team facilitated by the
clinical director to ensure that ‘everyone is
on the same page’ and has equal situ-
ational awareness in terms of clinical
delivery and that those choices that are
made represent the best use of available
resources.
Patient pathway
Key human factors are present at almost
every stage of the patient pathway24 and
those pertinent to R2A are depicted in
Figure 1. Working in a maritime platform
adds its own integral problems such as a
moving ship, limited space, noise and also
the ship’s own power supply, which will
need to cope with high voltage equipment
such as the Dragon (Xography, UK) X-ray
machine. DMS personnel must also be
well versed in emergency actions onboard
such as !re !ghting and damage control.
Usually, noti!cation of a casualty will be
via a signal to the ship and a decision will
be made as to how the casualty will be
brought onboard. This will typically be
via a helicopter to the "ight deck but
could also be via a boat transfer or even
from within the ship in the case of an
onboard incident. The whole R2A
team will be activated at this point and
be briefed by the team leader.
Communication with the biomedical sci-
entist will occur at this point regarding
the potential issue of a ‘shock pack’:
locally, this will be two units of universal
donor packed red cells and two units of
universal donor fresh frozen plasma (FFP)
but a further issue can be made including
cryoprecipitate, if carried and required.
Following sanitisation of the patient
(removal of weapons by an onboard
reception team), the R2A team must care-
fully transfer the patient to the hospital
facility. In the emergency department,
immediate checks for signs of life, cata-
strophic haemorrhage and airway com-
promise are quickly completed before the
patient is handed over by the prehospital
team. Once complete, the primary survey
is undertaken by the team in their desig-
nated roles in a ABC format (catastrophic
haemorrhage, airway, breathing, circula-
tion25) coordinated by the team leader
who is responsible for maintaining and
updating the team’s situational awareness
(‘the perception of the elements in the
Figure 1 Human factors involved in the patient pathway on a R2A unit. Casualty movements
are shown in red and lines of communication in black. AT-MIST, Age, Time of Injury, Mechanism
of Injury, Injuries Sustained, Signs and Symptoms and Treatment Given.
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environment within a volume of time and
space, the comprehension of their meaning
and the projection of their status in the
near future26’). In situations where more
than one casualty requires surgery, emer-
gency department personnel must be pre-
pared to have a role in optimising their
condition with support from the intensive
care team as required. The resuscitation
bay and trauma team working is outlined
in Figure 2.
In order to optimise communication in
complex trauma, the ‘Trauma WHO’27
(Table 1) was developed. Once the
primary and secondary surveys are com-
plete and initial investigations are taken,
the ‘Command Huddle’ will take place.
Because of the limited space in the trauma
bay, all personnel will be able to hear this
important conversation where effectively
the lead clinicians plan the casualties’
ongoing treatment. This might entail a
primary transfer to intensive care to await
further transfer or if a surgical procedure
is required, then the patient will need to
be transferred into the operating theatre
and positioned on the operating table.
Prior to any further activity, the second
part of the Trauma WHO is undertaken
where the patient’s identity is con!rmed,
the mechanism of injury, injuries sustained
and relevant investigations repeated and
then the surgical and anaesthetic plans
stated. It is helpful to write down the sur-
gical plan on the white board in theatre
and the triggers to move from plan A to
plan B and plan C if this is appropriate.
Once surgery is underway, then regular
‘SIT-REPS’ are required. When this was
tested in a clinical operational environ-
ment,14 it was felt that these should only
be undertaken when there was new infor-
mation to share with the group and might
be at a frequency of every 10–30 min.
Recently, the mnemonic for the sit-rep has
been changed to STACK (Lt Col Harry
Pugh, Personnel communication)
(Table 2), as this is relatively easy to
remember. Following handover to critical
care, a debrief of the team will occur.
Once the patient has left the emergency
department, the emergency physician must
liaise with the ship or Battlestaff in order
to ensure appropriate signal traf!c has
taken place and that an appropriate Role 3
facility has been identi!ed. Timelines for
evacuation must be decided early and an
appropriate evacuation asset identi!ed.
The evacuation team can then be identi-
!ed, so they may begin their preparations.
To illustrate the importance of human
factors on a deployed R2A unit, two !c-
tional case scenarios are described
(Tables 3 and 4).
DISCUSSION OF CASE 1
On a deployed R2A platform, equipment
is limited: only essential modalities are
carried. With this scenario, there is a spec-
trum of clinical signs and symptoms
which largely depend on the exact
intra-abdominal injury, the evacuation
timeline, critical decision-making time-
lines and the casualty’s physiological
response to the injury.
There is no thromboelastrography avail-
able to determine the exact nature of any
potential coagulopathy and no platelets are
carried. Therefore, the clinicians are
limited to 1:1 resuscitation (packed red
blood cells (PRBC):FFP) with supplemen-
tation by cryoprecipitate and recombinant
factor VIIa. This is an important factor to
consider when dealing with such casualties
in a deployed environment as blood pro-
ducts will be limited and the resupply
chain may not be immediate. Provision
may have been made for an emergency
donor panel on the ship and this should be
activated as soon as possible.
Once it has been identi!ed that the cas-
ualty requires an operation, it is impera-
tive that no delays in care are made. The
priority in damage control resuscitation is
to use damage control surgery as a
haemorrhage-arresting manoeuvre while
restoring circulating volume. Constant
communication between the anaesthetist
and the surgeon is of paramount import-
ance to determine whether:
A. Surgical control of haemorrhage has
been achieved, allowing the anaesthe-
tist to volume resuscitate with blood
products.
B. Surgical control has been achieved,
but the patient is not responding to
physiological measures, that is, non-
surgical bleeding.
C. Surgical control cannot be achieved
and the patient’s physiological para-
meters are deteriorating, with increas-
ing demand of blood products.
Adherence to the Trauma WHO27 is
vital and regular ‘sit-reps’ will ensure that
all members of the team are aware of the
stage of DCR-DCS.
While surgery is underway, the emer-
gency medicine consultant will liaise with
the command of the ship as to how the
Figure 2 Role 2 A!oat trauma team working in the resuscitation bay on a maritime platform.
© Crown copyright 2016. Reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s
Stationery Of"ce/Queen’s Printer for Scotland and Ministry of Defence.
Table 1 The Trauma WHO
1 Command Huddle
2 SNAP Brief
3 SIT-REPS
4 Debrief
Table 2 Sit-rep mnemonic
S Systolic BP
T Temperature
A Acidosis
C Coagulation
K Kit (including blood products used)
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casualty is best evacuated. This is import-
ant for two reasons: the patient will
require further treatment in a Role 3 facil-
ity and, with a 2-1-2 con!guration, cas-
ualty throughput is hindered if evacuation
is delayed. It is important to decide who
will escort the patient as he will undoubt-
edly remain intubated and ventilated for
transfer. A physician-led transfer will
reduce the medical staff of the facility by
20% and will therefore have a signi!cant
impact on capability.
DISCUSSION OF CASE 2
This case illustrates a number of issues
when managing patients at Role 2 and
also in the maritime environment.
Potentially, if there was immediate onward
evacuation to a Role 3 facility available
with a reasonable transfer time, then this
patient may not have required any emer-
gent treatment at R2A and would bene!t
from direct transfer to Role 3 for de!ni-
tive treatment. In this situation, there is
no immediate transfer available, so treat-
ment is required at R2A. At Role 2, ‘less
is often more’ and it is important that the
limited resources are not taken up with
prolonged surgical procedures which are
not required at this echelon of care. In the
Command Huddle, the decision is made
to take the patient to theatre. The patient
initially is clinically stable although during
the SNAP Brief it is recognised that there
is potential for the patient to deteriorate,
in particular the potential for the develop-
ment of compartment syndrome is recog-
nised. The surgical plan is to use Plaster
of Paris to splint the fracture although the
team has been warned that external !x-
ation may be required.
It is important that there is constant
communication about evacuation plans
throughout as the need for a prolonged
hold of the patient may in"uence the sur-
geons’ decisions in theatre.
The patient is extubated postoperatively
as there is no reason to keep the patient
intubated for transfer. This also means
that there is no need for a physician to
accompany the patient during transfer
meaning that medical manpower will not
be compromised.
SUMMARY
The R2A environment provides a unique
maritime platform to allow consultant-
delivered damage control resuscitation and
surgery to be performed followed by trans-
fer to a higher echelon of care. We have
described how attention to human factors
is vital to ensure that both the correct deci-
sion is made for patient care in a timely
manner and that the facility remains oper-
ational. Such considerations are transfer-
able to any of the small teams in DMS
Table 3 A gunshot wound (GSW) to the abdomen in a UK serviceman
Background The R2A is accommodated in RFA MOUNTS BAY in support of an amphibious operation. It is supported by an allied nation Role 3 Hospital
that can be reached by a 1-hour flight. It currently has 11 damage control surgery surgical sets, 20 units of packed red blood cells (PRBC), 20
units of fresh frozen plasma and 10 units of cryoprecipitate. Six general damage control sets available which can address damage control
laparotomy, thoracotomy, vascular shunt or named vessel repair, stabilise pelvis and fasciotomise a limb with additional supplementary three
damage control surgery debridement sets and two damage control surgery neurosurgical sets.
Preparation Radio communication to RFA MOUNTS BAY Ops Room that a UK serviceman has sustained a GSW to the abdomen.
The R2A team is activated and assembles in the hospital facility.
The team is briefed by the team leader (emergency medicine consultant).
In view of the likelihood that damage control resuscitation will be required, an initial ‘shock pack’ is ordered (two PRBC and two FFP).
The Belmont Rapid Infuser and other equipment are prepared.
Handover of patient A—25 years
T—1700
M—GSW
I—wound in right iliac fossa; another wound in right upper back
S—HR 110 bpm, BP 90/60 mm Hg
T—one large bore cannula into right antecubital fossa, 500 mL crystalloid given, morphine 10 mg intravenously
Initial findings and initial
actions
Primary survey findings:
Airway patient; good bilateral air entry but decreased excursion on the right; generalised abdominal tenderness and peritonism; GCS 15;
temperature 35.1°C.
CXR—no pneumothorax seen on supine film.
Pelvis X-ray—normal.
Venous blood gas results—Hb 9.0 g/dL, pH 7.20, lactate 4.5.
Administration of co-amoxiclav 1.2 g, tranexamic acid 1 g, ketamine 20 mg.
Command Huddle Decision is made to undertake a trauma laparotomy.
Further four PRBC, four FFP and two cryoprecipitate requested.
Transfer to theatre
SNAP Brief
SNAP Brief
Patient identification and injuries verified. No identified projectile on X-ray, so tract will likely follow the trajectory between two wounds.
Likely colonic injury with possibility of renal, hepatic and diaphragmatic injury. May require large volume resuscitation if extensive solid organ
injury. Will require chest drain on right side.
Plan A: If colonic injury, irrespective of contamination, given blood loss and acidaemia, the bowel will be left in discontinuity with an open
abdomen until physiology corrected.
Plan B: As per plan A but with limited solid organ injury, requiring <4 units PRBC/FFP, then haemostasis to be achieved and packing
performed until physiology corrected.
Plan C: If extensive solid organ injury and likelihood of high volumes of PRBC, then revisit at 5 units PRBC transfusion, if ongoing bleeding
not amenable to surgical correction, then Command Huddle to discuss likelihood of survival.
Ongoing theatre progress Intubation—fentanyl 70 mg, ketamine 70 mg, rocuronium 70 mg.
Surgical findings
GSW through ascending colon with gross faecal contamination and a grade 2 renal laceration on superior pole of right kidney. Right
hemicolectomy performed and left in discontinuity. Right kidney explored, no intervention required. Open abdomen with ‘Opsite sandwich’.
Right-sided chest drain inserted—small amount of blood and air released. Diaphragmatic wound repaired.
Emergency medicine consultant liaises regarding evacuation of patient from R2A.
Transfer to critical care Packaging for transfer
FFP, fresh frozen plasma; RFA, Royal Fleet Auxiliary.
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required to undertake contingency opera-
tions. Consideration should be made by
medical planners on the individuals
present in the team as disruptive personal-
ities could destroy team dynamics.15
Teamwork and communication are par-
ticularly important to ensure that limited
resources such as blood products and
other consumables are not wasted and that
patients are evacuated to allow the facility
the opportunity to accept further casual-
ties. As the team leader, the emergency
medicine consultant is responsible for
maintaining situational awareness and
feeding back information to the whole
team in the emergency department. This
process is continued in theatre by adoption
of the Trauma WHO.27
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4.5.1 Why this paper was written? 
The medical facilities in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively well 
developed. Towards the end of 2012, the UK-DMS changed its focus to undertaking roles in 
contingency operations. The Oxford Dictionary definition of a contingency is a f e e en  o  
circumstance which is possible b  canno  be edic ed i h ce ain  another definition more 
pertinent to the militar  is planning, reorganising and training so that we are ready to deploy 
wherever and whenever to react across the full spectrum of operations from peace support 
including humanitarian aid to warfighting (140) . I have deployed operationally at short notice 
three times with a small surgical team on a Maritime Platform termed Role 2 Afloat (141), to 
the Philippians in 2013 (Operation PATWIN), the coast of Libya in 2016 (MNTS 16) and in 
support of troops in Bahrain in 2013. This article describes the concept of Role 2 Afloat and 
explains the importance of human factors in a small team, working with limited resources on 
a contingency operation. A knowledge transfer paper was required as the Defence Medical 
Services had shifted to contingency operations and it was important that lessons learnt in 
previous conflicts around human factors were translated into this new arena. 
 
4.5.2 What was known at the time of writing? 
The composition of the Role 2 Afloat Team is described in Table 4.1. I have previously 
published a paper on the Anaesthesia and Critical Care requirements of Role 2 Afloat (141) 
but for the purposes of this thesis the Role 2 Afloat is a small surgical team that operates from 
either the Aircraft Carrier (currently HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH II) or a Royal Fleet Axillary 
Platform such as RFA MOUNTS BAY. The team is on a period of readiness (I was on 48 hours 
notice to move  at various points in m  career) and can deplo  to an here in the orld and 
be ready to work operationally within 48 hours. The key differences to this team from others 
 181 
previously described are the limited personnel and resources with a set kit list from he 370 
mod le  and in essence this team is set up to deal with two seriously wounded casualties at 
any one time. The situation now is that mindsets must change and there is no longer plentiful 
blood and operating theatre equipment and beds to hold patients and so clinical decision 
making must focus on limited kit and equipment. These decisions are borne out in this paper 
with human factors playing an important role and two typical cases are used to illustrate this. 
Human Factors differences from that previous found in Camp Bastion are discussed in Table 
4.2. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1. The composition of the Role 2 Afloat Team 
 
 Consultant in Emergency Medicine  
 Emergency Medicine Nurse 1  
 Emergency Medicine Nurse 2  
 Emergency Medicine Nurse 3*  
 Consultant Anaesthetist 1  
 Consultant Anaesthetist 2  
 Consultant General Surgeon  
 Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon  
 Operating Theatre Practitioner/Theatre Nurse 1  
 Operating Theatre Practitioner 2  
 Operating Theatre Practitioner 3  
 Biomedical Scientist  
 Radiographer  
 Critical Care Nurse 1  
 Critical Care Nurse 2  
 Critical Care Nurse 3  
 Medical Assistant*  
 Medical and Dental Servicing Technician 
*These personnel, along with a nominated physician, also form the Maritime In-Transit Care 
(MITC) team.  
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Table 4.2 Differences from Camp Bastion (large mature trauma system) 
 
Significantly reduced 
number of personnel 
There were 6 Consultant Anaesthetists when I deployed 
to Camp Bastion and 2 consultants covering the Critical 
Care. 
 
Reduced personnel will lead to every member of the team 
being on call  to receive casualties all the time and could 
lead to fatigue. 
 
A small team can only look after a small number of 
patients safely. This unit is designed to look after two 
seriously injured casualties and so once they have arrived 
the facility is effectively closed and could impact on 
operational capability. 
 
Team members may be asked to undertake roles that 
they did not usually perform in Camp Bastion but that are 
in the competency base (e.g. performing the primary 
survey) 
 
Personnel could potentially become isolated if they are 
the only member of the team in their field of expertise (i.e. 
there is only one orthopaedic surgeon) 
 
Reduced equipment 
 
 
There is no CT Scanner. This was vital in Camp Bastion 
to determine injuries sustained and is an integral part of 
complex trauma management in the UK. Clinicians need 
to manage the patient without the aid of CT. 
 
There is no RoTEM. This limits decision making on the 
blood products that are required once there is control of 
bleeding. The facility does not carry platelets as their shelf 
life is only 7 days. 
 
There are only so many operating trays with the 
equipment required to conduct Damage Control Surgery. 
This limits the length of time the unit can remain active 
without the opportunity for resources to be resupplied 
 
Operations may be limited to life, limb and sight saving 
surgery.  
 
Decision making 
 
 
Ethical decisions may need to be made in view of limited 
equipment. 
 
Evacuation of patients  where to transfer to and at what 
point in the treatment pathway 
 
Conducting a rapid sequence induction and ventilating a 
patient carries a significant burden for the team 
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4.5.3 Wha  he a e  added  c ib ed  he g ba  c i ica  c i ? 
 
This paper was written at a time when the Defence Medical Services were moving from mature 
operations in Afghanistan into contingency operations throughout the world. It was important 
that those clinicians who would be deploying with the Defence Medical Services appreciated 
the difference in deploying to a very resource rich (personnel and equipment) location such 
as Afghanistan or Iraq and a resource poor deployment on for example a ship in the South 
Atlantic. Many of the ideas and mental models that were discussed and presented have now 
been taken on board by the three services (Royal Air Force, Royal Navy and British Army) on 
recent deployments, including to South Sudan in 2018 (91). An appreciation of the importance 
of human factors whist deployed on a contingency operation is extremely important and I was 
able to appreciate this first hand on deployments with the Role 2 Afloat team(141), a small 
surgical team deployed on a maritime platform. 
 
4.5.4 Where are we now? 
This article outlined the important human factors in a resource limited military maritime 
environment and used two case studies to describe the importance of human factors. Moving 
forward, the UK-DMS are now involved in several contingency operations and it is not 
expected that there will be the need for a mature trauma system as there was in Camp Bastion 
for the foreseeable future. This knowledge has been fed into the training system and formed 
a series of workshops to develop mental models prior to deployment. The Military Operational 
Surgical Training Course (94) has recently been relaunched with a new focus on 
contingencies. 
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Review Article
Followership in complex trauma
Sarah Fadden and Simon J Mercer
Abstract
Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the importance of human factors in complex trauma manage-
ment. A reorganisation of trauma services in England has led to the creation of Major Trauma Centres and Major Trauma
Collaboratives, with dedicated Trauma Teams. Much attention has been devoted to the role of team leader and lead-
ership skills, with the human factor concept of followership largely overlooked. This article examines the importance of
followership in the trauma team, scrutinising several different followership styles. Followership should be highlighted
during trauma team training, promoting the practice of good followership to support the team leader and improve
patient care.
Keywords
Followership, human factors, leadership, team work, trauma
Introduction
Human factors in healthcare in the United Kingdom
have been highlighted by the recent acceptance of
a National Quality Board concordat1 by several
UK bodies. One definition for human factors is ‘enhan-
cing clinical performance through an understanding of
the e!ects of teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace,
culture and organisation on human behaviour and abil-
ities and application of that knowledge in clinical
settings’,2 another is ‘the cognitive, social, and personal
resource skills that complement technical skills, and
contribute to safe and e"cient task performance’.3
Recommendations from seminal papers published at
the start of the 21st century4,5 were initially slow to be
adopted until several prominent cases6,7 demonstrated the
catastrophic e!ect of a human factors breakdown.
Reflection on recent conflicts in Iraq (OPERATION
TELIC) and Afghanistan (OPERATION HERRICK)
have highlighted the importance of human factors in
the management of complex trauma,8–10 which has also
been considered in civilian practice.11 Analysis of human
factors and non-technical skills in di!erent clinical sub-
specialties has led to the development of frameworks for
anaesthetics,12 surgery13 and scrub practitioners,14 with
much of this work stemming from the key team resource
management principles described by Gaba and Rall15
(Table 1). These principles can be applied to the develop-
ment of trauma teams that have evolved from the
reorganisation of trauma services in England.16
The trauma team is a resource-rich unit of individ-
uals from many sub-specialties (Table 2), which is
activated according to pre-determined criteria based
on the casualty’s mechanism of injury, injuries sus-
tained, anatomy and physiology (Table 3). Although
there is no published framework for trauma team
human factors, several of those already established
for other specialties can easily be adapted. The anaes-
thetist’s non-technical skills framework (ANTS)12 has
four separate behaviour categories, comprising task
management, team working, situational awareness
and decision-making (Table 4), all of which can be
applied in the trauma resuscitation setting. When
activated, the trauma team prepares to receive the
patient (including allocating roles and setting up equip-
ment), then co-ordinates activities and exchanges
information once primary survey of the casualty is
under way. Throughout, the team leader is responsible
for maintaining situational awareness and ensuring
robust decision-making, which culminates in a plan
for ongoing management, usually at the end of the sec-
ondary survey.
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Followership
One principle of team resource management that is
often overlooked is followership, although it is funda-
mentally important to the trauma team. Followership
describes a set of skills and behaviours that help to
Table 3. Trauma team activation criteria (from King’s College
Hospital, Major Trauma Service: Information for Members of the
Trauma Team).
1. Traumatic event and one of the following:
! Oxygen saturation <90%
! Systolic BP <90 mm Hg
! Respiratory rate <9 or> 29 breaths/minute
! GCS <14
2. Penetrating injury to
! Head
! Neck
! Chest
! Abdomen
! Pelvis
! All gunshot wounds
3. Fractures
! Open or depressed skull fractures
! Pelvic fracture
! Two or more proximal long bone fractures
! Flail chest
4. Traumatic amputation
5. Blast or crush injury
6 Major burns
! 10% total body surface area (but lower threshold in child or elderly)
! Combination of burns and trauma
7. Road traffic crash
! High speed crash (>30 mph) or pedestrian versus vehicle
at >20 mph
! Separation of rider and bike
! Intrusion into passenger compartment
! Ejection from vehicle
! Death in same passenger compartment
! Bull’s eyed windscreen
! 20 min extrication time
8. Falls
! Height of >3 m
! Paediatrics – consider the age and height of the child in relation to
the height fallen
9. HEMS transfer
10. Drowning/submersion
BP: blood pressure; GCS: Glasgow Coma Scale; HEMS: Helicopter
Emergency Medical Service.
Table 2. Composition of a typical National Health Service
(NHS) Major Trauma Centre Trauma Team.
Team member Designated role/responsibility
Emergency Medicine
Consultant
Team leader
Emergency Medicine
Registrar
Primary survey
Anaesthetist Airway management "/# central
venous access
Orthopaedic Surgeon Advice on orthopaedic and soft
tissue injuries
General Surgeon Advice on general trauma surgery
Operating Department
Practitioner (ODP)
Assistant to the anaesthetist
Scribe Recording of trauma bay activity
Emergency Department
Nurse 1
Checking of blood products and
administration via rapid infuser
Emergency Department
Nurse 2
Peripheral venous access
Runner Delivery of blood samples to, and
collection of blood products
from, the laboratory
Radiographer Portable X-rays (chest, pelvis) "/#
CT scans (all as required)
CT: computed tomography.
Table 1. Key Team Resource Management Principles as out-
lined by Gaba and Rall.15
! Know the environment
! Anticipate and plan
! Call for help early
! Exercise leadership and followership
! Distribute the workload
! Mobilize all available resources
! Communicate effectively
! Use all available information
! Prevent and manage fixation errors
! Cross (double) check
! Use cognitive aids
! Re-evaluate repeatedly
! Use good teamwork
! Allocate attention wisely
! Set priorities dynamically
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improve team performance.17 The term ‘follower’
itself often conjures up unfavourable images18 and
negative connotations,19 resulting in a degree of stig-
matisation.20 This is in stark contrast to the term
‘leader’ which may be perceived as more dominant,
and therefore a more prestigious and desirable role.
There are several definitions of the word ‘followership’
in the literature but, simply put, it implies people
having a shared vision of a common goal or future
state, and what needs to be done to reach it.21 It has
also been described as a process in which subordinates
recognise their responsibility to comply with the orders
of leaders and carry out those orders appropriately and
to the best of their ability or, in the absence of orders,
determine and perform the actions that will facilitate
the end objective.22 It is possible to view leadership and
followership as complementary, and two-way, rather
than dichotomous endeavours. Ideally, these roles
occupy a spectrum that represents the multidisciplin-
ary, yet convergent, experiences and activities of an
e!ective team. Describing the ‘Courageous Follower’,
Chale! defines followership as a discipline of support-
ing leaders and helping them to lead well. He makes the
point that followership is not submission, ’but the wise
and good care of leaders, done out of a sense of gratitude
for their willingness to take on the responsibilities of lead-
ership and a sense of hope and faith in their abilities and
potential’.23 So, followership is ‘the active engagement of
followers in helping the group achieve its goals’24 and
‘the ability to take direction well, to get in line behind a
program, to be part of a team and to deliver on what
is expected of you’.20 In the trauma setting, the
physiological state of the patient can fluctuate greatly,
necessitating rapid decision-making with regard to
administration of blood products and transfer of
the patient to the operating theatre, making support
of the trauma team leader (TTL) by their followers
essential.
Followership styles
An ideally functioning trauma team relies on good fol-
lowership. It is important that organisations are aware
of the di!erent follower styles that have been described
and that these are scrutinised during training serials,
in order to enable individuals to learn how best to sup-
port the TTL and their colleagues. Several di!erent fol-
lowership styles have been described which could be
applicable to the trauma team.
Robert Kelley
Kelley describes five di!erent followership styles25:
. The ‘Passive Followers’ (or the sheep) (1–2% of an
organization): They lack initiative and rely on the
leader to do all the thinking for them saying what
the leader wants to hear even to the point of with-
holding information. They go along with whatever
the leader decides, are quite passive and require con-
stant supervision.
. The alienated follower (15–25% of an organization):
They have very negative attitudes, fighting against
the team leader. They are thought of as hurt and
angry towards the system with the individual lashing
out whenever there is an opportunity.26 They do not
work in a team.
. The pragmatic follower (25–25% of an organization):
These followers are described as ‘sitting on the fence’
looking out for themselves and lack commitment,
preserving the ‘status quo’. They are also described
as performing required tasks, but remain sensitive to
internal politics and, consequently, do not take
strong positions within the group.
. Conformist follower (20–30% of an organization):
These followers lack creative thinking are happy to
take ordering and are ‘yes people’. They are
described as avoiding of perceived conflict, instead
existing just under the radar.
. Exemplary followers perform well in every aspect;
they actively engage with their leaders and their
environment and exhibit independent, critical think-
ing. They support the team and the leader and go
above and beyond what is required of them focusing
on the goal by taking initiative.
Table 4. The anaesthetists’ non-technical skills framework.12
Category Element
Task management Planning and preparing
Prioritizing
Providing and maintaining standards
Identifying and utilizing resources
Team working Coordinating activities with team members
Exchanging information
Using authority and assertiveness
Assessing capabilities
Supporting others
Situational
awareness
Gathering information
Recognizing and understanding
Anticipating
Decision-making Identifying options
Balancing risks and selecting options
Re-evaluating
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Ira Chaleff
Chale! describes the ‘Courageous Follower’27 formed
along two axis; those that have courage to support the
leader and those that have courage to challenge the
leaders’ behaviour or policies. There are four styles:
. Implementer – Described as dependable, considerate,
providing a very high level of support, but are less
willing to challenge.
. Partner – These followers fully support their leader
but are also ready and willing to challenge, if
necessary.
. Individualist – These followers tell their leader
exactly what they think and how they feel. They
are isolated and provide a low level of support to
the leader, often challenging them.
. Resource – These followers do the bare minimum
and although they are available to their leaders
they are not committed to them and rarely challenge.
Barbara Kellerman
Kellerman aligns followers on one axis; the level of
engagement and divides followers into five types
along this continuum from feeling and doing absolutely
nothing on the one end to being passionately com-
mitted and deeply involved on the other.28
. Isolate – Detached and do not care about the leader.
They leave it up to others to make their decisions as
they are uninterested and uninformed.
. Bystander -Disengaged and do not participate.
. Participants - These are some way engaged favouring
their leaders, the groups and organizations of which
they are members.
. Activists - They are eager, energetic and engaged,
investing themselves in the process, working hard
for the leader.
. Diehards - Truly devoted to the leader they are pre-
pared to die if necessary for their cause, whether an
individual, or an idea or both.
Followership in relation to the
trauma team
A modern trauma team in a Major Trauma Centre
(MTC) will be led by a Consultant, usually in
Emergency Medicine. One definition of a leader is
‘a person whose ideas and actions influence the thought
and the behaviour of others’,3 in a position to influence,
inspire and direct in order to attain a desired objective.
In terms of trauma, the aim is to receive, assess and
stabilise a casualty and move them to the next most
appropriate stage of their treatment pathway swiftly
and safely. Healthcare professionals who deliver care
to trauma patients have a responsibility to keep up-
to-date with training in the skills they are required to
perform.29 Following activation of the trauma team,
there will be a period of preparation of equipment
and personnel.30 Here, there is an opportunity to intro-
duce team members by their name, role and competen-
cies and brief the team based on the TTL’s mental
model of what they expect to happen. Once the team
has assembled they must remain in the trauma bay until
they are stood down by the TTL, reducing the chance
that problems will get missed or tasks left unfinished.
The team must be proactive and make good use of
the preparation time prior to the arrival of the casualty.
Equipment is checked and drugs are drawn by the
anaesthetist in the form of a pre-determined ‘wetpack’
of drugs, usually consisting of an induction drug
(ketamine), muscle relaxant (often rocurionium), anal-
gesic (fentanyl), antibiotics and tranexamic acid.31
The organisation of these drugs is particularly useful
in expediting the availability of the controlled drugs,
the signing out of which requires two members of desig-
nated clinical sta!. During this preparation phase,
anticipated clinical tasks are discussed, including con-
tingency plans for potential problems, such as which
team member would perform an emergency cricothyr-
oidotomy in the event that the patient has an airway
that cannot be intubated conventionally. It is important
to liaise with other hospital departments at this time,
such as radiology, emergency theatres and blood bank,
as their services may be required. Much of this clinical
heads-up is now performed automatically, without spe-
cific direction from the TTL, and is considered to be
one of the aspects of ‘good followership’ that enables
the trauma team to function so e"ciently. For example,
MTCs have a process termed ‘code red’ to enable blood
and blood products to be available prior to the casualty
arriving, based on information from the pre-hospital
team.32 A runner is sent to the laboratory to collect a
‘shock pack’ of blood products that are delivered a box
with a timer. It is vital that the TTL is made aware if
products are not required and can be returned to the
fridge within 30min of having been issued, thereby
maintaining their viability.
When the casualty arrives at the trauma bay, a five-
second check, similar to that described on the European
Trauma Course,33,34 is prompted by the TTL to
confirm that the patient is alive, does not have visible
catastrophic haemorrhage and has a patent airway.
Once this has been established, it is important that all
team members listen in silence to the handover from the
pre-hospital team, which is relayed using the mnemonic
age, time of injury, mechanism of injury, injuries
Fadden and Mercer 9
sustained, signs and symptoms and treatment given
(AT-MIST). By listening to, and understanding, the
handover everyone in the team should have a shared
mental model of the case, enabling them to work e!ect-
ively both on individual tasks and in support of the
wider team activities. Thereafter, the TTL has the role
of ensuring that members of the team continue to work
together synergistically, by providing regular situ-
ational updates (Sit-Reps). Once the patient has been
transferred to the trauma trolley, the primary survey is
conducted using a horizontal approach35 (many com-
ponents at the same time) in the catastrophic haemor-
rhage, airway/C-spine, breathing, circulation
(<C>ABC)36 format. This approach facilitates rapid,
almost concurrent, assessment and treatment of the
casualty, which is co-ordinated by the TTL and, at its
optimum, might be analogised to a well-drilled
Formula One pit stop.11 To enable e!ective communi-
cation, general noise levels must be kept to a minimum
and limited to the transfer of information between the
TTL and trauma team. Communication is also facili-
tated by a senior member of the team taking on the role
of the scribe and documenting the full sequence of
events. Many of these processes occur automatically,
and without the need for micromanagement by the
TTL, thereby demonstrating good followership. An
example of initial actions for a patient involved in a
motor vehicle accident is shown in Table 5.
Throughout, as far as possible, the TTL should
adopt a ‘hands o!’ role, as they are responsible for
maintaining the overall situational awareness of the
team. This TTL oversight allows other members of
the team to concentrate on their own roles, whilst
also preventing fixation errors, where a single problem
is focused on to the detriment of the casualty as a
whole.37 Once the secondary survey has been com-
pleted, it is important that the team are then able to
support the TTL with further decision-making. The
Defence Medical Services (DMS) have developed the
concept of the Command Huddle,9 whereby senior
members of the team collaborate in deciding the most
appropriate next stage of a casualty’s treatment. The
potential patient pathway is outlined in Figure 1:
. Is treatment futile? (not usually a considered option)
. If treatment is to continue then should the patient be
transferred directly to
! Computed tomography (CT) scanner (most
favourable option)
! Operating theatre
! Critical care (if CT and surgery have already
occurred at a Trauma Unit and patient physi-
ology is not impaired)
! Trauma ward
! Another facility with specialist care
. If immediate transfer to the operating theatre is
required, then which theatre has been allocated in
the hospital? What equipment is required and
which body cavity is to be opened first?
. Does the patient require a rapid sequence induction
of anaesthesia (RSI) prior to theatre and, if so, in
which location is it safest to perform?
An organisation requires far more good followers to
meet its objectives than it does leaders.38 However, in
addition to demonstrating attributes such as a strong
work ethic, competence, honesty, courage, discretion,
loyalty and ego management,20 good followers also
Table 5. Initial management tasks performed by the trauma
team when receiving a casualty from a major motor vehicle
accident.
Primary survey <C> ABC
Cervical spine immobilisation (if not already performed)
Pelvic binder secured
Peripheral intravenous access established
Blood samples taken for
" Thromboelastometry (RoTEM!)
" Full blood count
" Group and save
" Urea and electrolytes
" Venous blood gas
" INR (if patient takes warfarin)
Chest and pelvic digital X-rays (reported by consultant radiolo-
gist and viewed by trauma team clinicians)
Rapid sequence induction (by anaesthetist and ODP if required)
" Ketamine 1–2 mg/kg (#/$ Fentanyl 1–3mg/kg)
" Rocuronium 1 mg/kg
Insertion of a trauma line if indicated (usually in the Subclavian
Vein)
Connection of rapid infusion device and commencement of
haemostatic resuscitation
Additional drugs administered
" Ketamine (for sedation)
" Fentanyl
" Neuromuscular blocking drug (Rocuronium)
" Tranexamic acid 1 g (15 mg/kg)
" Tetanus vaccination
" Antibiotics
" Calcium chloride (10 ml of 10%) (monitor ionised calcium)
Commencement of activing warning (using BairHuggerTM)
<C>ABC: catastrophic haemorrhage, airway/C-spine, breathing, circula-
tion; ODP: operating department practitioner.
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engage actively in their endeavours and think for them-
selves.25,27,39 In the trauma team, this may manifest in
challenging the TTL, when appropriate. Complex
trauma can present multiple di!erential diagnoses and
treatment priorities, and failure on the part of a team
worker to challenge an erroneous TTL decision may
lead to adverse outcomes.40,41 Kelley describes a crucial
aspect of followership as ‘the ability to make ethical
and legal judgments, to take proactive steps to promote
ethical and legal activities and then to stand up against
unethical and illegal decisions’.42 Erroneous decisions
can remain unchallenged, not because of a failure
to notice that the decision is wrong, but because of
reluctance to challenge the leader,43 and it is important
to address why a member of the trauma team might feel
this – perhaps, in part, due to the hierarchical nature
of the medical profession.44 So-called ‘compliant fol-
lowers’ do not challenge,45 whereas ‘responsible fol-
lowers’ have the interpersonal skills to challenge
authority and decision-making in a way that will not
create a defensive or risk-averse culture.45
Conclusions
The trauma team in a MTC is a resource-rich unit made
up of a multi-disciplinary team under the direction
of a TTL. In e!ect, everyone on the team is a follower
and so should be encouraged to display the character-
istics ascribed to a ‘good follower’. This will enable the
TTL, with the team, to assess and stabilize a casualty
rapidly, and to determine e!ectively the next appropri-
ate intervention. Those in senior positions should be
encouraged to identify di!ering followership styles
and aim to use training sessions (particularly with
fully immersive simulation) to explore the values indi-
viduals bring to the trauma team in order to encourage
exemplary followership.
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4.6.1 Why this paper was written? 
Followership is often over looked at as a non-technical skill in favour of leadership. An example 
of this is that an www.amazon.co.uk search of leadership books produced over 100,000 
choices compared to just 269 books on followership2. There is perhaps a degree of stigmatism 
(142) and negative connotations (143) when compared with leadership, but followership is 
vital and underpins the functioning of the complex trauma team. This article summarises 
several current followership theories and outlines different types of followers. This information 
is important when trauma teams are constructed or where individuals look at their own 
behaviours as part of the trauma team. A knowledge translation paper was required as this 
field of human factors is often neglected, and it was important that all members of the trauma 
team were aware of the vital roles that they played by appreciating the importance of good 
followership. 
 
 
4.6.2 What was known at the time of writing? 
Followership describes a set of skills and behaviours that help to improve team performance 
(144). It is also described as people having a shared vision, of a common goal or future state, 
and what needs to be done to reach it (46). Followership is also a process in which team 
members recognise their responsibility to comply with the orders of leaders and carry out 
those orders appropriately and to the best of their ability or, in the absence of orders, 
determine and perform the actions that will facilitate the end objective (145). Chaleff describes 
follo ership as the active engagement of follo ers in helping the group achieve its goals  
 
2 Amazon.co.uk search performed on 21 January 2019  
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(146) and in his book, the Courageous Follo er  (147) describes four styles of followership 
which are outlined in the paper 
 Implementer  
 Partner  
 Individualist  
 Resource 
Robert Kelle s describes five different st les of follo ership (148)  
 The Passive Follo ers  (or the sheep) 
 The alienated follower  
 The pragmatic follower 
 Conformist follower  
 Exemplary followers 
Barbara Kellerman also describes five different types of followership (149).  
 Isolate  
 Bystander 
 Participants  
 Activists  
 Diehards  
It is important for those who train and develop complex trauma teams to be aware of the 
different styles of followership that exist to allow teams to practice and be aware of where they 
fit into them. 
 
 
 
4.6.3 Wha  he a e  added  c ib ed  he g ba  c i ica  c i ? 
This article outlines a trauma call, but this time focuses of the elements of followership that 
ensure its smooth running. In many respects a follower is someone who is proactive, a team 
member who gets on with what needs doing without always being instructed to do so by the 
trauma team leader. They also work to support and assist the trauma team leader at every 
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opportunity with the mindset that everyone is working towards the same goal; the patient. 
Specific examples of how this works in clinical practice are described below in Table 4.3 
Table 4.3  Specific examples of followership within the trauma team. 
Preparing to receive a 
patient 
Members of the trauma team set about to prepare for the 
arrival of the patient this period of time whilst the patient is 
on route to the hospital is vital in terms of smooth 
progression of the trauma team.  
This process involves preparing specific equipment and 
drawing up drugs that will be required 
Communicating with other agencies in the hospital, e.g. the 
operating theatre, radiology and transfusion 
Discussing contingency planning amongst the team 
 
Handover 
 
Listening to the AT-MIST handover so that all team 
members are on the same page  and can adhere to the 
mental model of the trauma team leader. Team members 
will not be in a position to demonstrate good followership if 
they are not clear on the circumstances or mechanism of 
injury. 
 
Primary Survey 
 
Ensuring good communication with the trauma team leader 
so that they are aware of the initial physiology and 
examination 
Allowing the primary survey to be conducted rapidly with a 
horizontal approach. 
The trauma team lead has the role of piecing together all 
the clues and this gathering of information is the first stage 
of situational awareness. This is then shared with the rest 
of the trauma team during a situational update (or Sit-Rep 
in the military) 
 
Command Huddle 
 
Advising on the next stage of patient treatment 
The command huddle is an important vehicle to enable 
shared robust decision making and ensuring that the 
patient is moved to the right area at the right time. Members 
of the command huddle (14) bring their strengths and 
expertise to the table and guide the trauma team leader on 
the best course of action. 
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Kelley described a crucial aspect of followership as he abili  o make e hical and legal 
judgments, to take proactive steps to promote ethical and legal activities and then to stand up 
again  ne hical and illegal deci ion  (150). This highlights the need to create a culture where 
team members are comfortable with challenging the trauma team leader if necessary. 
Erroneous decisions can remain unchallenged, not because of a failure to notice that the 
decision is wrong, but because of reluctance to challenge the leader (68). So-called compliant 
follo ers  do not challenge (151), hereas responsible follo ers  have the interpersonal skills 
to challenge authority and decision-making in a way that will not create a defensive or risk-
averse culture (151). Our previous work on junior members challenging senior members of 
the team (70) ties in with what has been described around followership and we look to highlight 
this in trauma team training at our institution (8). 
4.6.4 Where are we now? 
 
This paper outlines current theories on followership and describes these principles in the 
context of the complex trauma team. It is clear that the function and success of the trauma 
team relies on the followership of the team members to complement the trauma team leader. 
Training the trauma teams should focus on followership and create a culture that allows 
participation and challenging of erroneous decisions. 
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Section 5  
 
Contribution of the Thesis to 
Knowledge and Implications 
of the Thesis 
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5.1 Contribution of the Thesis to Knowledge 
 
This thesis describes original research investigating the perceived barriers to junior 
anaesthetists challenging their consultants when they are concerned that an error has 
occurred. This knowledge has led to an enhanced appreciation of what worries or indeed 
motivates junior colleagues to challenge their seniors. A previous lack of challenging in high 
profile cases has led to serious patient safety issues [27] when ultimately the correct challenge 
could have prevented mistakes from occurring. This additional knowledge is now incorporated 
into regional teaching in the Mersey Anaesthesia rotation for novice trainees with the intention 
to ensure they are comfortable with challenging from an early stage of their career [154] and 
raised the profile of challenging in the Anaesthesia community. This is demonstrated by the 
original knowledge paper [70] now being cited 28 times in the medical literature.  
 
The Trauma WHO  [14], a tool to improve communication during damage control resuscitation 
[64] has been described and then subsequently tested and refined in an operational military 
field hospital [42]. This process consists of an initial command huddle  here earl  decisions 
are made b  senior members of the trauma team, a snap brief  prior to surger  commencing 
hich ensures all members of the team are on the same page  and regular sit-reps  hich 
are effectively situational updates occurring throughout the surgery. The pneumonic STACK 
[86] has been adapted to provide a rapid exchange of information between the surgical and 
anaesthetic teams to ultimately determine the length of time it is permitted to remain on the 
operating table based on the patient s ph siolog ; particularl  acidosis, h pothermia and 
coagulopathy. 
 
Finally, this thesis concentrates on the management of the anticipated difficult airway, 
particularly in penetrating trauma. This topic may at first appear to concern a technical skill, 
however the expert and successful management of complex airway issues require exceptional 
human factors [96] and patient harm has occurred where human factors have been suboptimal 
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[139]. This thesis has described original research in the creation of guidelines for the 
management of penetrating airway trauma [113] and then developed this knowledge further 
by means of a systematic literature review [95] to create a series of flow diagrams to 
encourage anaesthetists working in the frontline to develop their own mental models to deal 
with this rare but potentially hazardous condition. 
 
 
5.2 Implication of the Thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis was to describe recent advances in human factors in complex trauma 
and emergency anaesthesia with a view to informing all members of the multi-disciplinary 
trauma team working in the frontline in major trauma centres in England [6]. As an active 
consultant trauma anaesthetist, I am passionate that my patients receive the highest quality 
of care from point of wounding to rehabilitation and this requires timely robust decisions to be 
made and executed by the team to allow the patient to move safely to the next stage of their 
pathway. Analysis of trauma care in the military setting [5] and more recently the reorganised 
regional civilian trauma centres [2] has led to discussions that noticeable improvements are 
not just due to advances in surgical or anaesthetic techniques but to the appreciation of the 
role of human factors amongst members of the trauma team [86]. 
 
 
The original knowledge created, synthesised and described in this thesis concerning human 
factors in complex trauma and emergency anaesthesia has now been transferred and 
exchanged into the frontline. The implications of this thesis are therefore in the impact that this 
additional knowledge and knowledge translation has had in the frontline. During the recent 
COVID-19 pandemic, I have personally witnessed two episodes of patient care that have 
directly benefited resulting from training the team using the principles outlined in this thesis. 
These are described as follows 
 
a) A young lady (early twenties) was admitted as a Code Red Trauma Call [63] following 
self-inflicted penetrating trauma to the neck with the stem of a broken wine glass. This 
case was managed using the principles described in the thesis on the importance of 
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human factors when managing the anticipated difficult airway [96] and used a mental 
model developed in the systematic review [95]. Placement of the endotracheal tube 
was confirmed to be in the correct place under direct vision with a fiberoptic 
laryngoscope and potentially catastrophic surgical emphysema was avoided. 
b) A middle-aged man (mid-fifties) was admitted as a Code Red Trauma Call [63] having 
been run over by a train. He suffered life changing injuries to his left arm and leg and 
arrived at the trauma centre hypothermic, acidotic and coagulopathic. The principles 
of The Trauma WHO  [14] ere used throughout this case. A command huddle  
performed at the end of the primary survey [63] determined that this patient required 
immediate surgery to stop catastrophic haemorrhage and he was transferred to the 
operating theatre ithin 5 minutes. Follo ing a snap brief  involving three separate 
surgical teams, surger  commenced ith regular sit-reps  ever  10-15 minutes 
resulting in a total operating time of eight-five minutes. The patient left the operating 
theatre and was then transferred via CT-scanner to critical care with normal physiology 
and coagulation. This was a very successful execution of damage control resuscitation 
[64] 
 
 
 
Finally, the principles of human factors in complex trauma are firmly embedded into the 
Defence Medical Services. Knowledge translation papers have described the importance in a 
mature field hospital [86] and also within a small team on a contingency operation [141] in 
addition to the importance of followership amongst the team [49]. These are discussed in small 
group workshops and practiced using high fidelity simulation on the Military Operational 
Surgical Training Course [94] to ensure that all members of the team are prepared to deal with 
complex trauma patients should the need arise. Recent operations in support of the United 
Nations Mission in South Sudan [155] have reported the value of using the principles of The 
Trauma WHO  [14] successfull  in another militar  arena. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
I am passionate about the importance of human factors in healthcare and the goal of my work 
has been to implement human factors into military and civilian trauma teams to improve patient 
outcome. I have described how outcomes in military (5) and civilian (2) practice have improved 
over the last 10 years; and I strongly believe that this is not just down to advances in surgical 
and anaesthetic management but due to improvements in human factors and this opinion is 
shared by others (92). I have established myself as an invited national speaker and reviewer 
in the peer review process for several international journals including the British Journal of 
Anaesthesia. I continue to publish in the field of human factors and my publications are listed 
in chronological order in Appendix 1. 
 
On pages 8-9, I stated that the aim of this thesis was to demonstrate that I have a systematic 
acquisition and understanding of a substantial body of knowledge and am at the forefront of 
an area of professional practice; human factors in complex trauma and emergency 
anaesthesia. This thesis has described and demonstrated some of the work that I have 
undertaken to generate knowledge through original research, by synthesising knowledge 
through systematic review and finally by the translation of knowledge through the production 
of expert articles. This statement was made in cognisance of the statement by the QAA (2011) 
Doctoral Degree Characteristics that Doctoral degrees are awarded to students who have 
demonstrated: 
 the creation and interpretation of new knowledge, through original research or other 
advanced scholarship, of a quality to satisfy peer review, extend the forefront of the 
discipline, and merit publication 
 a systematic acquisition and understanding of a substantial body of knowledge which is at 
the forefront of an academic discipline or area of professional practice 
 the general ability to conceptualise, design and implement a project for the generation of 
new knowledge, applications or understanding at the forefront of the discipline, and to 
adjust the project design in the light of unforeseen problems 
 a detailed understanding of applicable techniques for research and advanced academic 
enquiry. 
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The original research that was described in Section 2 centred around 3 different sub-topics 
 The barriers to challenging seniors or to Speak Up  
 The testing and implementation of a communication tool in complex trauma  The 
Trauma WHO  
 Reviewing potential guidelines for the management of the airway in trauma 
 
The systematic reviews in Section 3 explored further the management of the airway in complex 
trauma and suggested specific mental models for anaesthetists orking on the shop floor  
when presented with a patient with blunt or penetrating trauma to the airway or severe burns. 
In the second systematic review human factors were explained in the context of several recent 
national audits from the Royal College of Anaesthetists. 
In Section 4, I specifically selected five articles to describe the importance of human factors in 
different clinical situations ranging from a mature field hospital, a civilian trauma centre and a 
small team deployed at sea with limited resources. 
All the papers I have presented, I feel, demonstrate the achievement of the above criteria for 
a Doctoral Degree via Publication (Route 2) and demonstrated that I have a systematic 
acquisition and understanding of a substantial body of knowledge and am at the forefront of 
an area of professional practice. I have also summarised the range of research skills in terms 
of data collection, data analysis, knowledge synthesis and knowledge translation that these 
papers encompass. In my role as Director of Medical Education at Liverpool University 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust I now use this knowledge to train trauma teams using high-
fidelity simulation and have noticed improvements in our own results, particularly in the rapid 
progress of patients to CT Scan and the operating theatre when indicated. This is 
demonstrated in our routine submissions of trauma data to the Trauma Audit and Research 
Network. 
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I have described in each section he e e a e no  following each publication. In terms of 
challenging seniors there has been further work following on from my study looking at the 
importance of challenging on the Intensive Care Unit (152) and for other member of the team 
in the Operating Theatre (78). There has also been further work around challenging behaviour 
in novice anaesthetists (153). I have developed several high fidelity simulation scenarios that 
are part of the Emergencies in Anaesthesia Course (154) undertaken by all 1st year 
anaesthetic trainees in my region and these are mapped to the curriculum of the Royal College 
of Anaesthetists. I intend to publish the effectiveness of these scenarios in the future. 
 
The Trauma WHO  has been adopted universall  in the UK-Defence Medical Services, but 
only by several centres in England. This has been where there are champions and usually 
where there is a Military contingent of clinicians. The articles published on this topic have been 
cited in the medical literature but in future I would try to involve more active marketing of this 
concept using social media in addition to talking at national meetings. Often new concepts 
such as the Trauma WHO  are slo  to be adopted and when imposed on clinicians are often 
resented as I have witnessed myself with the blanket introduction of WHO Checklist (103). 
Further evidence for the effectiveness of the Trauma WHO  could be achieved b  organising 
a multi-centre observational study and comparing the mortality for matched trauma patients in 
units that have implemented the Trauma WHO  ith those that do not et use it. This future 
research could persuade others to adopt a safety checklist that my teams find very effective. 
Patient safety is now high on the agenda with the recent launch of the NHS Patient Safety 
Strategy(155) which covers three strategic aims:  
 Improving understanding of safety by drawing intelligence from multiple sources of 
patient safety information 
 Equipping patients, staff and partners with the skills and opportunities to improve 
patient safety throughout the whole system 
 Designing and supporting programmes that deliver effective and sustainable change 
in the most important areas  
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I will continue to engage with this renewed focus on patient safety and human factors in the 
NHS and continue to champion the importance of human factors in complex trauma and 
emergency anaesthesia. 
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Appendix 3   
Summary of Tables 
 
Table 1.1 Crew Resource Management Key Principles taken from reference (33). Know 
the environment.  
Table 1.2 The Anaesthetists Non-Technical Skills Framework consists of four categories 
all containing specific elements (34) 
Table 1.3 Trauma team activation criteria (taken from Kings College Hospital London, 
Major Trauma Service: Information for Members of the Trauma Team)  
Table 1.4 The composition and roles of a Complex Trauma Team at a typical Major 
Trauma Centre in England 
Table 2.1  Previously reported barriers to challenging 
Table 2.2 Publications citing Beament T, Mercer SJ. Speak Up! Barriers to Challenging 
Erroneous Decisions of Seniors in Anaesthesia. Anaesthesia 2016; 71: 1332
1340 
 
Table 2.3 Publications citing Human Factors in Decision Making in Major Trauma in 
Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. Arul S, Pugh H, Mercer SJ, Midwinter M Annals 
of The Royal College of Surgeons of England 2015; 97: 262-268  
 
Table 2.4 Publications citing Creating Airway Management Guidelines for Casualties with 
Penetrating Airway Injuries Mercer SJ, Lewis SE, Wilson SJ, Groom P, 
Mahoney PF. Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2010; 156: S357-362  
 
Table 2.5 Articles citing Human Factors in Preventing Complications in 
Anaesthesia. Jones CP, Fawker-Corbett J, Groom P, Morton B, Lister 
C, Mercer SJ. Anaesthesia 2018; 73(S1): 12-24  
 
Table 3.1  Articles citing A Systematic Review of The Anaesthetic Management of Non-
Iatrogenic Acute Adult Airway Trauma. Mercer SJ, Jones CP, Bridge M, 
Clitheroe E, Morton B, Groom P. British Journal of Anaesthesia 2016: 117 
(S1): i49 i59 
Table 3.2 Specific Examples of Human Factors in Trauma Calls  
Table 4.1 The composition of the Role 2 Afloat Team 
 
Table 4.2  Differences from Camp Bastion (large mature trauma system) 
Table 4.3  Specific examples of followership within the trauma team. 
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Appendix 4  
Summary of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Plot of predicted probability of survival by NISS value for each year. Shaded 
regions indicate the 95% CIs for the predicted values obtained from the 
logistic regression model  - J Trauma Acute Care Surg. 2015;78: 1014-1020 
 
Figure 1.2  Position of the Trauma Team Leader during a Trauma Call. (Photo courtesy 
of Dr Mark de Rond) 
Figure 1.3 Position of the Trauma Team Leader during a Trauma Call to maintain 
Situational Awareness.  
Figure 1.4  The Three Stages of Situational Awareness in a Trauma Setting 
 
Figure 1.5  Causes of injury deaths worldwide. (Adapted from World Health Organization. 
Injuries and violence: the facts. Geneva: WHO; 2010) 
 
Figure 1.6  New Injury Severity Score (NISS) associated with 50 % chance of survival 
following injury. Data applies to casualties treated by the UK DMS during a 
period of the Afghanistan conflict (2003 2014) and shows the improvement in 
survival rates associated with the development of the trauma service 
 
Figure 1.7  Trends in odds of surviving major trauma: April 2008 March 2017. Hospitals 
ith consistent submissions. ISS  9, missing GCS imputed.  
Figure 1.8  Infographic of a typical trauma call. Mercer SJ, Kingston EV, Jones CPL. The 
Trauma Call. British Medical Journal 2018; 361: 410-413 
Figure 1.9  Patient Pathway leading to CT Scan and then Operating Theatre 
 
Figure 1.10  Patient Pathway leading to direct transfer to the Operating Theatre 
 
Figure 2.1  Thematic network diagram of barriers to challenging seniors 
 
Figure 2.2  Model of Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
Figure 3.1  A trauma team at a trauma call will initially behave in the same manner as a 
Formula One Pit Crew. There are several sub-teams in operation. 
 
Figure 3.2  Trauma Team Members undertaking the primary survey using a horizonal 
approach to activity. 
 
Figure 3.3  Position of team in the operating theatre. The Lead Anaesthetist is 
maintaining situational awareness 
 
